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The examiners suggested the following additions to this thesis: 
p.3, after heading "SCOPE OF STUDY" 
A simple search for terms like "currency unification" or "currency union" in 
literature database like EconLit can clearly indicate how extensive the literature 
is. In paliicular, a number of criteria or dimensions have been rai sed in the 
literature for assessing whether the economies in concern constitute an optimal 
currency area (see Chapter 3). For a given time limit, incorporating more 
dimensions in the analysis will inevitably compromise the depth of investigation 
for each dimension. Being aware of this tradeoff, this thesis focuses on eclectic 
issues that are of particular relevance to Hong Kong and China. These issues are 
chosen either because the monetary union literature is yet to cover them, or 
because there are substantial room for extension. Nevertheless, in order to 
maintain the comprehensiveness of this thesis, many studies that cover other 
dimensions are discussed wherever appropriate. Results of related empirical 
studies are also reviewed in order to complement the findings of this thesis. 
p.88, after line 22 "prove the transmission mechanism." 
Possible transmission channels between the two economies include investm ent 
and trade (see section 2.4). Suppose an upbeat assessment of economic prospect 
stimulates an investment bloom and thus an output ri se in China. The positive 
assessment of China's economy is likely to trigger a similar sentiment in Hong 
Kong due to foreseeable demand from China for Hong Kong's middleman 
services. As a result, investment wi II expand in Hong Kong too. [n this case, the 
supply shocks upon the two economies are correlated but with a lag. A case to 
demonstrate this relationship is the impact of Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in 
early 1992. The tour stirred up not only the then depressed Chinese economy, but 
also the stock and property markets in Hong Kong (see section 6.2.1.2). 
p.158, after the heading "ANALYTICAL RESULTS" 
The model laid down in section 5.4 can be used to analyze the interrel ation 
between trade structure and the choice of nominal anchor. In general, the impact 
of an exogenous shock upon the entrepot A changes with its choice of nom inal 
anchor and the nature of the shock. Nevertheless, the impact changes also with 
the structure of the entrepot's trade regime. It is demonstrated below that, certain 
trade structures can reduce the difference between the impacts under different 
nominal anchors. That is, specific trade structures can lessen the importance of 
choosing the '·right" nom inal anchor, especially when there is uncertainty abellt 
the nature of d isturbances . 
Typos 
p.50 line 4 
" ... this popular Hong Kong say ing .. " should be read " ... thi s popular Hong Kong 
saying.". 
p.226 equation (7 .1 c) 
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p.22S equation (7.2h) 
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(I" + 15H) should be read (r + 15H) . 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a collection of essays on the exchange rate arrangement of Hong Kong, 
focusing on the feasibility of unifying the Hong Kong dollar with the Chinese currency, 
renminbi. 
The analytical framework of the thesis is founded on the theories of optimum currency 
area (OCA). Using a structural vector autoregression modeling technique, it found that 
the disturbances experienced by certain European countries are more correlated than 
those experienced by Hong Kong and China. However, if a two-quarter transmission 
time lag is allowed, the correlation of disturbances between Hong Kong and China 
becomes comparably significant. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that, as 
the two economies are of diverse economic structures, they are unlikely to be hit by 
symmetric shocks, although, through their deep economic linkages, disturbances are 
transmitted from the big economy China to the small economy Hong Kong. 
Furthermore, the more open and developed Chinese provinces around the coast, such as 
Guangdong, are more correlated with Hong Kong than are their inland counterparts. 
Not only are China and Hong Kong found to not meet OCA criteria, but China also 
fails. Attributed to local protectionism, a single market has not yet formed amongst 
Chinese provinces . In terms of symmetry of disturbances, Chinese provinces are not as 
correlated as their European and American counterparts. Only one group of eastern 
provinces are found to be consistently strongly correlated. This suggests that treating 
China as an integrated economy could be misleading at both the micro and macro 
levels, and casts doubt on the effectiveness of using uniform monetary policies to 
manage the business cycles of all provinces . 
While this thesis has largely benefited from the literature of European Monetary Union 
(EMU), it goes beyond that to address unique and important issues in the context of 
Hong Kong-China but not so much for the EMU. 
The first issue of this kind to be considered is the influence of entrepot trade in the 
choice of monetary standard for small open economies. A theoretical three-country 
model is used to demonstrate that trade structure can substantially change the impact of 
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exogenous shocks on a small economy. More importantly, it is shown that the current 
structure of indirect trade between the United States (US), Hong Kong and China could 
reduce the opportunity cost of choosing between the US dollar and the renminbi as the 
nominal anchor for the Hong Kong dollar. The result undermines the net gain, if any, of 
switching the monetary standard of Hong Kong from the US dollar to the renminbi. 
The second special issue to be examined is the interrelations between exchange rate 
arrangements, property markets, and the rest of the economy. A partial equilibrium 
analytical model and a general equilibrium simulation model are constructed to capture 
various institutional features of Hong Kong's property markets. It is established that the 
real impacts of monetary shocks on property markets are more prolonged than those on 
non-durable goods markets. Consequently, a fixed exchange rate regime, in general, 
exacerbates the business cycles of property markets and the economy as a whole. The 
simulation results indicate the attempt of the Hong Kong government to stabilize 
property prices during the Asian crisis, by suspending land disposal , might come at a 
cost of delaying economic recovery. The finding highlights the following dilemma: On 
the one hand, monopolistic control over land resource has opened up opportunities for 
the Hong Kong government to engage in supply side macroeconomic management, 
especially when the monetary instrument has already been committed to maintain the 
currency board system. On the other hand, the fixed exchange rate regime can magnify 
the impacts of land policies, raising difficulties and challenges in conducting counter-
cyclical policies. 
Finally, it is asserted that the greatest advantage of the prevailing currency board 
arrangement in Hong Kong is the credibility and stability the US dollar offers. 
Forasmuch as the renminbi is not yet convertible in its capital account and is largely 
untested for its credibility and acceptability, it can hardly provide an alternative 
monetary standard for Hong Kong in the near future. This thesis concludes that as long 
as Hong Kong can maintain its structural flexibility, the issue of the choice of the 
nominal anchor will be secondary to its future development. 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of Tables 
List of Figures 
List of Abbreviations 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
Synopsis 1 
1.1 
1.2 
Introduction 
Scope of Study 
xiv 
xvi 
XVlll 
2 
3 
1.2.1 Chinese Monetary Union: Part I 4 
1.2.2 Chinese Monetary Union: Part II 5 
1.2.3 Choices of Nominal Anchors & Entrepot Trade 5 
1.2.4 Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part I 7 
1.2.5 Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part II 8 
1.2.6 Background & Conclusions 8 
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis 8 
Reference 1 10 
Chapter 2. Economic & Political Background 
Synopsis 2 12 
13 2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Historical Background 16 
2.3 Changing Face of the Hong Kong economy 17 
2.3.1 Phase I (1947-52): Intermediary of China Trade 18 
2.3.2 Phase II (1952-70): Development of Domestic Exports 18 
2.3 .3 Phase ill (1970-82): Consolidation of Manufacturing Sector 21 
vii 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
2.3.4 Phase IV (1981-96): Services-Based Center 
2.3.5 Phase V (1996- ): Global Control Room 
Integration with China 
2.4.1 Trade 
2.4.2 Investment 
Policy Regime of Hong Kong 
2.5.1 Prudent Fiscal Policy 
2.5.2 Minimal Government 
2.5.3 Simple Tax System 
2.5.4 Non-discriminatory Industrial and Trade Policies 
Linked Exchange Rate System & Asian Crisis 
2.6.1 Linked Exchange Rate System 
2.6.2 The Storm 
2.6.3 Counting the Wounds 
2.6.4 Beyond the Storm 
Conclusions 
Reference 2 
Appendix 2 
Chapter 3. Chinese Monetary Union: Part I 
Synopsis 3 
3.1 
3.2 
Introduction 
Optimum Currency Area Theories 
3.2.1 Criterion Approach 
3.2.1.1 Empirical Evidence 
3.2.2 Cost-Benefit Approach 
3.2.2.1 Empirical Evidence 
3.2.3 Modem Approach 
viii 
21 
23 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
33 
35 
36 
38 
40 
41 
45 
49 
50 
52 
52 
55 
57 
61 
62 
3.3 Chinese Monetary Union 65 
3.3.1 Is Hong Kong an OCA? 65 
3.3.2 Symmetry of Disturbances 67 
3.4 Quantitative Analysis 70 
3.4.1 Blanchard and Quah Decomposition 71 
3.4.2 Structural Shocks 73 
3.4.3 Data 75 
3.4.4 Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 76 
3.5 Results 78 
3.5.1 Impulse Responses Functions 78 
3.5.2 Variance Decomposition 83 
3.5.3 Correlation of Supply shocks 84 
3.5.4 Correlation of Demand shocks 86 
3.5.5 Lag Effects 88 
3.5.6 Correlation with Chinese Provinces 91 
3.5.7 Sensitivity Tests 96 
3.6 Conclusions 97 
Reference 3 98 
Appendix 3 106 
Chapter 4. Chinese Monetary Union: Part II 
Synopsis 4 111 
4.1 Introduction 112 
4.2 Economic Fragmentation 114 
4.2.1 Income Gap & Fiscal Integration 118 
4.2.2 Openness 118 
4.2.3 Factors Mobility 119 
4.2.4 Commodity Market Integration 121 
4.2.5 Production Diversity 122 
ix 
4.3 
4.4 
Symmetry of Disturbances 
4.3.1 Estimation Results 
4.3.2 Sensitivity Tests 
Conclusions 
Reference 4 
Chapter 5. Choices of Nominal Anchors & Entrepot Trade 
Synopsis 5 
5.1 
5.2 
5.3 
5.4 
5.5 
5.6 
Introduction 
Entrepot Trade in Hong Kong 
5.2.1 China Factor 
5.2.2 Outward Processing Related Trade 
5.2.3 Value-added 
5.2.4 Trading Partners 
5.2.5 Offshore Trade 
5.2.6 Remarks 
Historical Perspective 
Three Country Indirect Trade Model 
5.4.1 Goods Market 
5.4.2 Money Market 
Analytical Results 
5.5.1 Domestic Shocks from A 
5.5.2 Expansionary Real Demand Shock from B 
5.5.3 Expansionary Real Demand Shock from C 
5.5.4 Contractionary Nominal Shock from B 
5.5.5 Contractionary Nominal Shock from C 
5.5.6 Opportunity Cost of Choosing the Nominal Anchor 
5.5.7 Other Scenarios 
Conclusions 
x 
123 
124 
129 
131 
132 
135 
136 
139 
140 
142 
143 
144 
147 
150 
151 
154 
156 
158 
158 
161 
161 
164 
165 
166 
166 
170 
171 
Reference 5 
Appendix 5 
173 
176 
Chapter 6. Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part I 
Synopsis 6 
6.1 
6.2 
6.3 
6.4 
6.5 
Introduction 
Property Markets of Hong Kong 
6.2.1 The Days of Being Hong Kong, Britain 
6.2.1.1 Supply and Demand 
6.2.1.2 Property Inflation 
6.2.1.3 Monopolistic Developers 
6.2.2 The Days of Being Hong Kong, China 
6.2.3 The Stormy Days of Being Part of Asia 
6.2.4 Issues Raised 
Partial Equilibrium Model of Property Market 
6.3.1 Household 
6.3.1.1 Housing as an Asset 
6.3.1.2 Comparative Static 
6.3.2 Property Developer 
6.3.2.1 Property Market Equilibrium 
Policy Experiments 
6.4.1 Demand Side Policy 
6.4.1.1 Unanticipated Shock 
6.4.1.2 Anticipated Shock 
6.4.2 Supply Side Policy 
6.4.2.1 Unanticipated Shock 
6.4.2.2 Anticipated Shock 
6.4.3 Policy Implications 
Conclusions 
Reference 6 
xi 
178 
179 
182 
184 
184 
186 
190 
191 
193 
196 
197 
197 
201 
201 
204 
206 
208 
208 
208 
210 
211 
211 
211 
213 
214 
215 
Appendix 6 218 
Chapter 7. Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part II 
Synopsis 7 
7.1 
7.2 
7.3 
7.4 
7.5 
Introduction 
Review and Preview of Housing Models 
General Equilibrium Model of Property Markets 
7.3.1 Industries 
7.3.2 Household 
7.3.3 Government 
7.3.4 External Balance 
7.3.5 The Rest of the Model 
Simulations 
7.4.1 Baseline and Simulations 
7.4.2 Money Supply Shock 
7.4.3 Land Supply Shock 
7.4.3.1 Common Results 
7.4.3.2 External Balances 
7.4.3.3 Dutch Disease 
7.4.3.4 Dissimilarities 
7.4.4 Financial Shock 
7.4.4.1 Revitalization 
7.4.4.2 Physical & Housing Capital 
7.4.4.3 Dissimilarities 
7.4.4.4 Property Price Stabilization Policy 
7.4.4.5 Remarks 
Conclusions 
Reference 7 
Appendix 7 
Xl! 
219 
220 
220 
225 
225 
229 
235 
239 
241 
243 
243 
247 
251 
262 
262 
267 
268 
269 
269 
278 
279 
281 
286 
287 
289 
293 
Chapter 8. Conclusions 
Synopsis 8 299 
300 8.1 
8.2 
8.3 
Summary of Findings 
8.1.1 Economic & Political Background 300 
8.1.2 Chinese Monetary Union: Part I 301 
8.1.3 Chinese Monetary Union: Part II 301 
8.1.4 Choices of Nominal Anchors & Entrepot Trade 302 
8.1.5 Property Markets and Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part I 303 
8.1.6 Property Markets and Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part II 304 
Policy Implications 
Final Remarks 
Reference 8 
305 
307 
307 
xiii 
List of Tables 
Chapter 2. Economic & Political Background 
Comparative Economic fudictors (1997) 14 Table 2.1 
Table 2.2 fudicators of Hong Kong's Achievements in the World Economy 15 
Table 2.3 Evolution of Hong Kong Economy 19-20 
Table 2.4 GDP Composition of Hong Kong by Production (%) 23 
Table 2.5 GDP Composition of Hong Kong by Expenditure (%) 24 
Table 2.6 Economic Comparison between Hong Kong and China 26 
Table 2.7 Exchange Rate Regime for the Hong Kong Dollar 34 
Table 2.8 Year-on-year Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Production (%) 37 
Table 2.Al Chronology of Economic and Political Events in Hong Kong 45-46 
Table 2.A2 Summary of Provisions of the Basic Law 47-48 
Chapter 3. Economic & Political Background 
Table 3.1 Correlation of Output Gaps between Hong Kong, China & the US 70 
Table 3.2 Summary of Unit Root Tests of CMU, E9 and G3 76 
Table 3.3 Percentage of Variance of Output Due to Supply Shocks 83 
Table 3.4 Percentage of Variance of PricelInfiation Due to Supply Shocks 84 
Table 3.5 Correlation of Supply Shocks between CMU, E9, and G3 
Table 3.6 Correlation of Demand Shocks between CMU, E9, and G3 
Table 3.7 Correlation of Supply Shocks with Transmission Lags 
Table 3.8 Correlation of Demand Shocks with Transmission Lags 
Table 3.9 Correlation of Supply Shocks between Hong Kong and 
Chinese Provinces 
Table 3.10 Correlation of Demand Shocks between Hong Kong and 
Chinese Provinces 
Table 3.Al Sample Periods of Tested Countries 
Tables 3.A2-3.AS Numerical Example of Reconstructing China Data 
xiv 
85 
87 
89 
90 
93 
92 
106 
108-110 
,I 
Chapter 4. Chinese Monetary Union: Part II 
Table 4.1 
Table 4.2 
Table 4.3 
Table 4.4 
Comparison of OCA Criteria between China, the US, and the EC 116 
Ordering of Provinces According to OCA Criteria 117 
Correlation of Supply Shocks between Chinese Provinces 125 
Correlation of Demand Shocks between Chinese Provinces 127 
Chapter 5. Choices of Nominal Anchors & Entrepot Trade 
Table 5.1 Re-export to Domestic Export Ratio 140 
Table 5.2 Growth Rate and Market Share of Hong Kong Exports 
Table 5.3 Impacts on the Output of Entrepot A 
Table 5.AI Definitions of Notations and Composite Parameters 
143 
159 
176-177 
Chapter 6. Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part I 
Table 6.1 Statistics of Hong Kong Property Markets 180 
Table 6.2 Projection of Housing Production Before and After the Asian Crisis 192 
Table 6.3 Loans for Use in Hong Kong by Sector 
Table 6.4 Results of Comparative Static 
Table 6.Al Definitions of Notations (in alphabetical order) 
194 
202 
218 
Chapter 7. Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part II 
Table 7.1 Structure of the Model 222 
Table 7.2 Summary of Simulations 
Table 7.AI Definitions of Notations (in alphabetical order) 
Tables 7 .A2-7.A 7 Baseline Solutions 
xv 
244 
293-295 
296-298 
List of Figures 
Chapter 2. Economic & Political Background 
Figure 2.1 
Figure 2.2 
Hong Kong Dollar Inter-bank Offer Rate 
Three Month Moving Average of Labor Market Data 
36 
38 
Chapter 3. Chinese Monetary Union: Part II 
Figures 3.1-3.13 Impulse Response Functions 79-83 
94 
95 
Figure 3.14 Provinces Correlated to Hong Kong in Supply Shocks 
Figure 3.15 Provinces Correlated to Hong Kong in Demand Shocks 
Chapter 4. Chinese Monetary Union: Part II 
Figure 4.1 
Figure 4.2 
Chinese Provinces Correlated in Supply Shocks 
Chinese Provinces Correlated in Demand Shocks 
126 
128 
Chapter 5. Choices of Nominal Anchors & Entrepot Trade 
Figure 5.1 Re-exports, Domestic Exports and Imports of Hong Kong 141 
Figure 5.2 Re-exports to Domestic Exports Ratio (Hong Kong to Destination 
Countries) 145 
Figure 5.3 Share of Re-exports of Hong Kong by Destination Countries 145 
Figure 5.4 Share of Domestic Exports of Hong Kong by Destination Countries 146 
Figure 5.5 Share of Imports of Hong Kong by Source Countries 146 
Figure 5.6 Ratio of Indirect Exports via Hong Kong to Direct Exports 147 
Figure 5.7 Year-on-year Growth Rate of Hong Kong Exports 148 
Figure 5.8 Effect of Trade Structure on the Impact of an Expansionary Real 
Demand Shock from B 162 
Figure 5.9 Effect of Trade Structure on the Impact of a Contractionary 
Nominal Shock from B 165 
Figure 5.10 Variance Between Pegging A$ to B$ and to C$ for an Expansionary 
Real Demand Shock from B 168 
Figure 5.11 Variance Between Pegging A$ to B$ and to C$ for a Contractionary 
Nominal Shock from B 170 
xvi 
Chapter 6. Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part I 
Figure 6.1 Residential Land Disposal in Hong Kong 186 
Figure 6.2 
Figure 6.3 
Figure 6.4 
Figure 6.5 
Figure 6.6 
Figure 6.7 
Price and Rent Indexes of Private Domestic Housing in Hong Kong 187 
Property Price Indexes of Hong Kong 
Owner-occupation Rates in Hong Kong & Other Countries 
Phase Diagram for the Property Market 
Impacts of a Negative Demand Shock on the Property Market 
Impacts of a Negative Supply Shock on the Property Market 
189 
193 
207 
209 
212 
Chapter 7. Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part II 
Figure 7.1 
Figure 7.2 
Figure 7.3 
Production Nesting 
Consumption Nesting 
Property Price Index Nesting 
Simulation Results for a Nominal Shock 
Simulation Results for a Land Supply Shock 
Simulation Results for Specific Factor Shocks 
Simulation Results for a Financial Shock 
225 
229 
237 
248-250 
252-261 
263-265 
270-277 
Figures 7.4-7.11b 
Figures 7.12-7.40 
Figures 7.41-7.49 
Figures 7.50-7.73 
Figures 7.74-7.85 Simulation Results for a Financial Shock plus Stabilization 
Policy 282-285 
xvii 
List of Abbreviations 
Abbreviation (in alphabetical order) 
AD-AS 
ArC 
B&Q 
CEC 
CES 
China 
CMU 
cpr 
DF test 
ECB 
EEC 
EMU 
EU 
FDI 
GDP 
HIBOR 
HSI 
HK$ 
HKMA 
HKMC 
HSBC 
MFA 
MFN 
NAFfA 
NrC 
OCA 
OPRT 
PBC 
PP test 
PRC 
SAR 
SOE 
US 
US$ 
VAR 
WTO 
Aggregate-demand-aggregate-supply 
Akaike's information criterion 
Blanchard and Quah 
Commission of the European Communities 
Constant elasticity of substitution 
Mainland China (unless specify otherwise) 
Chinese Monetary Union 
Consumer price index 
Dickey-Fuller test 
European Central Bank 
European Economic Communities 
Economic and Monetary Union 
European Union' 
Foreign direct investment 
Gross domestic product 
Hong Kong Inter-bank Offered Rate 
Hang Seng Index 
Hong Kong dollar 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation 
Multi-Fiber Arrangement 
Most Favored Nation 
North American Free Trade Area 
Newly industrialized country 
Optimum currency area 
Outward processing related trade 
People's Bank of China 
Phillips-Perron test 
People's Republic of China 
Special Administrative Region 
State-owned-enterprise 
United States 
US dollar 
Vector autoregression 
World Trade Organization 
, With the Maastricht Treaty, the term European Economic Community has been replaced by the 
European Union, which refers to both a political and economic union. 
xviii 
I •• 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Synopsis 1 
This thesis is a collection of essays on the exchange rate arrangement of Hong Kong, 
focusing on the feasibility of unifying the Hong Kong dollar with the Chinese currency, 
renminbi. The analytical framework of the thesis is based on the literature of monetary 
unification, especially the studies of European Monetary Union (EMU). However, it 
goes beyond that to address some unique and important issues in the context of Hong 
Kong-China. These include the influence of entrepot trade on the choice of monetary 
standard, and the interaction between property markets and the exchange rate 
arrangement. This thesis brings some new perspectives to the existing literature and 
makes a number of contributions. 
1 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a collection of essays on exchange rate arrangements, with specific 
reference to the question of unifying or pegging the Hong Kong dollar with the Chinese 
currency, renminbi. 
The topic is inspired by the political unification between Hong Kong and Mainland 
China (abbreviated as China henceforth unless stated otherwise). Since July 1, 1997, 
Hong Kong has become a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's 
Republic of China. According to the Joint Declaration signed by the Chinese and British 
governments, Hong Kong will maintain a high degree of autonomy in all areas except 
foreign affairs and defense. In particular, the Declaration stipulates that Hong Kong can 
maintain its own currency and monetary system. Both Chinese and Hong Kong officials 
have declared that it is necessary to maintain the exchange rate linkage between the 
Hong Kong dollar and the US dollar after 1997; for example, see Sheng (1995) and 
Chen (1995). Practically, the renminbi is still not fully convertible in the capital 
account, let alone the question of becoming a widely accepted international currency. 
So, undeniably, in the short-term there is little room to alter the exchange rate regime of 
Hong Kong under the present political and institutional settings in both China and Hong 
Kong. 
On the other hand, it is certain that the issue of linking the Hong Kong dollar with the 
renminbi will remain on the agenda in public discussion. Given that Hong Kong and 
China have become increasingly inseparable on most economic fronts, further unifying 
the Hong Kong dollar into the renminbi appears to be an inevitable and sensible future 
development. This perception has been nurtured by the fact that even without any policy 
coordination, a certain degree of monetary integration has already been achieved 
between the two economies. It is estimated that, about 22 to 25 percent of the total 
supply of Hong Kong dollars in 1994, equivalent to US$2.2 billion, was absorbed by 
China (Sung, Liu et al. 1996:233)1 The main Chinese destination of Hong Kong dollars 
is, expectedly, Guangdong. Since the onset of the recent Asian financial crisis, the issue 
1 Another study put the figure at 30 percent for 1992, compared to just 6.9 percent in 1980 (Hong Kong 
Bank 1993). 
2 
has received even greater attention as the linked system between the Hong Kong dollar 
and the US dollar has been threatened by speculative attacks ; for example, see EIU 
(1997). 
In summary, the political reality will prohibit fundamental changes to the current 
exchange rate arrangement of Hong Kong in the short run,' whereas, in the longer run, 
economic forces are likely to continue to highlight the issue. 
Due to the politics, what this thesis addresses appears to be a hypothetical issue. 
Notwithstanding, it is the first step in the rigorous analysis that will be required to 
address the prospect of monetary integration amongst the Chinese economies - China, 
Hong Kong, Macau, and even Taiwan. In addition, many aspects raised in this thesis are 
directly related to the current exchange rate arrangement of Hong Kong in which the 
currency is pegged to the US dollar. 
1.2 SCOPE OF STUDY 
Three issues about the exchange rate arrangement of Hong Kong are addressed: 
o Is it economically sustainable to form a Chinese Monetary Union (CMU) between 
China and Hong Kong? 
o Does the indirect trade between the US , China and Hong Kong affect the choice 
between the US dollar and renminbi as the nominal anchor for the Hong Kong 
dollar? 
o How does the exchange rate arrangement influence the business cycles of the Hong 
Kong property market? 
2 Mussa (1997:217) admits that "A stroll along the first floor corridor at the International Monetary 
Fund's Washington headquarters reveals the fundamental and indisputable fact that political 
considerations, rather than purely economic concerns, are the predominant practical determinants of the 
domain of operation of currency regimes." 
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1.2.1 Chinese Monetary Union: Part I 
The study of monetary integration is copious and expanding rapidly. Most of the 
research efforts have been stimulated by and devoted to the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), and its predecessor the European Monetary System (EMS). This is not 
surprising, given the tremendous impact of the EMU on economic and political 
development in Europe, as well as its influence upon the broader international monetary 
order. 
One of the most fundamental analytical frameworks of monetary unification is the 
optimal currency area (OCA) paradigm instigated by Mundell (1961), McKinnon 
(1963), and Kenen (1969). According to the OCA theories, a major disadvantage of 
joining a monetary union is the loss of individual monetary instrument for 
macroeconomic management. How critical the consequence heavily depends on the 
symmetry of disturbances experienced by the member states.' Other things being equal, 
the more synchronous their business cycles, the more sustainable it is for two economies 
to link their currencies together. A major contribution of the EMU literature is to 
quantify hitherto descriptive arguments of the OCA theories, including the symmetry of 
disturbances. 
The literature of the EMU provides a useful starting reference point for this thesis . In 
Chapter 3, the question of whether it is economically sustainable for China and Hong 
Kong to form a CMU is raised under the OCA framework. The econometric modeling 
work of this chapter focuses on the symmetry of disturbances between Hong Kong and 
China; some prevailing methodologies from the EMU literature are adopted. 
Sustainability is a relative instead of an absolute concept. Therefore, the empirical 
assessment of the CMU has to be conducted in a comparative perspective. In this aspect, 
the EMU can also serve as a benchmark for measurements, albeit whether itself 
constitutes an OCA has long been subject to debate. 
3 Here "symmetry of disturbance" is an ex post concept. That is, it includes the symmetry of events 
occurring to the member states as well as the symmetry of impacts of the events upon them. The latter is 
determined by the economic structures and policy responses of the member states. Therefore, countries 
with more symmetric economic structures are more likely to be hit be symmetric shocks. For example, a 
rise in oil prices, which is an ex ante symmetric event to all countries, can cause ex post asymmetric 
disturbances to oil-importing countries and oil-exporting countries . 
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1.2.2 Chinese Monetary Union: Part II 
Chapter 4 shifts the focus slightly from the Hong Kong-China context to China only. In 
most previous studies, China is treated as a single economic entity. Nevertheless, China 
covers a large area and has a massive population. In terms of fiscal autonomy, it 
consists of 30 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions (all simply denoted as 
"province" henceforth), not to mention numerous sub-provincial units. Most provinces 
are of geographical sizes comparable to, if not bigger than, an average European 
country. Most importantly, these sub-national economic units have highly diverse 
endowments, levels of development, and degrees of openness. Therefore, it raises the 
question of whether these heterogeneous Chinese provinces constitute an OCA. 
This question has an important policy implication. An objective of economic reform in 
China is to establish a "socialist market economy" in which the market will substitute 
command-type control as a primary mechanism for resource allocation. Accompanying 
this transformation is a corresponding change of the macroeconomic management 
framework. For instance, establishing a financial market implies that the discretionary 
credit allocation policy in the past has to be replaced by a nondiscriminatory interest 
rate policy. As market-compatible monetary policy gradually resumes its function in 
economic management in China, the implication of this chapter falls into place. That is, 
the more China resembles an OCA, the more efficacious it is to use uniform monetary 
policy to smooth out macroeconomic vicissitudes in different regions as they occur. 
This chapter reapplies the concepts developed in the previous chapter on the Chinese 
provinces by comparing various OCA criteria between China and the two most 
prominent economic unions - the US and the European Community. Likewise, the 
empirical part emphasizes on the symmetry of disturbances across the provinces. 
1.2.3 Choices of Nominal Anchors & Entrepot Trade 
While the EMU literature can provide a solid foundation for this thesis to lean on, the 
research agenda of the literature, particularly the empirical part, is largely bounded by 
the political and economic settings of the EMU. Therefore, strictly following this 
literature would risk overlooking some aspects that are unique and important for Hong 
Kong, but not necessarily for its European counterparts. 
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Two prominent features of the Hong Kong economy can be identified as 'neglected' 
issues in the literature of EMU, namely entrepot trade and the real estate economy. 
In the literature, it is commonly asserted that if a small country decides to peg its 
currency to a foreign currency, it should choose the currency of its largest trading 
partner. The rationale is that a more stable exchange rate will promote trade and 
investment. Therefore, pegging to the largest trading partner will maximize the benefits . 
This merit comes with a potential cost that the fixed exchange rate regime will amplify 
the impacts of monetary disturbances from the anchor country. On the other hand, real 
disturbances from the anchor country will have their spillover effects dampened by the 
exchange rate peg. Such a trade-off is well presented in the classic Mundell-Fleming 
model. 
Nonetheless, in almost all studies, direct trade is assumed and indirect trade is ignored. 
While this is a very reasonable assumption in the case of European countries, this is 
definitely not so for Hong Kong. In 1998, the total value of Hong Kong' s re-exports 
was about 6.2 times that of direct exports. In terms of value-added, the contribution of 
re-exports to the gross domestic product (GDP) is about 2.7 times that of direct exports. 
It is postulated that Hong Kong, together with its primary trading partners, China and 
the US, constitutes the largest indirect trading bloc in the globe. 
The distinct trade structure of Hong Kong brings a new perspective to the old topic of 
the choices of nominal anchors for small economies. Different from direct trade, 
entrepot trade involves at least three economies and, therefore, two exchange rates. 
Unless its trading partners peg their currencies together, an entrepot can not expect to 
gain the benefits of exchange rate stability on both sides. By the same token, the 
existence of indirect trading routes in parallel to direct ones can dramatically complicate 
the transmission mechanisms of disturbances across economies. For instance, for the 
case of three countries, direct trade involves six trading routes only; allowing entrepot 
trade will increase the number by two-thirds: 
To investigate this multi-dimensional interaction mechanism, a three-country indirect 
trade model is developed in Chapter 5. The model is instrumental in demonstrating how 
4 The number of trading routes will increase by two-thirds if only one of the three countries is entrepot. If 
two or all three countries can serve as entrepots, the number will be even greater. 
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entrepot trade influences the impacts of exogenous shocks on a small economy under a 
fixed exchange rate regime. Most importantly, it can illustrate how indirect trade alters 
the opportunity cost of choosing one foreign currency instead of another as the nominal 
anchor for a small entrepot like Hong Kong. The analytical results are in contrast to 
some standard outcomes under the Mundell-Fleming model. 
1.2.4 Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part I 
Generally speaking, the EMU literature has given little attention to the impact of 
monetary unification on individual industries. The real estate sector is singled out in this 
thesis because of its distinct role in the Hong Kong economy. For example, about 40 
percent of GDP and 50 percent of government revenue comes from property related 
activities. Due to land reclamation, hill terracing, and urbanization of rural areas, land 
supply is far from being inelastic in Hong Kong. Nonetheless, almost all land resources 
are statutorily monopolized by the government. 
The special institutional setting in Hong Kong gives the authorities a policy instrument 
that is usually not available in other market economies: control over land disposal. This 
opens up a completely new perspective to macroeconomic management. Even if under 
currency unification the duty of combating asymmetric imbalances between member 
states does not weigh solely on the fiscal policy. This is demonstrated from the 
deployment of land supply policy to accommodate financial disturbances by the Hong 
Kong government during the recent Asian crisis. 
Chapter 6 lays down the platform for studying the interrelations between land policies, 
property markets, the wider economy, and the exchange rate arrangement. First it gives 
a detailed account of the institutional and policy settings of Hong Kong's property 
markets. The changes of the government's housing and land policies before and after 
the hand-over, as well as its policy prescription for the Asian financial crisis are 
highlighted. 
Then an intertemporal partial equilibrium model of property market is developed to 
illustrate some basic economic properties of real estate markets. The effectiveness of 
various housing and land policies as macroeconomic management instruments is 
examined with the help of the model. 
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1.2.5 Property Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part II 
In Chapter 7 the partial equilibrium property market model developed in Chapter 6 is 
further extended into a multi-sector general equilibrium model. The model of this 
chapter incorporates many open economy elements and institutional features of Hong 
Kong's property markets, such as the coexistence of private and public housing markets. 
This extended model is used to examine many theoretical issues left out in the previous 
chapter. They include the impact of property booms on the wider economy, the 
influences of the exchange rate arrangement upon the business cycles of property 
markets, and the effects of financial crisis on property markets. On the policy front , the 
economic implications of the Hong Kong government's land policy response to the 
Asian financial crisis are analyzed. 
1.2.6 Background & Conclusions 
This thesis consists of eight chapters, including this introductory one. 
Chapter 2 is a background chapter. It provides a brief review of the Hong Kong 
economy. It includes the political settings before and after 1997, economic synergy with 
China, evolution of its comparative advantage, policy framework, and lastly the Asian 
crisis episode. More detailed information about individual issues like entrepot and 
property markets can be found in associated chapters. 
Chapters 3 to 7 are fairly self-contained. They have their own abstracts, literature 
surveys, background materials and references. 
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter. It summarizes the findings of previous chapters, 
and draws from them some overall inferences and policy implications. 
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis makes several contributions to the existing literature. 
(i) Since the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, discussion about the 
prospect of unifying the Hong Kong dollar into the renminbi has been going on. 
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Nevertheless, formal examinations of this scenario are rare. So far, the only 
serious attempt known to us is Chan (1996). This thesis takes a very different 
approach and covers many issues not explored by Chan or by the broader 
literature of monetary unification. 
(ii) It is commonly realized that the Hong Kong and Chinese economies are 
structurally diverse but complementarily integrated. The former character implies 
the disturbances experienced by them are unlikely to be synchronous, while the 
latter suggests disturbances can be easily transmitted between the two, presumably 
from the big economy China to the small economy Hong Kong. This transmission 
mechanism is seldom put to empirical tests. An identifiable exception, Dodsworth 
and Mihaljek (1997), has touched this issue. This thesis addresses the question 
with a different methodology, and provides an answer with richer detail. 
(iii) This thesis recognizes that China is an agglomeration of numerous heterogeneous 
provinces, and the economic integration between Hong Kong and China is highly 
biased towards the Pearl River Delta region. Therefore, besides national data, this 
thesis uses provincial data to examine the possibility of forming sub-national 
OCAs between Hong Kong and individual provinces, as well as between certain 
provinces themselves. No similar attempt to examine the macroeconomic 
divergence of Chinese provinces is known to us at the time of writing. 
(iv) Entrepot trade is a unique feature of the Hong Kong economy. Understandably, 
studies about the relation between entrepot trade and the exchange rate 
arrangement are extremely limited. The only two noticeable publications are Tom 
(1989) and Tom (1964). However, these two studies not only refer to the situation 
for Hong Kong before the 1950s, but lack rigorous (in the mathematical sense) 
treatments. As a result, they fail to pin down the insights carried by the formal 
model developed in this thesis. 
(v) While the economics of housing is a highly flourishing area in the economics 
discipline, the literature is overwhelmingly skewed towards the microeconomic 
perspective of property markets. Macroeconomic aspects of property markets, 
especially in relation to open economy issues, are largely overlooked. Morande 
(1992) and Matsuyama (1990) are two exceptional examples. Still, the general 
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equilibrium property market model presented in this thesis is far more elaborated 
and instrumental to analyzing the interrelation between property markets and the 
exchange rate arrangement. This thesis represents one of the very first efforts 
devoted to understanding this interrelation. 
The main findings in each of these areas are summarized in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Economic & Political Background 
Synopsis 2 
Economically and politically, China is the most influential external factor in the 
development of Hong Kong. The constraints in endowment and economic size make 
international trade essential for Hong Kong's prosperity. The hinterland provided by 
China has facilitated Hong Kong to evolve into an international trade and financial 
center. As a result, the two economies have been increasingly integrated into one. 
Domestically, positive non-interventionism remains the dominant philosophy in policy 
making, albeit the authorities have taken more initiatives in industrial development after 
the Asian crisis. The over-reliance of the economy on property-related activities has 
exaggerated the impact of the crisis. On the other hand, the prominence of the real estate 
sector implies that the government's monopolistic control over land disposal can be 
turned into a power supply side instrument for macroeconomic management. 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The exchange rate arrangement is a key component of the policy regime of an economy. 
Its role can not be appropriately assessed without first understanding the economy in 
which it is functioning. This chapter looks at the 'time-series' development of the Hong 
Kong economy as well as the 'cross-sectional ' setting of its policy regime. A 
chronology of Hong Kong history is provided in Table 2.A1 in Appendix 2. 
Measured before the Asian financial crisis, by all means the achievement of the Hong 
Kong economy was very impressive (Table 2.1 ). In 1997, its per capita GDP had 
already reached US$26,573, equivalent to 88.1 percent of that of the US , and only 
second to Singapore amongst the four Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs). In 
terms of the growth rate of per capita GDP over the period 1978-94, Hong Kong ranks 
last amongst the NICs, and eighth in the world (World Bank 1997). The economy is 
highly flexible. The non-accelerating-inflation-rate of unemployment was estimated to 
be just about 2 percent (Mihaljek, Hussain et al. 1998). The unemployment rate barely 
rose above the 3 percent level. Table 2.2 lists other economic achievements of Hong 
Kong that are always cited by the government as a showcase. 
Nevertheless, the Asian crisis exposed some weaknesses of the economy. A foremost 
example being the extremely high dependency of fiscal revenue and equity values on 
property related activities. The performance of the economy is even more disappointing 
when compared to its 'rival ' - Singapore. While located next to the worst hit Southeast 
Asian economies, Singapore was one of the least affected in the region. It recorded a 
positive year-on-year growth of 1.2 percent in the first quarter of 1999, after 
experiencing only two quarters of moderate negative growth (Porter 1999). In contrast, 
the economy of Hong Kong shrank by 3.5 percent in the same quarter (Saunders 1999). 
Sachs, Warner et al. (1999) assert that the exchange rate parity with the strong US dollar 
was a key reason why Hong Kong's recovery lagged behind that of Singapore, which 
revived through currency devaluation. 
The distressing experience during the Asian crisis has raised questions in relation to 
what direction the economy should be heading in the future. On the one side, 
manufacturers have loudly criticized the strict practice of non-interventionism by the 
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Table 2.1: Comparative Economic Indicators (1997) 
Hong Kong Singapore Taiwan South Korea US 
GOP (US$ bn) 172 89 283 438 4192 8080 
Per capita GOP (US$) 26,573 3 1,035 13,153 9,530 33,213 30, 147 
Unemployment rate (%)' 2.2 1.7 2.7 2.6 3.4 4.9 
Consumer price innation (%) 5.7 2.0 0.9 4.5 1.7 2.4 
Current account balance (US$ bn) -6.6 b 14.0 7.8 -8.6 94.4 - 166.8 
Exports of goods (US$ bn) 188.1 125.9 \21.7 138.6 409.2 680.3 
Imports of goods (US$ bn) 209.2 124.7 107. 142.5 307.6 877.3 
Foreign Trade (% of GOP) ' 230.9 28 1.4 81.1 64.1 17 .1 18.3 
Average growth rate of real per capita GOP d 5.1 5.2 6.3 6.9 4.9 1.5 
Foreign reserves (US$ Ill) , 63,833 76,847 88,038 34,037 216,648 64,040 
Per capita foreign reserve (US$) 9,941 25,279 4,100 747 1,723 240 
Area (sq. kill) 1068 647.5 36,006 99,314 377,819 9,159,115 
Population (mn) 6.50 3.04 21.68 45.5 126.2 268 
Source: Country Reports of EIU, various issues, World Bank (1997), Singapore government (http://www.singstat.gov.sg/FACT/SIF/siLhtml). 
(a) Figure for China corresponds to official statistic of urban unempl oyment rate. 
(b) Goods and services balance. 
(c) Merchandise exports plus imports. 
China 
917 
742 
3.1 
2.8 
29.7 
182.7 
136.4 
34.8 
6.8 [8.0) 
139,901 
11 3 
960,000 
1,236 
(d) The figures are estimated over the period of 1978-94. The figure in parentheses is from Ch inese official statistics, the other one is the World Bank's 
estimation. The figure for Japan is estimated by the author, based on the data of International Financial Statistics, various issues. 
(e) Figures of the last quarters (different months for different countries) of 1996. 
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authorities for hollowing out the industrial base of the economy. On the other, the 
government's decisions to stabilize the stock and property markets during the crisis 
spiked an outcry about the authorities deviating from the gospel of laissez-faire. 
Table 2.2: Indicators of Hong Kong's Achievements in the World Economy 
: International trading center: 
. 1. Ranked as the world's freest market by Heritage Foundation in 1997. 
I 
I 
2. Ranked as the second most competitive economy after Singapore by World Economic 
Forum in 1998. 
3. The eighth largest trading entity in goods in the globe in 1998, according to the World 
Trade Organization Report. 
4. Reclassified as an advanced economy by the International Monetary Fund in 1997. 
International financial center: 
5. The second largest stock market, in terms of capitalization, in Asia after Japan. At the 
end of November 1998, the stock market capitalization was US$353 billion. 
6. The sixth largest banking center in the world in terms of external banking transactions 
volume. 
I 7. The seventh largest foreign exchange market in the world in terms of turnover, with 
. average daily turnover reached US$79 billion in April 1998. 
18. I Its foreign reserves reached US$88.7 billion at the end of October 1998, the world 's 
third largest. 
I 
; International transport hub: 
: 9. It has the busiest container port in the globe. Total container throughput in 1997 was 
14.5 million Twenty-foot Equivalent Units. 
10. It has the busiest international air cargo terminal in the world. The air cargo handling 
capacity was 1.78 million tones a year in 1997. 
11. Its airport is the fifth busiest in the world in terms of international passengers. The 
number of passengers in 1997 was up to 28.3 million. 
Source: The Information Services Department, Hong Kong Government 
(hnp:llwww. info.gov.hklhkbilenghkbil4/topic4.htm). 
This chapter does not aim to provide a roadmap for the future development of Hong 
Kong. Instead, it gives an overview of the economy and points out the concerns. Due to 
space limitations, the discussion is intended to be brief and selective. The next section 
provides the historical background of Hong Kong; Section 3 focuses on the economic 
linkages between China and Hong Kong; Section 4 reviews the development of the 
economy over the past few decades ; Section 5 discusses the policy framework of the 
government; Section 6 looks at the problems arising from the Asian crisis and the 
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response of the economy; and Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
2.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Right from the beginning, the marking of Hong Kong onto the world economic map 
was all about China trade. In the late eighteenth century, China had already engaged in 
foreign trade, but in 1799, China decided to ban trade on opium, which was a major 
export of Britain. This event alerted Britain to decide to secure its own trade and 
commercial station in the Far East, and the 'trade conflict' degenerated into military 
confrontation. Hong Kong Island was abdicated to Britain in 1841, after China was 
defeated in the First Opium War (1840-42). 
After the Second Opium War (1856-68), the Kowloon peninsula of the mainland, which 
is north of Hong Kong Island, was also abdicated to Britain. In 1898, to fence off the 
colony from aggression by other foreign powers heading down from the mainland, 
Britain forced China to 'lease' the New Territory, which is the vast area between 
Kowloon and the place now known as Shenzhen, plus 235 outlying islands for 99 years 
till 1997. 
However, those treaties were never officially recognized by the People's Republic of 
China which was established in 1949. In the summer of 1982, China for the first time 
announced it would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong (including Kowloon peninsula 
and the New Territories) on July 1, 1997. After two years of negotiation, China and 
Britian signed an agreement that sealed the fate of Hong Kong - the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration. The core of the Declaration is that Hong Kong could enjoy a high degree of 
autonomy after 1997 except in foreign affairs and defense. Hong Kong can maintain its 
social, economic, legal and judicial, and legislative systems unchanged for 50 years 
after 1997. The term of 50 years is rather arbitrary, and Chinese officials have 
repeatedly stated that it is likely to be extended. 
16 
I •. 
Based on the Joint Declaration, a mini-constitution of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) government - the Basic Law - has been formulated.' 
Both the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law are very explicit about the policy regime 
of the SAR. For instance, the Basic Law requires the SAR government to maintain the 
budget to be in line with GDP growth and a low tax system. On the monetary front , it 
states that the Hong Kong dollar remains as the legal tender. While the Basic Law does 
not explicitly adopt the prevailing exchange rate link with the US dollar, it maintains the 
issue of the Hong Kong dollar to be fully backed by foreign reserves . In brief, the Basic 
Law tries to preserve all the essential policy elements that were deemed by China to 
constitute the success of Hong Kong under British rule. Table 2.A2 in Appendix 2 
summarizes the Basic Law provisions that shape the economic policies of Hong Kong. 
2.3 CHANGING FACE OF THE HONG KONG ECONOMY 
While Hong Kong may have gone through many changes, it is first and foremost a trade 
center. In 1998, Hong Kong was ranked the eighth largest trading entity in the globe in 
terms of value of merchandise trade; the fourth largest if trade within the European 
union is counted as internal trade.' In terms of value of services trade, it was ranked 
eleventh. Despite the increasing importance of the domestic market, trade remains a key 
driving force of economic growth. 
At the outset, Hong Kong is bound to be open to trade, as it has virtually no natural 
endowment. The fishery and agricultural sector contributed merely 0.1 percent to GDP 
in 1997. As a result, domestic consumption relies almost entirely on imports. For the 
same reason, domestic production heavily counts on imported materials, capital goods 
and fuel. The extremely high degree of openness implies that the industrial structure is 
, A principle difference between the two documents is that the Joint Declaration is an international treaty 
honored by two sovereignties - Britain and China - and has been registered with the United Nations, 
while the Basic Law is a domestic legal document enacted only by China' s legislative institute, the 
National People's Congress, in 1990. 
2 Details about the ranking and trade figures can be obtained from the web-site of the World Trade 
Organization (http://www.wto.orglwto/statis/staLhtm). 
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closely related to the trade pattern. This section traces the evolution of the economy in a 
changing environment (Table 2.3). 
2.3.1 Phase I (1947-52): Intermediary of China Trade 
During the post-war recovery period, the situation in Hong Kong largely resembled that 
in the nineteenth century. Positioned at the annex of southern China, Hong Kong 
naturally defined itself as a trading hub of China. Entrepot trade was the dominant 
activity, as there was virtually no domestic product exported. The manufacturing sector 
was developed mainly to facilitate entrepot trade, such as rope production, shipbuilding 
and repair, food processing and tin-refinement (Ho 1992). 
2.3.2 Phase II (1952-70): Development of Domestic Exports 
The economic structure of Hong Kong started to evolve when the People's Republic of 
China was established ' in 1949. Internally, China was more willing to trade with the 
former Soviet Union Bloc. But after diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union turned 
sour, China retreated into a policy of self-sufficiency. Externally, the engagement of 
China in the Korean War in the 1950s led to the imposition of trade embargoes by the 
US and the United Nations. Exports to China, which dominated Hong Kong's entrepot 
trade, fell by almost 70 percent during 1951-52, and China's share in Hong Kong' s total 
trade declined from 39.3 percent in 1950 to 4.2 percent in 1956, and, further, to less 
than 1 percent by 1966 (ibid.). 
While the changing of the international political landscape had truncated the entrepot 
trade of Hong Kong, it created other opportunities. The defeat of the Nationalists by the 
Communists in the late 1940s and subsequent numerous political movements in the 
mainland caused a continuous influx of refugees into Hong Kong.3 These refugees came 
mainly from commercial centers like Guangdong and Shanghai, bringing not only a 
mass of cheap labor but also capital and entrepreneurial skills that formed the 
3 It is estimated that half a million people migrated from China to Hong Kong over 1949-54, boosting the 
population by 27 percent (Leung 1993). 
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Table 2.3: Evolution of Hong Kong Economy 
1947-52 1952-70 1970-82 1981 -96 beyond 1996 
Changing Post war recovery Cut o rr o r China Competiti on rrom Opcning up ofCllina's Gravit y o r development shifts 
en vironment trade NI Cs and other low- economy rrom southern China to 
Growth o r us and cost countries Increasing internati onal northern China 
European markets co mpetition Increas ing competiti on rrom 
Singapore and Shanghai 
Economic structure Entrepot tradc and Tex tiles Textiles and clothing Entrepot trade scrviccs Conventional entrepot trade is 
services Clothing Diversifi ed Financial and business services graduall y replaced by o rrshore 
consulller 
trade and transshipment 
Consumer 
manufacturing Fashion apparel and textiles Others rcmain the sa me 
electronics goods Diversified consumcr 
Plas tics Fin ancial and manuracturing goods 
business services Tourism 
Economic Excellent port Transfer o r capital Low-cost labor Quali ty work rorcc A prudentl y regula ted fin anc ial 
roundations Expcrienced and skill s rrom Responsive phys ical Accessible technology market 
internat ional trade 
Shanghai 
in fras tructure such O thers remain the same 
sector Migrant of low-cost as housi ng and Open and stable lega l and 
labor rrom southern transportation regul atory system 
Extensi ve shipping Chin a Forward-lookin g phys ical 
and trade links inrrastructure 
Simple and low tax system 
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-Table 2.3: Evolution of Hong Kong Economy (continue) 
Economic strategy 
Internal economic 
constraint 
1947-52 
Exploit shipping and 
trading advantage 
Weak domestic 
manufacturing base 
1952-70 
Labor-intensive 
industrialization 
Political instability 
in China 
Source: Based on Leung (I993) and extended by the author. 
1970-82 
Export-orientcd 
industrial 
diversification 
Raising labor cost 
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1981-96 
Move to highcr-value-added 
manufacturing 
Strengthen entrepot services 
Relocation of domestic 
manufacturing basis to China, 
especially Peal River Della 
region 
1997 uncertainty 
Brain drain due to massive 
migration 
Rising property prices 
beyond 1996 
Exploit areas of technology-
intensive productions 
Relocation of labor-intensive 
productions from southern 
coast to northern and western 
inland 
Shift of manufacturing basis in 
southern China to higher-value-
added products 
Develop into a financial center 
for China enterprises' 
capitalization 
Deteriorating competitiveness 
due to high property prices 
Higher demand for weI fare due 
to aging population and 
massive migrants 
foundation for the development of Hong Kong's domestic export industries, especially 
textile and clothing. 
2.3.3 Phase III (1970-82): Consolidation of Manufacturing Sector 
As the manufacturing base matured, the economy started to diversify its production to 
meet the challenge of intensifying external competition. Higher value-added products 
like consumer electronics and machinery were getting weights in Hong Kong's exports. 
At its peak in the early 1970s, the manufacturing sector contributed over 30 percent to 
GDP and employed nearly 50 percent of the labor force (Leung 1993). 
Migration from China to Hong Kong largely stopped after 1951, due to China's closed-
door policy. Dlegal migration was common, and controls were loose initially as they 
were deemed a source of labor supply. However, in the late 1980s, the problem of 
illegal migrants became fierce, forcing the authorities to tighten control, effectively 
putting a brake on growth of the labor force . From 1987 to 1994, the annual 
unemployment rate was persistently below 2 percent (Sung 1998). The stringency in 
labor supply was soon translated into rising wages, a situation further exacerbated by 
surging rental prices due to the scarcity of land. 
2.3.4 Phase IV (1981-96): Services-Based Center 
The problems of a labor shortage and rising wages in the region had begun to erode the 
comparative advantages of all the Asian NICs in labor-intensive exports. In response, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea decided to promote capital- and technology-
intensive exports to displace labor-intensive ones' In contrast, Hong Kong reoriented 
itself towards service industries. This change, different from those in the other three 
Tigers, was not guided by government policies but by the market's invisible hands. 
4 Singapore staned to move toward high-tech manufacturing in the 1970s, much earlier than Taiwan and 
South Korea. 
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In the late 1970s, China reopened its economy. In view of lower labor and land costs, 
and investment incentives offered to foreign investors in the Peal River Delta region, 
Hong Kong manufacturers gradually relocated production across the border. It is 
estimated that by the end of 1991 , in Guangdong alone, Hong Kong firms operated 
about 14,000 enterprises and employed about 3 million workers (Dodsworth and 
Mihaljek 1997). Employment increased to 6 million in 1997, equivalent to 20 times the 
entire manufacturing workforce in Hong Kong (Sung 1998). 
A large proportion of those cross border investments was related to outward processing. 
Hong Kong manufacturers imported semi-products and then re-exported them to China 
for compiling. The processed products were then exported back to Hong Kong for final 
packaging before being re-exported to end-user countries. 
Coincident with global financial liberalization in the 1970s, Hong Kong also started to 
reshape itself into an international financial center.5 The number of banks jumped from 
74 in 1977 to 165 in 1989, of which 134 were foreign banks. By 1991 , Hong Kong was 
already established as the second largest financial market behind Japan in the Asia-
Pacific region in terms of loan syndication, fund management, gold trading and stock 
market capitalization (Leung 1993). 
The dynamism of the Hong Kong economy during this period is best illustrated by the 
composition of GDP (Table 2.4). In 1980, when China had just adopted its open-door 
policy, secondary industry contributed 31 .7 percent to GDP in Hong Kong, out of which 
23 .7 percentage points were from the manufacturing sector. Since then, the share of 
manufacturing has shrunk steadily to 17.6 percent in 1990, and, further, to 6.5 percent in 
1997. The reduction all went to the tertiary industry. Its share grew from 67.5 percent in 
1980 to 74.5 percent in 1990, reaching 85 .2 percent in 1997. 
In terms of employment, the number for manufacturing fell by almost half during 1987-
97, from 916,000 to 443,900.6 However, industrial production index of the sector 
5 For further discussion of this topic, see Hui (1992), Ho (1991 ), and Jao (1994). 
6 Data are from Table 2.1 "Employed Persons by Industry," Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 
various issues. 
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increased from 116.3 in 1987 to 126.3 in 1995, before sliding back to 120.6 in 1997.' 
This reflects the fact that mechanization, automation and relocation of assembly-type 
operations to the mainland have made room for the development of more knowledge-
based and higher value-added manufacturing (Howlett 1998). 
Table 2.4: GDP Composition of Hong Kong by Production (%) 
Industry 1980 1985 1990 1993 1994 1995 
Primary 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Secondary 31.7 29.9 25.3 18.5 16.4 16.1 
Manufacturing 23.7 22.1 17.6 11.2 9.2 8.3 
Construction 6.6 5.0 5.4 5.2 4.9 5.4 
Others 1.5 2.7 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.3 
Tertiary 67.5 69.6 74.5 81.3 83.4 83.8 
Sale & hotel ' 21.4 22.8 25.2 27.0 26.2 26.6 
Transponation b 7.4 8.1 9.5 9.5 9.7 10.1 
Business services C 23.0 16.0 20.2 25.8 26.8 24.4 
Social services d 12.1 16.7 14.5 15.7 15.9 17.3 
Others 3.5 5.9 5.1 3.2 4.8 5.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: The Census and Statistics Depanment of the Hong Kong Government 
(http ://www.info.gov . hklcenstatdlhkstatlfas/fasidx. htm). 
(a) Sale and hotel services include wholesale, retail and trades, restaurants and hotels. 
(b) Transportation includes transport, storage and communications. 
(c) Business services include financing, insurance, real estate and business services. 
(d) Social services include community, social and personal services. 
2.3.5 Phase V (1996- ): Global Control Room 
1996 1997 
0.1 0.1 
15.5 14.7 
7.3 6.5 
5.8 5.8 
2.4 2.3 
84.4 85.2 
26.7 26.1 
9.8 9.3 
25.1 26.5 
17.6 17.4 
5.2 5.8 
100.0 100.0 
By the year of the hand-over, Hong Kong had already evolved into the most 
quintessential service-based economy. The two largest sectors are financing, insurance, 
real estate and business services, and wholesale, retail and trades, restaurants and hotels. 
, Data are from Table 4.7 "Indices of Industrial Production," Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 
various issues. 
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The fonner contributed 26.5 percent to GDP in 1997, whereas the latter contributed 26.1 
percent. 
Services are important not only to domestic output, but also to external trade. In 1997, 
the total value of exports of services was equivalent to 25.7 percent of GDP, or 15.2 
percent of that of exports of goods (Table 2.5); the corresponding figures for imports 
were 16.2 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively. Major trading services include 
transportation, travel and tourism, insurance, trade related services, financial and 
banking services. 
Table 2.5: GDP Composition of Hong Kong by Expenditure (%) 
1987 1991 1993 1995 1997 Annual growth 
rate 1987-97 
Private consumption 54.9 58.7 60.2 59.6 60.5 6.8 ' 
Government consumption 7.4 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.4 5.6 
Public investment b 3.3 3.4 4.8 6.9 7.5 15.9 
Private investment 22.1 25.7 30.7 36.7 48.7 15.3 
Changes in inventories 2.1 0.7 0.3 5.3 0.4 -10.9 
Exports of goods 81.5 122.7 147.9 167.0 168.7 14.5 
Less: Imports of goods 82.6 125.5 153.2 181.5 184.3 15.5 
Exports of services 24.0 24.3 25.8 26.3 25.7 6.4 
Less: Imports of services 12.6 15.9 16.4 16.6 16.2 8.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.6 
Source: Table 17.2 "Gross Domestic Product Estimates by Main Expenditure Component" and Table 17.6 
"Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation by PubliclPrivate," Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 
various issues. 
(a) The growth rate is the average annual growth rate. 
(b) Public and private investments are the gross value of expenditure on construction, machinery and 
equipment, including real estate developer's margin, and transfer costs of land and buildings. 
Between 1987 and 1997, the average annual growth rates of exports and imports of 
services in real tenns reached 6.4 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively, compared to 5.6 
percent of GDP. But the growth of trade of services was still behind that of trade of 
goods (14.5 percent for exports and 15.5 percent for imports). Despite this , in the run up 
to the next rnillenium, it is observed that the Hong Kong economy is entering another 
phase of structural change in which the fonner may gain greater momentum. Again, the 
China factor is the key catalyst for this transfonnation. 
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After almost two decades of economic reform, Chinese authorities have gradually 
shifted the focus of development from the southern to northern and western regions as a 
strategy to combat regional inequality. The preferential treatment previously enjoyed by 
the coastal region, such as foreign investment incentives, is now preserved for its inland 
counterpart. Secondly, as a consequence of economic advancement, labor costs in 
coastal regions have risen to a much higher level than that in the inland. Lastly, 
infrastructure like the port facilities in China has been greatly improved such that the 
reliance of Chinese exports on the shipment services of Hong Kong has been declining. 
Witnessing these changes of comparative advantage between the Chinese provinces, 
Hong Kong manufacturers have started to relocate low-cost, assembly-type productions 
from the Peal River Delta region further inland, and to free up manufacturing capacity 
in the former for higher value-added production. Moreover, in response to the decline of 
its own comparative advantage in conventional entrepot services, Hong Kong has 
gradually shifted resources to transshipment and, further, to offshore trade (see Chapter 
5) . That is, Hong Kong is evolving into a control center for trade servicing and 
financing, directing flows of goods around the globe without being involved in the 
actual operation. 
2.4 INTEGRATION WITH CHINA 
Despite the political disconnection before 1997, and the institutional insulation after, 
economic integration between China and Hong Kong has been deepening since the 
opening up of the Chinese economy. A comparison of economic structure and human 
capital content clearly indicates the two economies are highly complementary to each 
other (Table 2.6). In terms of economic structure, Hong Kong was extremely skewed 
towards the tertiary sector. China's economy was relatively more evenly distributed, 
with the secondary industry taking up almost half of GDP in 1997. In terms of the 
densities of accountants and lawyers, the figure for Hong Kong was around 9 times that 
of China! In 1995, Hong Kong already housed 405 banks and branch offices, 1,300 
accounting firms , and 3,000 management consulting firms; and nearly 800 foreign firms 
had set up headquarters in Hong Kong. 
The next two subsections describe the trade and investment linkages between Hong 
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Kong and China. 
Table 2.6: Economic Comparison between Hong Kong and China 
Hong Kong China 
Share of GOP (%) (1997) 
Primary 0.1 18.7 
Secondary 14.7 49.2 
Tertiary 85.2 32.1 
Professional staff (per 100,000) (1995) 
Accountants 35 4 
Lawyers 62 7 
Share oflabor force (%) (1997) 
Trade and commerce 30.3 12.1 
Finance and insurance 12.7 2.0 
Transport and communications 11.0 5.6 
Services (total) 75.2 26.4 
Source: World Bank (1997), Howlett (1997), and China State Statistical Bureau (1998). 
2.4.1 Trade 
Since 1978, commodity trade or visible trade between Hong Kong and the mainland has 
grown at an average annual rate of 28 percent (Howlett 1998). In gross value terms, 
China was Hong Kong's largest trading partner in 1997, and, reciprocally, Hong Kong 
was China's second-largest trading partner, second only to Japan. In 1997, China 
accounted for 36 percent of Hong Kong's total trade, including 90 percent of indirect 
trade; reciprocally Hong Kong accounted for 16 percent of the mainland's total trade 
(ibid.). 
Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the two-way trade between Hong Kong and 
China has arisen from the outward-processing investment of Hong Kong firms in the 
mainland. If measured in finished products, the US was still the largest end-user market 
for Hong Kong's exports in 1996. In that year, 34.3 percent of Hong Kong total exports 
were absorbed by China, compared to 21.2 percent by the US. However, in terms of 
final goods, China actually only accounted for 21.9 percent, compared to 25.2 percent 
for the US (see Chapter 5). 
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2.4.2 Investment 
In gross value tenus, Hong Kong is the largest 'foreign' investor in the mainland. By 
the end of 1997, the cumulative value of realized direct investment from Hong Kong in 
China was estimated at US$121 billion, equivalent to about 55 percent of total foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in China (Howlett 1998). By the end of 1996, over 88 percent 
of the outward FDI of Hong Kong was channeled to China (Sung 1998). 
Similar to the case of trade, the investment figures were exaggerated by the fact that a 
lot of capital flowing from Hong Kong to China originated from other economies. That 
includes capital from Taiwan to get around political barriers and "round-tripping" 
capital from the mainland itself to take advantages of foreign investment privileges. 
In fact, Hong Kong's dominant share of FDI in China reflects the backwardness of the 
investment environment in the mainland. Lack of functioning investment rules and 
regulations means that kinship, language and cultural affinity have become the 
passwords to business opportunities ." When added to geographical proximity, Hong 
Kong has vast advantages over other foreign investors. However, as the policy regime 
in China matures in the future, the comparative advantage of Hong Kong is likely to 
diminish. 
Secondly, when China first opened to FDI, it aimed to promote export oriented 
manufacturing industries. Since labor-intensive manufacturing firms tend to be of small 
to medium scale, Hong Kong investors were not in a disadvantaged position compared 
to their western counterparts. Moreover, western investors have been more interested in 
China' s domestic market, especially the services sector, which China was very reluctant 
to open in the past. Notwithstanding, since Deng Xiaoping's southern tour in early 
1992, China has progressively relaxed restrictions upon joint venture enterprises' 
participation in the domestic market, such as banking, real estate, tourism, shipping and 
aviation (Sung 1988). This is reflected in the fact that the share of services in inward 
FDI in China rose from 16 percent in 1992 to 27 percent in 1993, and further to 30 
8 Empirical evidence shows that sharing a common language can boost bilateral FDI flow by as much as 
250 percent (Wei 1995). 
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percent in 1995 (ibid.). If China successfully enters the World Trade Organization, the 
liberalization of its services sector will surely be accelerated. As the services sector 
normally incurs significant economies of scale, giant western enterprises are likely to 
gain ground in this area. 
Besides FDI, Hong Kong also has a significant role in channeling funds into China. For 
instance, among China' s commercial loans, over 60 percent were syndicated in Hong 
Kong (ibid.). By the end of May 1997,24 H-share stocks issued by Chinese state-owned 
enterprises had been listed on Hong Kong 's Stock Exchange, with a market 
capitalization of US$6.9 billion (Ni 1994). On top of this , 50 listed Hong Kong 
companies have been controlled by China, with a market capitalization of US$49 
billion, equivalent to 10 percent of the total value of the Hong Kong stock market (Sung 
1998). 
Reciprocally, China is one of the major 'foreign ' investors in Hong Kong. By the end of 
1995, China had invested a total of US$14 billion in Hong Kong, second only to the UK 
(Howlett 1998). About 1800 mainland enterprises have been established in the territory. 
Their investments are highly diversified, ranging from traditional areas such as trades, 
wholesale and retail , banking, transport and warehousing, to new areas like real estate, 
hotels, financial services, manufacturing and infrastructure development (ibid.). 
An event that signified China as a major player in Hong Kong's financial market was 
the Bank of China Group becoming a note-issuing bank in May 1994, along with the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) and the Standard Charted 
Bank. Since 1995 the other three major state banks, the People's Construction Bank of 
China, the Agricultural Bank of China, and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, have been granted banking licenses to operate in Hong Kong. The Bank of China 
Group has already become the second largest banking network in Hong Kong, only after 
the HSBC. 
2.5 POLICY REGIME OF HONG KONG 
The orientation of public policies in Hong Kong is "positive non-interventionism" - an 
akin of laissez-faire - coined by Philip Haddon-Cave, the Financial Secretary from 
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1971 to 1982:' 
"[Positive non-interventionism] involves taking the view that, in the great majority of 
circumstances it is futile and damaging to the growth rate of the economy for attempts 
to be made to plan the allocation of resources available to the private sector and to 
frustrate operation of market forces which, in an open economy, are difficult enough to 
predict, let alone to control. ,,10 
"The implications of the adjective 'positive' are important: when faced with an 
interventionist proposal, the Hong Kong Government does not simply respond that such 
a proposal must, by definitions, be incorrect. .. in all cases, decisions are made 
positively, and not by default, and only after the immediate benefits and costs are 
weighed against the medium and longer term implications of the interventionist acts 
proposed (including the inevitable difficulties of unwinding them).,,11 
The positive non-interventionism philosophy has been translated into several policy 
guidelines, including prudent fiscal policies, a simple and low tax system, minimal 
government, and non-discriminatory industrial and trade policies. 
2.5.1 Prudent Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal policy is the up front defender of positive non-interventionism. Over the financial 
year period of 1984/85 to 1996/97, only the financial year 1995/96 recorded a deficit of 
0.25 percent of GDP due to the peak spending on the Airport Core Program (Dodsworth 
and Mihaljek 1997). But on average, the government delivered a surplus equivalent to 2 
percent of GDP across the whole period. By the end of financial year 1996/97, fiscal 
reserves had accumulated to 14.5 percent of GDP (Mihaljek, Hussain et al. 1998). 
Hong Kong' s fiscal policy is characterized by its frequently wrong estimation of the 
budget balance. This is largely because the stock and property markets in Hong Kong 
, In fact, Britain had started to implement the laissez-faire policy in Hong Kong soon after it colonized 
the island in the mid-nineteen century (Howlett 1998). 
10 Haddon-Cave (1984), cited from Leung (1993:9). 
11 Haddon-Cave (1982), cited from Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997:23). 
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are generally volatile but the authorities tend to make a conservative estimation of the 
revenues from stamp duties on asset transactions and land sales (Dodsworth and 
Mihaljek 1997). As a result, stronger than budget-predicted activities in these two 
markets had envisaged an 'unexpected ' windfall of revenues over many years until the 
outbreak of the Asian crisis (see Section 6). From the policy-makers ' perspective, 
adopting a conservative scenario of revenue estimation helps deter demands for greater 
social spending, especially recurrent types. 
Due to the conservative budget proceeding and the volatile nature of revenue sources, 
there is a tendency for the surplus to rise during booming periods and to fall during 
depressed periods. Therefore, from the revenue side, this helps to stabilize the economy, 
as the standard Keynesian type management. From the expenditure side, the self-
imposed restraint implies that fiscal policies are barely counter-cyclical. Dodsworth and 
Mihaljek (1997) show that, over the financial year period of 1984/85 to 1995/96, the 
budget was largely neutral in terms of fiscal impulse. The only exception is that the 
investment peak on the Airport Core Program, which was up to 3 percent GDP, resulted 
in slightly expansionary effects in the following two years. 
2.5.2 Minimal Government 
Accompanying prudent fiscal policy is limited public spending. Government 
expenditure in Hong Kong is small as a percentage of GDP compared to OECD 
countries, mainly because of much more modest spending on social welfare and defense 
(ibid.). Before the hand-over, defense expenditure only took up about 0.1 percent of 
GDP; after 1997 the cost is fully borne by the Chinese government. 
Social security programs in Hong Kong narrowly target the lowest income group, such 
as the elderly, the disabled and new migrants from the mainland. To maintain labor 
market flexibility, unemployment benefits are extremely scare and restrictive. To resist 
the pressure from political parties and the community to demand greater spending on 
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social benefits, the government has committed itself to keeping the growth of public 
expenditure in line with GDP growth in the long run. 12 
A means to control growth of the public sector is marketization of government services. 
A "user pays principle" has been adopted for public utilities since the early 1990s, in 
that government departments charge the users of their services, including other 
departments within the government, to recover full operating costs (Ho 1999). A 
number of major public organizations have been incorporated so that they can be 
operated in market terms, such as the Mass Transit Railway, Housing Authority, 
Hospital Authority, and, coming up, the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation. 
2.5.3 Simple Tax System 
The Hong Kong tax system is arguably one of the simplest with the lowest rate in the 
world. Salary tax is limited to not more than 15 percent of total income, and profit tax is 
flat at 16 percent. The tax base of Hong Kong is rather narrow. Income taxes, comprised 
of a salary tax and a profit tax, raised 40.3 percent of total revenue in the financial year 
1996/97. Stamp duties plus several other internal taxes, together raised 16.6 percent of 
total revenue, whereas land sales, transactions and related interest earnings contributed 
another 14.2 percent. As pointed out by Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997), the current 
narrow-based tax system worked well in the past because of continuous strong 
economic growth, along with the low administrative and compliance costs of the 
system, and the incentives it provides for domestic and foreign investors. 
However, the Asian crisis has exposed the weakness of the system, in that public 
revenue relies excessively on equity and property market performance. Half of the total 
revenue is estimated to be property related (Granitsas 1999). In 1997/98, the downturn 
in the property market cut property related revenue by US$4.1 billion, equivalent to 
14.6 percent of the original estimated total revenue (Tseng 1999). As a whole, the 
estimated budget surplus of US$1.4 billion in the financial year 1998/99 eventually 
12 In annual budgets, the financial year 1986/87 is used as a staning point to measure the accumulated 
growth rates of GDP and public expenditure. Therefore, when measured on an annual basis, the growth 
rate of public expenditure can exceed that of GDP. 
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turned into a deficit of around US$4 billion. And the government forecasted the budget 
will not return to surplus until 2002/03 (ibid.)." 
2.5.4 Non-discriminatory Industrial and Trade Policies 
Coherent to the positive non-interventionism philosophy, the trade regime of Hong 
Kong is basically neutral to all domestic and external traders. Hong Kong is primarily a 
duty-free port and does not levy any tariffs on imports. Nevertheless, excise taxes are 
levied on some products, such as tobacco, cosmetics, alcohol, vehicles, and hydrocarbon 
oils. The purpose of these taxes is to raise revenue and fulfil specific policy objectives, 
like traffic control, environmental protection and health promotion. Hong Kong does 
not exercise any export or import quotas, with the only exception being the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement quota on textile and clothing exports. 
The government has provided limited support for industrial development, including 
zoning land for general and specialized industrial use, and funding facilities for applied 
research. Basically the government tries not to 'pick winners' through any protection or 
subsidizing schemes. 
Nonetheless, it is a fallacy to assume that laissez-faire is always the order of the day. 
For instance, all land resources are monopolized by the government, and property 
markets are dominated by a few big players (see Chapter 6). In the financial sector, the 
Hong Kong Association of Banks has acted like a cartel in control of interest rates via 
setting an "interest rate agreement" (lao and King 1990). Most public utilities are either 
government-owned or controlled by franchised private corporations. 
The Asian crisis has also prompted more government initiatives, if not interventions, in 
industrial development. In the 1999/2000 fiscal budget, the government proposed to 
establish a US$1.67 billion "Cyberport" to promote information multi-media industries. 
The tourism industry was also singled out as a legitimate sector for assistance. In 
addition to a US$64 million grant for a major tourism attraction Ocean Park, the 
" Despite the deficiency of the currency system, calls for widening the tax base were rejected by the 
Financial Secretary in his latest budget (see section 111-114 of Tseng (1999». 
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government committed to access the feasibility of building a Disney theme park in 
Hong Kong (Tseng 1999). In mid-1999, the government further proposed a US$1 
billion "Silicon Harbor" project to promote micro-electronic industries (Cheung 1999; 
Hui 1999). 
2.6 LINKED EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEM & ASIAN CRISIS 
Another important founding stone of Hong Kong's policy regime is the "linked 
exchange rate system." Soon after the change of sovereignty, the linked system was 
harshly tested by a financial crisis that ripped through Asia. This section elucidates the 
linked system, the impacts of the Asian crisis on it and on the economy as a whole, and 
what lessons can be learnt from the episode. 
2.6.1 Linked Exchange Rate System" 
The small but external-oriented nature of the Hong Kong economy makes nominal 
stability very desirable. This is revealed from the fact that, throughout its 150 years 
history, except for a ten-year period in the mid-1970s, Hong Kong has maintained 
certain kinds of fixed exchange rate regimes (Table 2.7). 
The only free floating period of the Hong Kong dollar was between November 1974 and 
October 1983. The floating regime worked fairly well in the first two years after its 
adoption, with both inflation and the growth of money supply and bank credit being 
fairly stable. Nevertheless, after the second quarter of 1977, the money supply and 
credit expanded at a rate three to four times that of GDP (Jao and King 1990). This 
eventuated into a persistent depreciation of the Hong Kong dollar and double-digit 
inflation. An asset price bubble was formed in 1981 due to the huge influx of foreign 
capital. Over-exposure of the banking sector to property related loans set the scene for a 
financial crisis. 
14 For references of the link exchange system in Hong Kong, read Nugee (1995), Dodsworth and Mihaljek 
(1997), Yarn (1998), Kwan and Lui (1996), and Jao and King (1990). Schwartz (1993) and Balino and 
Enoch (1997) provide a comparative perspective on the topic. 
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Table 2.7: Exchange Rate Regime for the Hong Kong Dollar 
Date 
Until November 4, 1935 
December 6, 1935 
November 23 , 1967 
July 6, 1972 
February 14, 1973 
November 25, 1974 
October 17, 1983 
Source: Nugee (1995). 
Exchange rate regime 
Silver standard 
Pegged to Sterling 
(Same as before) 
Fixed to the US dollar with ±2.25 percent 
intervention bands around a central rate 
(Same as before) 
Free floating 
Link system to the US dollar 
Reference rate 
£1 =HK$16 
£1=HK$14.55 
US$1 =HK$5. 65 
USS1=HKS5.085 
US$1=HK$7.80 
The instability in the monetary front crashed with a confidence crisis aroused by the 
protracted and opaque Sino-British negotiation during 1982-84 over the future of Hong 
Kong. On September 24, 1983, the Hong Kong dollar dropped to HK$9.60 per US$1 
and had lost 38 percent of its value measured in the US dollar since July 1982 
(Dodsworth and Mihaljek 1997). Derivatives from the currency crisis included a stock 
market crash, a real estate price slump, and runs on small banks. To stabilize the Hong 
Kong dollar, the government announced the installation of a currency board system in 
October 1984." Note-issuing banks were required to back the banknotes they issued by 
equivalent amounts of US dollars rated at HK$7.8 to US$l. Thereafter, the linked 
exchange rate system has constituted the backbone of Hong Kong's policy regime and 
the rate of HKS7.8 to US$1 has lasted up to the present day. 
Using a structural vector autoregression technique, Kwan and Lui (1996) show that 
shifting from free floating to the currency board system reduces output volatility in 
Hong Kong by over 62 percent, and price volatility by 42 percent, but at a cost of lower 
output growth. They argue that the performance of the currency board has been greatly 
enhanced by the prudent and stable fiscal policy of the government. 
15 Another measure taken by the authorities was to lift the 10 percent withholding tax on interest earned 
from Hong Kong dollar deposits, equalized the positions of assets dominated in the Hong Kong dollar and 
in foreign currencies, respectively. 
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2.6.2 The Storm 
Since its installation, the linked exchange rate system had seldom been challenged until 
the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in July 1997. Basically, until the end of August 
1998, the Hong Kong dollar was continuously under speculative attack. Each time the 
pressure was contained only after the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) had 
purchased Hong Kong dollars from the foreign exchange market. When the supply of 
Hong Kong dollars contracted, liquidity in the domestic inter-bank money market was 
in shortage. The Hong Kong Inter-bank Offered Rate (HIBOR) was then driven up to 
reverse the outflow of capital and to equilibrate the inter-bank market (Figure 2.1). At a 
brief moment on October 23, the overnight HIBOR was hit up from 9 percent to 280 
percent (Hong Kong Government 1998)!" Feeling the pressure of high interest rates, the 
stock market fell by lOA percent, compared to 4.7 percent in Singapore and 3A percent 
in Kuala Lumpur (ibid.). 
In August 1998, being aware of this interest rate defense mechanism, some speculators 
changed their strategies to "double market play." Speculators first borrowed Hong Kong 
dollars when Hong Kong dollar interest rates were relatively stable. On the other hand, 
they accumulated sizable short positions in the stock and futures markets. When they 
short sold their borrowed Hong Kong dollars in the foreign exchange market, Hong 
Kong interest rates were driven up - as anticipated. Therefore, as long as stock prices 
crumbled, even if the Hong Kong dollar was not devalued, the speculators could still 
gain from the stock and futures markets. The move of speculative funds was evidenced 
by the sharp rise in trading in stock index futures. In early August, the number of 
contracts of Gross Open Interest in spot Hang Seng Index (HSl) futures increased by 
over 30 percent, compared to that in June (HKMA 1999a). 
16 What caused the extraordinary interest spike on October 23 was the denouncement of the HKMA to 
charge a penalty rate on banks which "repeatedly borrow" through the Liquidity Adjustment Facility to 
meet the liquidity demand. But the authority did not specify the penalty rate and the definition of repeated 
borrowers till November 12. The uncertainty caused the banks to bid for Hong Kong dollars, which were 
simply not there, to settle their transactions. 
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Figure 2.1: Hong Kong Dollar Inter-bank Offered Rate 
(period average) 
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Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Hong Kong Monetary Authority. 
The attack intensified after mid-August. Based on the grounds that double market play 
is a manipulation of the system, the Hong Kong government decided to support share 
prices by purchasing equivalent to US$15.2 billion shares from all 33 constituent stocks 
of the HSI as well as HSI futures contracts. The maneuver was effective in frustrating 
double players, albeit it raised criticisms domestically as well as internationally that the 
authorities were walking away from non-interventionism. After August, HIBORs have 
eased quickly and significantly. 
2.6.3 Counting the Wounds 
The Asian crisis is one of the worst economic crises Hong Kong has ever experienced. 
GDP growth rate recorded -2.6 percent in the first quarter of 1998 - the fIrst negative 
fIgure in ten years (Table 2.8). The recession hit the bottom at the third quarter, with 
GDP growth rate dropped to 6.9 percent on the negative scale. 
Leading the fall was private consumption, which accounted for 60 percent of GDP 
(ibid.). Contraction in consumption was closely related to rising unemployment, a wage 
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freeze, sharp decline in asset prices and thus wealth, high interest rates, and a gloomy 
economic atmosphere." 
Table 2.8: Year-on-year Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Production (%) • 
1997 1998 
Quarter Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
Pri vate consumption 4.5 8.7 11.1 2.9 -2.6 -5.1 -10.0 -9.3 
Government consumption 4.6 5.6 -0.1 -0.4 2.1 -5.3 3.8 2.5 
Investment: b 19.7 15.8 13.7 13.7 -1.2 5.6 -9.2 -18.7 
Construction 2.9 8.2 12.5 3.3 5.4 6.1 -10.8 -14.5 
Machinery 28.2 14.1 7.1 19.4 -7.1 8.7 -6.0 -22.9 
Exports of goods 4.0 6.2 4.4 9.6 1.4 -0.5 -7.0 -9.6 
Imports of goods 6.4 6.9 7.1 8.2 -\.7 -1.8 -10.5 -13.5 
Exports of services 4.4 1.9 -3.9 -5.8 -10.0 -11.4 -4.3 -1.1 
Imports of services 4.3 -0.3 5.8 4.3 1.1 1.6 -2.6 -2.7 
GDP ' 5.7 6.7 6.0 2.8 -2.6 -5.1 -6.9 -5.7 
Source: The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Government 
(http://www.info.gov.hklcenstatdlhkstatlfas/tgdpl.htm). 
(a) Changes are measured in constant (1990) price. 
(b) Investment is defined as gross domestic fixed capital fortnation. 
(c) "Change in in ventories" is omitted. 
Export performance was also disappointing. But this was only partly ascribed to the 
disruption in the East Asian market, and perhaps more to the weakening import demand 
in China. In the second half year of 1998, the year-on-year growth rate of exports to 
China fell by 15.9 percent. The disorder in air cargo handling services in the new airport 
added to the poor export performance in July-August (Husain, Duenwald et al. 1999). 
A huge fall in investment was recorded in the second half of 1998. This was the joint 
result of interest rate spikes, the completion of the Airport Core program, the downturn 
in property markets, and cautious market sentiment. 
" It is estimated that a one percentage point increase in real interest rates lowers consumption growth by 
about 0.25 percentage point in the short run, and nearly 0.5 percentage point in the long run, as well as 
gross fixed capital formation growth by 0.4 percentage point (Dodsworth and Mihaljek 1997). 
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The impact of the crisis on the unemployment rate was disastrous (Figure 2.2). The 
unemployment rate rocketed up throughout 1998, attributed to downsizing and 
retrenching in the corporate sector. Also fueling the situation was a fast growing labor 
force due to housewives reentering the labor market, returned emigrants, and new 
mainland migrants (HKMA 1999a). By February-April 1999, the rate reached 6.3 
percent, the highest in 17 years (Husain, Duenwald et al. 1999). 
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2.6.4 Beyond the Storm 
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In the light of the experience from the crisis, in September 1998 the HKMA announced 
seven measures to strengthen the linked exchange rate system (HKMA 1999b). A major 
provision is to broaden the scope of Convertibility Undertaking from three note-issuing 
banks to all licensed banks. This allows them to convert their Hong Kong dollars in the 
HKMA clearing accounts into US dollars at the official exchange rate. The provision 
simply aims to reinforce the authority's credibility in maintaining the peg. 
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The second major provision is to allow banks unlimited borrowing from the HKMA in 
respect of repurchase agreement transactions involving Exchange Fund Paper, which is 
fully backed by foreign reserves. IS This is to remedy a shortcoming of the previous 
arrangement in that the size of the inter-bank money market, measured by the Aggregate 
Balance," was too thin compared to the total money supply. In 1996, the Aggregate 
Balance was just equal to 0.25 percent of Ml or 0.026 percent of M3.20 Consequently, 
movement of a small amount of funds could provoke volatile interest rate responses. 
And it was this kind of interest rate hike that provided speculators opportunities to 
engage in double market play. Once the Aggregate Balance is enlarged, speculators 
need to accumulate more funds to provoke the same scale of interest rate volatility. 21 
A clear aspect of the crisis is that, even if interest rate volatility is an inevitable tradeoff 
to maintaining exchange rate stability, the associated negative impact was unnecessarily 
aggravated by the excessive exposure of equity markets and banks to property related 
business.21 By the end of January 1998, property prices had dropped by about 30 percent 
from their peak in the third quarter of 1997 (Cheng, Wong et al. 1998). By the end of 
that year, property prices had fallen back to, and in some cases below, 1993-94 levels. 
In view of the vulnerability of the economy to a property market crash, in July 1998 the 
government announced two measures to stabilize property prices, along with five other 
actions on tax relief. The two measures were additional spending of US$460 million to 
subsidize first-time property buyers and, most controversially, a moratorium on land 
sales for six months (EIU 1998). 
18 Repurchase agreement, or "repo," involves one party selling securities to another party, with an 
agreement to repurchase them on a specified date and at a specified price. The purpose of repo is mainly 
to smooth liquidity shortages in the inter-bank market, though it is also used by some central banks as a 
monetary instrument (Yam 1998). It was done through the Liquidity Adjustment Facility in the HKMA 
previously, and now through the Discount Window. 
" The Aggregate Balance is the net balance in the clearing accounts maintained by banks with the HKMA 
for selling inter-bank payments. 
20 Figures obtained from the HKMA (hllp:llwww.info.gov.hklhkma!) and the Census and Statistics 
Department of the Hong Kong Government (http://www.info.gov.hklcenstatdlhkstatl). 
21 Besides, the authorities also tried to strengthen the operations in stock and futures markets. For details, 
see Hong Kong Government (1998). 
2' 
- For example, see Charles Goodhart's teller in Hong Kong Government (1998). 
39 
The moratorium was disputable despite the legitimate need to safeguard the banking 
sector. This is because to regain competitiveness, the economy required a downward 
adjustment of prices and real wages, whereas the moratorium on land sales actually 
represents engineered sluggishness in asset price adjustment. The consequence is 
prolonging the recovery of the economy from the crisis-led recession. 
Nevertheless, to a certain extent, this negative judgement about the moratorium is based 
on the presumption that the previous land disposal rate is (closer to) the optimal rate. 
Whether this is true is a complicated quantitative issue which goes beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Ho (1999), for example, provides a counter argument about the cause of the 
economic crisis in Hong Kong. He suggests the government's decision to allow public 
housing tenants to purchase their units at a highly subsidized rate upset the 'ecology of 
housing markets,' as it suddenly reduced demand in the private housing market. The 
excess supply of private dwellings dragged down property prices, curtailed activities in 
the construction sector, and thereby set off negative chain reactions in the economy. 
Therefore, Ho asserts that suspending land sales was the correct rescue policy. 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Three reflections can be made from the discussion in this chapter. 
Firstly, a portrait of development over the decades illustrates that China was the most 
influential external factor in the development of Hong Kong. The synergy between the 
two economies is reflected in their increasing interdependence in trade and investment. 
A follow up question is whether the integration between the two economies at the micro 
level replicates at the macro level in terms of correlation of business cycles. If this is the 
case, it is going to create a dilemma for Hong Kong in that, while its business cycles are 
influenced by those of China, under the linked exchange rate system its monetary 
policies are set (by the US) to mitigate those of the US. 
Secondly, the constraints in natural endowment and economic size imply that 
international trade is the gateway to economic success for Hong Kong. In fact , the vast 
hinterland provided by China greatly facilitates Hong Kong to specialize into 
international trade and financial services. Nevertheless, openness comes with a cost of 
greater exposure to external shocks and, hence, higher vulnerability of the 
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economy. This becomes more consequential when the monetary instrument has been 
surrendered under the currency board arrangement. As a result, other means have to be 
developed to alleviate the cost attached with international trade. 
Thirdly, adherent to the principle of positive non-interventionism, the Hong Kong 
government has refrained from excessively flexing its muscle. Partly due to prudent 
fiscal policies, and partly due to the high degree of openness, Keynesian type fiscal 
tools are not considered to be very efficient for macroeconomic management in Hong 
Kong. In this sense, giving up the monetary autonomy is particularly costly. 
Notwithstanding, the Hong Kong government has an instrument which is not commonly 
available to administrations in other market economies - control over land disposal. 
This opens up the possibility of substituting monetary-based demand side macro 
management with a land-based supply side one. 
These three aspects of exchange rate arrangement in Hong Kong are addressed 
respectively in the next five chapters. 
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Appendix 2 
Table 2.Al: Chronology of Economic and Political Events in Hong Kong 
Period 
1839-42 
August 29, 1842 
1842-44 
1844 
October 24, 1860 
1863 
1880 
Late 1980s 
June 9, 1898 
1935 
1949 
1967 
1968 
1971 
July 6,1972 
November 1974 
November 25, 1974 
Events 
Opium War between China and the UK. 
Hong Kong island abdicated to the UK under the Treaty of Nanking 
(Nanjing). 
No formal monetary standard was adopted. 
The pound sterling standard was adopted 
Kowloon Peninsula abdicated to the UK under the Treaty of Tientsin 
(Tianjin). 
The silver dollar standard was adopted. 
Major western industrial countries had already switched from the silver 
to the gold standard, including the US, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, 
and a number of European countries. 
Far eastern countries staned to adopt the gold standard, for instance, 
Japan in 1897, India in 1899, and the Philippines in 1903. 
New Territory was leased to the UK for 99 years under the Convention 
between China and the UK. 
China adopted the gold standard to avoid losing silver reserves. 
Hong Kong followed suit to abandon the silver standard. The pound 
sterling exchange paper standard was adopted consequently. It means 
Hong Kong adopted a currency board with sterling as the anchor 
currency. 
Sterling was pegged with the USS under the Bretton Wood Accord. 
The peg between sterling and the US dollar was broken. The Hong 
Kong dollar depreciated against sterling, leading to massive capital 
outflows. 
Both the UK and Hong Kong panicipated in the Basel Accord. 
Bretton Wood system broke down, all major currencies staned to float. 
Hong Kong dollar fixed to the US dollar with ±2.25 percent intervention 
bands around a central rate 
The US dollar attacked globally, and depreciated against the Hong Kong 
dollar. 
Hong Kong dollar began to float. 
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1974 
1978 
1982 
October 1983 
December 19, 1984 
June 4, 1989 
April 4, 1990 
1992 
1993 
May 1994 
July 1997 
June 1998 
August 1998 
September 1998 
November 17, 1998 
Hong Kong experienced great inflation, low growth, and particularly 
volatile business cycles. The HSI index dropped 60.5 percent in 1974 
andjumped 105 percent in the next year. GDP growth varied from 2.7 
percent in 1975 to over 16 percent in 1976. Inflation swung from 2.7 
percent in 1975 to 15.5 percent in 1980. The HK$ depreciated against 
the US$ from Hong Kong$5.1 in 1981 to HK$9.6 in 1983. 
China adopted an open door policy. 
China announced the intent to resume sovereignty of Hong Kong by 
July 1, 1997. 
~-----~---------------------~--------
Hong Kong readopted the currency board system, pegging to the US$ at 
a parity of HK$7.8 to US$I. 
Sino-British Joint Declaration signed. 
Crackdown of democratic movement in Tiananmen. 
China's parliament, the National People' s Congress, enacted the Basic 
Law of the Hong Kong SAR. 
Deng Xiaoping toured southern China and called for accelerating 
economic reform. 
H-shares started to list in Hong Kong's stock market. 
The Bank of China Group became the third note-issuing bank in Hong 
Kong. 
Hong Kong returned to China on July 1. 
Currency crisis in Asia emerged in the middle of the year. 
The newly established SAR government promised to build 85 ,000 
housing units per year and raise home ownership from 50 percent to 70 
percent of the population within ten years. 
The government announced a number of measures to stabilize property 
markets, including a nine-month moratorium imposed on land sales till 
the end of March 1999 
The government intervened in the stock market, purchasing US$15.3bn 
shares from domestic stocks. 
New measures were introduced to strengthen the Linked Exchange Rate 
system. 
Government announcement to merge the reserves held by the Land 
Fund (US$27.1bn) into those held by the Exchange Fund (US$94.2bn). 
Source: Tom (1989), Walters (1997), EIU (1998-99), Nugee (1995), Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997) , 
Kwan and Lui (1996). 
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Table 2.A2: Summary of Provisions of the Basic Law' 
Item b 
General 
autonomy (2) 
Economic system 
(5) 
Land and natural 
resource (7) 
Language (9) 
Property right 
(lOS) 
Public finance 
(106, 107, 108) 
Monetary and 
financial policies 
(109, 110, Ill) 
Chapter I: General Principles 
The National People's Congress authorizes the SAR to exercise a high 
degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent 
judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the 
provisions of this Law. 
The socialist system and policies shall not be practised in the SAR, and the 
previous capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 
years. 
The land and natural resources within the SAR shall be State property. The 
Government of the SAR shall be responsible for their management, use and 
development and for their lease or grant to individuals , legal persons or 
organizations for use or development. The revenues derived therefrom shall 
be exclusively at the disposal of the government of the Region. 
In addition to the Chinese language, English may also be used as an official 
language by the executive authorities, legislature and judiciary of the SAR. 
Chapter V: Economy 
The SAR shall , in accordance with law, protect the right of individuals and 
legal persons to the acquisition, use, disposal and inheritance of property and 
their right to compensation for lawful deprivation of their property. 
Such compensation shall correspond to the real value of the property 
concerned at the time and shall be freely convertible and paid without undue 
delay. 
The ownership of enterprises and the investments from outside the Region 
shall be protected by law. 
The SAR shall have independent finances. 
The SAR shall use its financial revenues exclusively for its own purposes, 
and they shall not be handed over to the Central People's Government. 
The Central People's Government shall not levy taxes in the SAR. 
The SAR shall follow the principle of keeping expenditure within the limits 
of revenues in drawing up its budget, and strive to achieve a fiscal balance, 
avoid deficits and keep the budget commensurate with the growth rate of its 
gross domestic product. 
The SAR shall practise an independent taxation system. 
The SAR shall, taking the low tax policy previously pursued in Hong Kong 
as reference, enact laws on its own concerning types of taxes , tax rates, tax 
reductions, allowances and exemptions, and other matters of taxation. 
The Government of the SAR shall provide an appropriate economic and 
legal environment for the maintenance of the status of Hong Kong as an 
international financial centre. 
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Foreign exchange 
policies (112, 
113) 
Trade policies 
(114, 115, 116) 
Development 
policies (118, 
119) 
The Government of the SAR shall, on its own, formulate monetary and 
financial policies, safeguard the free operation of financial business and 
financial markets , and regulate and supervise them in accordance with law. 
The Hong Kong dollar, as the legal tender in the SAR, shall continue to 
circulate. 
The authority to issue Hong Kong currency shall be vested in the 
Government of the SAR. The issue of Hong Kong currency must be backed 
by a 100 per cent reserve fund. 
The Government of the SAR may authorize designated banks to issue or 
continue to issue Hong Kong currency under statutory authority, after 
satisfying itself that any issue of currency will be soundly based and that the 
arrangements for such issue are consistent with the object of maintaining the 
stability of the currency. 
No foreign exchange control policies shall be applied in the SAR. The Hong 
Kong dollar shall be freely convertible. Markets for foreign exchange, gold, 
securities, futures and the like shall continue. 
The Government of the SAR shall safeguard the free flow of capital within , 
into and out of the Region. 
The Exchange Fund of the SAR shall be managed and controlled by the 
government of the Region, primarily for regulating the exchange value of the 
Hong Kong dollar. 
The SAR shall maintain the status of a free port and shall not impose any 
tariff unless otherwise prescribed by law. 
The SAR shall pursue the policy of free trade and safeguard the free 
movement of goods, intangible assets and capital. 
The SAR shall be a separate customs territory. 
The SAR may ... participate in relevant international organizations and 
international trade agreements (including preferential trade arrangements) , 
such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and arrangements 
regarding international trade in textiles. 
Export quotas, tariff preferences and other similar arrangements, which are 
obtained or made by the SAR or which were obtained or made and remain 
valid, shall be enjoyed exclusively by the Region. 
The Government of the SAR shall provide an economic and legal 
environment for encouraging investments, technological progress and the 
development of new industries. 
The Government of the SAR shall formulate appropriate policies to promote 
and co-ordinate the development of various trades such as manufacturing, 
commerce, tourism, real estate, transport, public utilities, services, 
agriculture and fisheries , and pay regard to the protection of the 
environment. 
Source: The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People' s Republic of 
China (hnp://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/englishlindex.htm). 
(a) The text is directly extracted from the Basic Law, except that "Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region" is replaced by "SAR." 
(b) Numbers in parentheses are the original Article numbers. 
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Chapter 3 
Chinese Monetary Union 
Part I 
Synopsis 3 
This chapter examines the economic sustainability of forming a monetary union 
between China and Hong Kong by focusing on symmetry of disturbances. In gener:iJ., 
certain European countries are found to be more correlated than Hong Kong and China. 
Hong Kong is correlated neither to its pre-1997 political sovereignty - the United 
Kingdom, nor to its long-term monetary sovereignty - the United States. However, if a 
two-quarter transmission time lag is allowed, then the correlation between China and 
Hong Kong becomes significant. The finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
disturbances are transmitted from the big economy China to the small economy Hong 
Kong. Nevertheless, Hong Kong is not uniformly correlated to all Chinese provinces. 
The more open and developed provinces around the coastal line are found to be more 
correlated with Hong Kong than their inland counterparts. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
"If China catches cold, Hong Kong will suffer from pneumonia." 
No other metaphor seems to describe the relationship between Hong Kong and China 
more sharply than this popular Hong Kong saying .. Behind the saying are two common 
viewpoints. First of all, Hong Kong and China are bonded together both politically and 
economically. Secondly, China has much more influence over Hong Kong than the other 
way round. The linkages between the two economies at the microeconomic level were 
depicted in detail in the last chapter. This chapter extends the analysis to the 
interrelation at the macroeconomic level. In the perspective of the exchange rate 
arrangement, the essential issue to be addressed here is, whether Hong Kong and China 
are integrated deeply enough to form a monetary union, namely the Chinese Monetary 
Union (CMU). 
The extensive literature of currency unification, which largely associates with the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), indicates a broad range of issues of relevance. A 
substantial proportion of the literature is concerned with institutional and transitional 
issues of the EMU. To some extent, it is superficial to discuss those issues in the context 
of the CMU, as it is merely a hypothetical concept rather than one proposed for 
implementation. Therefore, to keep the discussion in focus , this study is confined within 
some general macroeconomic aspects of monetary unification. The study basically 
follows the paradigm of optimum currency area (OCA) which, although not without its 
own limitations, remains the most common analytical framework in this field. 
The quantitative analysis focuses on symmetry of disturbances which, as argued below, 
is one of the most important convergence criteria in monetary unification. This is 
because if the member states of a monetary union are hit predominantly by synchronous 
shocks and their policy objectives are similar, one set of monetary instruments for the 
union is enough to manage all of their business cycles (Karras 1996). The cost of 
surrendering individual monetary autonomy will then be small; the union will hence be 
more sustainable. 
Two aspects about the symmetry of disturbances between China and Hong 
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Kong are worth emphasizing. l On one side, due to substantial structural differences 
between the two economies, the probability that they will be hit by symmetric shocks 
could be fairly low. On the other, through their close economic linkages, disturbances in 
one economy could be easily transmitted to the other (Angeloni and Dedola 1999), 
conceivably from the big economy China to the small economy Hong Kong. Inasmuch 
as the two factors give opposite deductions about the correlation of their business 
cycles, the overall outcome depends on which factor dominates. 
The structural vector autoregression (V AR) technique pioneered by Blanchard and Quah 
(1989) is used to measure the correlation of demand and supply shocks between China 
and Hong Kong. This technique has been widely adopted in the studies of monetary 
unification. This study makes two extensions in its application. Besides the 
contemporaneous correlation of shocks, it considers their lag correlation to test the 
transmission hypothesis mentioned above. Moreover, it acknowledges that China is a 
heterogeneous economy and its economic linkage with Hong Kong is highly biased 
towards the Pearl River Delta region. Therefore, the study disaggregates China into 30 
provincial units in order to examine whether there are sub-national OCA within the 
greater China continent. Lastly, to put things in perspective, the study is conducted in 
comparative terms. The EMU is an obvious choice for the benchmark. 
The remainder of the chapter is arranged in the following way. Section 2 reviews the 
literature of OCA theories; Section 3 looks at the limited application of OCA theories in 
the context of Hong Kong and China; Section 4 outlines the method for quantitative 
analysis; Section 5 discusses the estimation results and the last section concludes. 
1 As mentioned in Chapter I, "symmetry of disturbances" is an ex post concept here. It depends on the 
symmetry of events occurring to the member states in a union, as well as their reactions. The latter is 
determined by the symmetry of economic structures and policy responses between the member states. 
Insomuch as the vector autoregression model used in this chapter can not distinguish ex ante events from 
the responses of economies, an 'ex post' interpretation of disturbance is more appropriate. On the 
contrary, if structural models are used, as is the case in Chapters 5 to 7, an 'ex ante' interpretation of 
disturbances can be adopted. 
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3.2 OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREA THEORIES 
Discussion of monetary unification in the literature has been conducted predominantly 
under the framework of OCA. The basic concept of the OCA paradigm is to find out 
what the optimal domain of a currency area should be. Studies of OCA can be roughly 
categorized into the criterion, cost-benefit, and modem approaches, respectively. 
3.2.1 Criterion Approach 
Initial discussion of the OCA paradigm in the 1960s was basically an extension of the 
debate between flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes. Optimality is measured with 
respect to conventional objectives of macroeconomic policies: full employment, 
external balance and a stable price level (McKinnon 1963). 
The OCA paradigm primarily arises from the question of how to mitigate internal and 
external balances without nominal exchange rate (NER) realignments. Friedman (1953) 
suggests that regions with price and wage systems flexible enough to strike economic 
balances can maintain fixed exchange rates with each other. Thus, price and wage 
flexibility should be the first criterion to be examined in defining the domain of an 
OCA. 
Nevertheless, flexibility is a relative rather than an absolute concept. Since the whole 
discussion of OCA is about how to minimize the need for NER realignments, price and 
wage flexibility should be measured against NER flexibility as a benchmark. Obviously, 
compared to asset prices, which can jump instantaneously, it is bound to conclude that 
commodity prices and real wages are sluggish.' Consequently, other factors (i.e. criteria) 
that can compensate, partially or completely, the rigidity of prices and real wages, are 
called in. 
, Even if not put to such an 'extreme' of comparing with asset price movement, sticky price is widely 
considered practically relevant in economic studies. For example, see Obstfeld (J 997b) and Blinder 
(1997). 
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The most commonly mentioned criteria include labor mobility (Mundell 1961), 
openness (McKinnon 1963), diversification (Kenen 1969), and convergence in inflation 
rates (Fleming 1971). The larger the extent to which these criteria are met, the smaller 
will be the need for NER realignments to maintain internal and external balances:3 
Cl Labor mobility. Higher labor and capital mobility between regions can correct inter-
regional imbalances by transferring labor from depressed regions to booming 
regions. This criterion, however, is deemed hard to satisfy. Evidence in some 
currency areas like the United States, Canada, and the former Western Germany 
shows that labor mobility between regions, or even between industries, is low in the 
short run (De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke 1990; Eichengreen 1990a). Whereas it is 
exactly in the short run that prices and wages are rigid, so that high factor mobility is 
needed to reduce the cost of adjustment (Kawai 1994). 
Cl Openness. Openness can be measured by the output ratio of tradable to non-tradable 
goods. It is likely . that the more open an economy, the larger the proportion of 
tradable goods in price indexes. Consequently, NER change will have little effect on 
real wages or terms of trade.' In such case, monetary autonomy becomes immaterial. 
A caveat of this criterion is that openness comes along with exposure to external 
shocks, making it a double-bladed sword (Giersch 1973). 
Cl Diversity. For a diversified economy, imbalances in individual sectors tend to cancel 
each other if sector-specific shocks are random. So, there is little pressure to correct 
the external balance at the aggregate level. Diversification also reduces the size of 
each industry compared to the economy as a whole, undermining the impact of 
individual sector-specific shocks. Corden (1994:133) gives a precise summary of 
this and the previous criterion in that "For the large, diversified economy, real 
exchange rate devaluation brought about by nominal devaluation is possible but not 
3 For mathematical expositions of the above criteria, see Bayoumi (l992b) and Ricci (1997). 
4 Here terms of trade is defined as the ratio of a foreign tradable goods price index to the domestic price 
index. The domestic price index is composed of non-tradable goods prices and tradable goods prices. The 
latter is determined by world prices. 
53 
necessary ... , while for the small, undiversified economy, it is necessary but not 
possible" ,," 
o Inflation convergence. Surrendering individual monetary autonomy to a central 
authority implies a unified general inflation rate. If member states have different 
demands for seigniorage revenues or employment-inflation tradeoff, there may be 
conflicts in setting the centralized monetary policies. However, the availability of 
the employment-inflation tradeoff menu is highly conditional on the validity of a 
downward sloping Phillips Curve.' Therefore, some argue that harmonization of 
inflation rates is more a transitional problem than a one about sustainability (Vaubel 
1978). On the other side, even if the employment-inflation tradeoff exists in the 
short run only, it is still indispensable once there is hysteresis in the natural rate of 
unemployment (Zis 1995). 
Other criteria identified in the literature include fiscal integration (Scitovsky 1967; 
Ingram 1973), policy integration (Haberler 1970; Tower and Willett 1970), financial 
market integration (Ingram 1969), goods market integration (Mundell 1961), real 
exchange rate (Vaubel 1978), and economic size (Johnson 1973). The list goes on. As 
recognized by Vaubel (1978), the counting will hardly be completed, as in principle all 
factors that can shift the balance of payments should be included. 
Although the list is seemingly inexhaustible, if one looks at the issue in reverse, various 
criteria can be brought under the same framework. As pointed out by Kawai (1994), if 
goods and factors markets are completely integrated globally, all prices and real wages 
are perfectly flexible, and trade is free from any barriers and transportation costs, the 
OCA will be the whole world and the usefulness of money will be maximized. In 
essence, the criterion approach is to restate one by one the assumptions of a perfect 
world like factor mobility, or to raise a remedy for the imperfection such as greater 
diversification and openness. 
5 Long-term employment-inflation tradeoff definitely requires a downward sloping long run Phillips 
Curve. Short-term tradeoff between the variances of inflation and employment also requires a downward 
sloping short run Phillips Curve. 
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At the center of numerous criteria is indeed correlation of business cycles. This is 
because all OCA criteria are about adjustment without intra-union NER realignment. If 
the business cycles of member states are completely synchronous and their policy 
preferences are identical, there will be no intra-union imbalances; whether other criteria 
are fulfilled then becomes secondary. 
A critical drawback of this approach is that it does not take into account the after effects 
of monetary unification, especially those arising from policy harmonization. In other 
words, it implicitly assumes the exogeneity of those criteria in the process of monetary 
unification.' Furthermore, few hints are provided about how to compare the 
measurements of various criteria, as well as the relative weightings between them. 
Unless a landslide majority of ' votes' emerges, working through a checklist of criteria 
will not deliver a concrete conclusion. 
3.2.1.1 Empirical Evidence 
In earlier empirical analysis of the choice of exchange rate regime, cross-country data of 
exchange rate regimes (i.e. the explained variable) are regressed against selective OCA 
criteria (i.e. explanatory variables) to verify their importance in choosing the regimes. A 
survey of six studies by Chan (1996) indicates that openness, production diversification, 
economic size, inflation convergence, and nature of disturbances are consistently 
significant in determining the choice of exchange rate regime7 Nevertheless, unless the 
principle of revealed preference is presumed, there is no guarantee that the prevailing 
exchange rate regimes are optimal. 
6 This means that, in principle, studying monetary unification always requires a general equilibrium model 
that can pass the test of the Lucas Critique. 
7 The six studies are Branson and Katseli-Papaefstratiou (1981), Dreyer (1978), Heller (1978) , Holden, 
Holden et al. (1979), Melvin (1985), and Savvides (1990). 
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The emergence of the EMU on the agenda of international monetary arrangements has 
stimulated plentiful empirical research on OCA theories. Though the results for the 
EMU are mixed.8 
Inter-regional labor mobility, measured by the proportion of migrant workers in the total 
labor force, is two to three times higher in the US than in the European Community 
(EC) (OECD 1986). Eichengreen (1990b) finds that, in terms of dispersion of 
unemployment rates, the figure for the EC is double that for the US. Smaghi and Vori 
(1992) show that even the dispersion within individual EC member states has increased 
over time. The low mobility of labor in the EC is attributed to cultural and language 
barriers, as well as to incompatibility in social security systems. 
European economies are open to each other and intra-EC trade has been promoted by 
the Single European Act (i.e. the 1992 program). Over half of the trade in the EC is 
between EC members, compared to one-third in the North America Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA). Nonetheless,in contrast to the argument of McKinnon (1963), the greater 
closeness of the EC does not result in stronger nominal illusion. It is evidenced that real 
wage rigidity rather than nominal wage rigidity prevails in European labor markets, 
whereas the opposite happens in the US .' 
The diversification of manufacturing in the EC is found to be only about half of that in 
the US." The US experience shows that market integration can lead to higher regional 
specialization underpinned by comparative advantage. On the other side, some argue 
that the dominance of intra-industrial trade in the EC indicates exploitation of scale 
economies being the major determinant of industrial structure, which should be intact 
under market integration. The moral is one can not take for granted the effect of 
8 For recent surveys of thi s issue, see Eichengreen (1993), Obstfeld (1997), Wyplosz (1997), and Feldstein 
(1997). 
9 Based on the estimations of OECD (1989), Smaghi and Vori (1992) compute the indexes of real wage 
rigidity, which is defined as the ratio of the elasticity of nominal wage with respect to price over that with 
respect to unemployment, for a number of EC countries, the US, Canada and Japan. It is found that the 
index of the US is 0.22, while those of EC countries range from 1.0 (Belgium) to 6.8 (Germany). 
10 This is based on the calculation of Bini and Vori (1992), cited from Chan (1996). Also, see Helg, 
Manasse et al. (1995). 
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monetary integration on industrial structures and, hence, on the correlation of sector-
specific shocks. 
Lastly, inter-state fiscal transfer (indirectly through the federal budget) in the US is 
found to be about double that of inter-member fiscal transfer in the EC (Smaghi and 
Vori 1992)." Moreover, the transfer in the EC is more a means to redistribute incomes 
rather than to stabilize incomes, as the transfers are more concentrated on low-income 
countries like Portugal and Spain (ibid.). 
Somehow, such a comparison with the US is 'unfair' to the EMU in the sense that the 
latter was established on January 1, 1999, while the former has been established since 
the late 1780s. Inasmuch as a single monetary system may promote inter-union 
economic integration, ex ante measurements can provide references but not necessarily 
verdicts about the optimality of a currency union in waiting. This, indeed, is related to 
the issue of endogeneity of OCA raised by Frankel and Rose (1996) (see below). 
3.2.2 Cost-Benefit Approach 
The criterion approach discussed previously assumes the benefits of monetary 
unification to be given, and endeavors to identify what factors (i.e. criteria) can help to 
lessen the costS.1 2 And most of the concerns are about a single issue of losing individual 
monetary instruments to accommodate asymmetric shocks. Succeeding literature adopts 
a more comprehensive approach, contemplating the benefits as well as the costs of 
forming a monetary union. Likewise, issues other than idiosyncratic shock gain more 
and more attention. 
Under the cost-benefit approach, the OCA paradigm becomes a notion of the right 
balance between the costs and benefits of monetary unification. When the marginal 
11 A more recent study of Sorensen and Yosha (1998) also finds that both inter-state fiscal transfers and 
private capital market lendingfborrowing smooth consumption in the US to a much larger extent than in 
the EC. 
12 To a certain extent, the degree of fulfillment of those criteria also has implications for the amount of 
benefits. For example, the criterion of openness is related to the benefit from more intensified trade under 
monetary unification . 
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benefit of having one more currency is just equal to the marginal cost, an OCA is 
formed. Earlier studies with this approach include Grubel (1970), Ishiyarna (1975), 
Tower and Willett (1976). The approach still prevails in contemporary studies of the 
EMU, as seen in the reports of the Commission of the European Communities (CEC 
1990; 1991). 
The benefits of fonning a currency union mainly come from the enhancement of the 
conventional functions of fiat money as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a 
unit of account. In summary, monetary unification has the following benefits: 
o Transaction cost. Currency unification can release the real resources previously 
deployed in foreign-exchange transactions for other uses. In the case of the EMU, 
the saving in transaction costs is estimated to be approximately 0.4 percent of the 
EC's GDP (CEC 1990). 
o Exchange rate risk. Currency unification reduces intra-union NER and RER 
volatility and uncertainty. Various market instruments such as forward and swap 
contracts can also be used to hedge the exchange rate risk, but their own operations 
entail transaction costs. Besides, the long-term exchange position is hard to judge. 
So it is difficult to hedge long-term investment or trade against exchange risks when 
the sizes of those activities are functions of future exchange rates (Kenen 1997). 
o International currency. A unified currency is likely to be a more prominent currency 
in the foreign exchange market than individual member currencies due to the size 
effect. It implies a greater bargaining power of the member states as a whole in 
international forums. If the unified currency is used more widely than individual 
currencies by non-member states as a foreign reserve currency, international 
seigniorage revenues will also increase as a result. 
o Trade and investment. In the long run, a unified monetary system could have 
feedback effects on other aspects of regional economic cooperation such as intra-
union trade and investment, especially long-term investment like infrastructure 
projects (Morsink and Molle 1991). 
o Price stability. Abandoning national currencies guarantees relinquishment of 
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competing monetary policies within the union. Provided that the central monetary 
authority is credible in pursuing low inflation policies, it will improve the stability of 
price levels and, thus, further reinforce production, trade and investment. 
o Foreign reserves. It economizes the holding of foreign reserves for inter-union 
payments, as payment imbalances between member states will tend to cancel each 
other. 
A criticism of the above discussion is in order. It is not entirely clear whose welfare the 
OCA paradigm is referring to (Melitz 1995). For instance, from the point of view of 
Eastern European economies, it may be 'optimal' to join the EMU, but from that of the 
qualified EMU members, it may be 'optimal ' not to enlarge the un.ion to incorporate 
transitional economies. This problem becomes more complicated with multiple possible 
combinations of union memberships. 
Again, the primary cost of joining a currency union is the loss of individual monetary 
autonomy. This leads to several consequences: 
o Economic management. Member states lose individual monetary instruments for 
macroeconomic management. This is particularly important if they are 
predominately hit by asymmetric shocks. 
o Fiscal flexibility . Member states' long-term fiscal positions are constrained by 
monetary unification. Since money issuing is centralized by the union central bank, 
member states can not monetize their own debts (Bean 1992). Higher factor mobility 
in a common market, which is one of the OCA criteria, will further tighten the 
restriction. This is because a large public debt will signal factor owners about the 
possibility of higher future taxes. Therefore, it will prompt factor outflow, and 
contract the current tax base (Eichengreen 1993). 
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o Seigniorage. Member states will lose seigniorage revenues to the central money 
issuing authority. 13 But the net loss depends on how much of the centrally collected 
seigniorage revenues being redistributed to the member states. In 1988, the 
seigniorage revenues collected by countries with double digit inflation like Greece 
and Portugal were up to 2 to 3 percent of GDP, while those of over half of the EC 
countries were only around 0.5 percent of GDP (CEC 1990: 120)." 
o External exchange risk. Restricting the adjustment of NERs and RERs among 
member currencies may just shift the pressure to others, such as the exchange rates 
vis-a-vis non-member currencies (Fratianni and Hagen 1992). The consequence is 
that the benefits gained within the union may be neutralized, partly or wholly, by the 
losses made outside. 
In summary, the ultimate economic advantage of monetary unification is to raise outputs 
through reinforcing intra-union trade, investment and competition. This, nevertheless, 
relies on the existence of a positive relationship between economic activities and 
exchange rate certainty. While such a lower-uncertainty-stronger-activities hypothesis is 
theoretically appealing, it is difficult to verify empirically. This is because relationships 
between variability and level variables are much less understood than those between 
level variables. 
On the other hand, the major disadvantage of monetary unification is the loss of 
individual monetary instruments for macroeconomic management. The cost is 
determined by the usefulness of individual monetary instruments in ironing out business 
cycles. The cost is twofold. For risk-averse economic agents, their welfare will directly 
be reduced due to greater volatility in consumption. Besides, stronger business cycles 
may have adverse impacts on growth, counteracting the benefits from lower volatility in 
13 Sinn and Feist (1997) consider a special issue of transitional gainsflosses of seigniorage amongst the 
EMU members due to conversion of reserves (bonds, gold, international currencies and alike) into euros. 
They find that countries with relatively large monetary bases such as Germany, the Netherlands and Spain 
could lose per capital wealth of 182 to 406 ecus. 
" The flow amount of nominal seigniorage revenue is simply equal to that of money creation. The volume 
of real seigniorage revenue lost by a member state expressed as a proportion of GDP, is equal to the 
growth rate of nominal money supply divided by the velocity of circulation (Bean 1992). 
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exchange rates (Ramey and Ramey 1995). Both impacts, again, rest on relationships 
between variability and level variables. 
Consequently, unless the connections between variability and level variables can be 
clearly defined, exact measurements and comparison of the costs and benefits would be 
arduous to carry out. 15 This difficulty is well summarized by Wyplosz (1997: 18): 
"Assessing the cost and benefits of monetary union quantitatively is both frustrating and 
useless. It is frustrating because, frankly, as economists we are unable to compute them 
with any precision, and we owe it to the profession to admit so in public. Our 
understanding of monetary and exchange rate policy is regrettably limited, and the lack 
of a precedent leaves us with more conjectures than certainties. Moreover, quantitative 
estimates are useless unless they are sized up against the costs and benefits of the 
relevant alternatives, which is equally beyond our curtent ability. The best that can be 
done in this situation is to gain an understanding of where the costs and benefits are 
likely to reside." 
3.2.2.1 Empirical Evidence 
Notwithstanding all the difficulties mentioned above, limited empirical evidence does 
exist. CEC (1990) is an ambitious attempt to quantify the net gain of the EMU. But it is 
criticized as overstating the best scenario to justify the economic desirability of the 
EMU. The empirical result of Frankel and Rose (1996) casts some doubts on the 
conventional wisdom of OCA theories in that the OCA paradigm can be an endogenous 
result, rather than a prior condition, of monetary unification. They establish that trade 
integration can enhance the correlation of business cycles between panner economies, 
undermining the usefulness of individual monetary autonomy in a monetary union. This 
concept of endogeneity of OCA also gains support from Molle and van Mourik (1988), 
who show that labor mobility is fostered by, among others, trade linkage. 
15 This echoes the views of Obstfeld (1997b), Bean (1992), and the Swedish Government Commission on 
the EMU (1997). 
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On the other side, a survey study by the International Monetary Fund concludes that 
there is no concrete association between short-run exchange rate variability and trade 
(IM:F 1984). Frenkel (1992) also finds that the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on 
trade is marginal, with a doubling of the standard deviation of RER associating with a 
0.7 percent reduction of trade volume. '6 Eichengreen (1993) ascribes this result to the 
buffer effects of forward markets. These findings are important, because if the linkage 
between exchange rate stability and trade volume is not warranted, then that between 
monetary unification and synchronization of business cycles will also be discounted. 
Notwithstanding, the impact of monetary unification on trade and investment could 
come from the harmonization of institutional and policy settings rather than from 
exchange rate certainty. 
3.2.3 Modem Approach 
Following the unsuccessful implementation of the EMU in the earlier 1970s, the OCA 
paradigm faded out from the debate of international monetary arrangements. However, 
with the return of this international monetary architecture in the 1980s, OCA has 
emerged into the limelight again. While the prevailing analytical framework remains the 
cost-benefit approach, economists have attempted to incorporate more dynamic 
elements into traditional static analyses. Such efforts are indeed a reflection of the 
development of modem economic theories such as game theory, rational expectation, 
and endogenous growth, as well as of the practical issues arising from the launch of the 
EMU. 
For instance, under the Solow-Swan growth model, given a constant saving rate, higher 
efficiencies of resource allocation due to sharing a common currency will result in an 
outward expansion of the production frontier. But it only generates a medium-term 
growth during the transitional period from the old to the new frontier. However, 
endogenous growth models predict a much larger gain. Using an increasing returns-to-
16 This is cited from Eichengreen (1993). 
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scale and a profit-motivated innovation growth modeJ ," Baldwin (1989) estimates that 
the dynamic impacts might amplify the benefits of the 1992 program by as much as 450 
percent I 
Whereas precise quantification of the impacts of monetary unification is still beyond 
reach, recent advancements in empirical techniques do allow researchers to explore this 
territory more than ever before. Examples include the econometric modeling works of 
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994a; 1997), Whitt (1995), 
and Hartley and Whitt (1997); the multicountry general equilibrium modeling efforts of 
Masson and Symansky (1993), Fair (1998), McKibbin and Bok (1995), and Gagnon, 
Masson et al. (1996); and an unconventional genetic approach of Ghosh and Wolf 
(1994). 
Furthermore, the launch of the EMU opens up a bunch of strategic, transitional, spatial 
and institutional issues of monetary unification. Specific topics include independence of 
central banks, motivations for dominant and peripheral countries to join a currency 
union, and mUlti-speed approaches of unification; for example, see Beetsma and 
Bovenberg (1998), Ghironi and Giavazzi (1998), Kenen (1995), Baldassarri and 
Mundell (1993), and CEC (1990; 1991). 
In practice, the EMU membership requirements spelled out in the Maastricht Treaty 
emphasize more about policy credibility and convergence than structural compatibility 
like openness or diversification. The four admission conditions include convergence in 
the inflation rate, convergence in the long-term interest rate, stability in the NER, and 
sustainability in public finance 1 8 These apparently fairly rigid admission conditions are 
to safeguard a smoother transition to the EMU and to lower the risk of compromising 
17 For details of these models, see Romer (1987a), Romer (l987b), Grossman and Helpman (1988a) and 
Grossman and Helpman (l988b). 
18 Explicitly, the four admission provisions are as follows (Kenen 1995; Klein 1998): 
(i) the inflation rate does not exceed by more than 1.5 percent that of the three best performing states; 
(ii) a member state does not unilaterally devalue its currency against any other members' currencies at 
least in the previous two years; 
(iii) the long-term interest rate does not exceed by more than 2 percent that of the three members with the 
lowest inflation rates in the previous year; and 
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future centralized monetary policies (Klein 1998). Notwithstanding, they are not 
completely well received. Proponents of the opposite fast-track approach assert, under 
the belief of monetarism, that if the European Central Bank (ECB) is independent a 
painless adjustment process can be immediately achieved, leaving the convergence 
criteria redundant (Wyplosz 1997). 
Among the four criteria, fiscal convergence becomes an increasingly disputable issue. 
Dornbusch (1997) argues that the requirement of fiscal consolidation is unnecessary, 
insofar as the provisions of independence for the ECB and of no bailouts of public debts 
sufficiently shield monetary policies from poor fiscal management. De Grauwe (1996) 
holds a similar view that member states should be allowed to equip with fiscal 
instruments for macro management, and the market will impose disciplines upon them, 
as evidenced in the debt performance of state and municipal governments in the US. 
Nonetheless, Wyplosz (1997) points out that market failure does exist and correctional 
reactions of the market tend to be abrupt. The request of Italy for a "temporary" 
departure from the budget deficit criterion a few months after the launch of the euro in 
January 1999, to a certain extent, demonstrates the (over) stringency of this convergence 
condition. 
In summary, the launch of the EMU has widened the scope of monetary unification 
studies from conventional OCA theories to incorporate institutional and political 
economic issues. Equipped with contemporary economic theories, the modern approach 
puts far more emphases on the interaction between member states, and that between 
private agents and policy makers. Thus, it is the inclusion of individual agents ' reacting 
behaviors that gives rise to a richer dynamic dimension in the modern approach of 
monetary unification analysis. 
(iv) the budget deficit does not exceed 3 percent of GDP, and the government debt does not exceed 60 
percent of GDP. 
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3.3 CHINESE MONETARY UNION 
3.3.1 Is Hong Kong an OCA? 
As shown previously, most empirical applications of OCA theories are based on the 
EMU. Some exceptions exist. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994a) and Ghosh and Wolf 
(1994) have a global perspective; Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994b) focus on the 
NAFT A trio ; Horvath and Grabowski (1997) apply the theories to the African continent; 
and Chan (1996) analyzes the exchange rate arrangement of a sub-national economy -
Hong Kong. In particular, Chan (1996) is the only OCA study with reference to Hong 
Kong that is known to us to date. 
The theme of Chan (1996) is very similar to this study, though the focus is different. 
Chan lists nine OCA criteria to test whether Hong Kong should adopt a floating 
exchange rate regime, and if not, which currency area it should join. Five currencies are 
selected in his study as the candidate nominal anchors for the Hong Kong dollar, 
including the renminbi, US dollar, pound sterling, Deutschmark and Japanese yen. 
Three countries in the US dollar zone and 12 countries in the French franc zone are used 
for comparison (abbreviated as Z15 henceforth)19 
The results of Chan seem to clearly reject the hypothesis of Hong Kong being an OCA. 
For instance, Hong Kong has a very internationally mobile labor force, though outward 
migration is driven more by political factors. In the early 1990s, about 35 percent of the 
population in Hong Kong was born in China and another 5 percent in other countries. 
Hong Kong is also home to a large number of foreign workers on a temporary basis, 
including domestic helpers, unskilled workers, and professionals. With the opening up 
of the Chinese economy, there are increasing numbers of Hong Kong people, mostly 
professional and businesspersons, working in China. In the early 1990s, migrant workers 
19 The 12 countries in the FF zone are: Chad, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Togo, Central African Republic, 
Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon; the three countries in the US dollar zone 
are: Panama, Venezuela, and Oman. 
65 
made up about 7 percent (5 percent incoming and 2 percent outgoing) of the total labor 
force (ibid.). 
Secondly, as an international trading hub, Hong Kong is extremely open. In 1997, it 
ranked fourth in world merchandise trade and fourteenth in commercial service trade.20 
Its trade to GDP ratio is much higher than those of the Z15. In terms of export and 
production diversification, which are measured in terms of both market and product 
concentration, Hong Kong is also among the top band of the Z15 , but falls short of 
having the best performance (ibid.). 
Furthermore, financially, Hong Kong is highly integrated with the rest of the world. This 
is reflected from the status of Hong Kong as an international financial center, the 
presence of major international financial institutes, and completely free global capital 
transactions. 
On the other hand, the findings of Chan about the choice of the optimal nominal anchor 
for the Hong Kong dollar are not that definite. Out of the nine criteria, two favor the 
renminbi (labor mobility and political linkage) , one the Japanese yen (inflation 
convergence), and four the US dollar (openness, financial integration, symmetry of 
disturbance, and RER variability). The remaining two criteria are neutral for this 
question (diversification and economic size). 
Overall, the proposition of Hong Kong being an OCA is firmly rejected by Chan. This 
finding justifies the motivation of this study. Notwithstanding, there is room for further 
investigation about the choice of the nominal anchor for the Hong Kong dollar. This is 
because, firstly, the results in Chan's study are not overwhelmingly conclusive, although 
the US dollar seems to have the most favorable position. 
Secondly, as recognized by Chan, many OCA studies simply start with national 
boundaries and, therefore, overlook the possibility of having sub-national OCAs. To a 
certain extent, Chan falls within his own criticism. Given the size of China, the diversity 
20 Merchandise trade includes both domestic and re-exports. Ranking and trade figures can be found in the 
web-site of the WTO (http://www.wto.org/wto/statis/prerelease.htm). 
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of development in different regions, and, most importantly, the bias in economic 
integration between Hong Kong and the southern provinces, treating China as a 
homogenous entity is not unquestionable. 
Thirdly, in analyzing symmetry of disturbances, Chan deploys the decomposition 
technique of Cohen and Wyplosz (1989). The method is to extract error terms from 
autoregressions of macroeconomic data like GDP, and interpret the sums of the error 
terms for two economies as symmetric shocks, and their differences as asymmetric 
shocks. This method is, nevertheless, criticized as atheoretical (Giovannini 1989). Most 
crucially, the method does not distinguish between disturbances and responses . As 
pointed out in CEC (1990:284), macroeconomic fluctuations are "the outcome of a 
combination of the working of the economy and policy intervention. To the extent that 
the latter are unexpected, they also act as shocks and therefore as a source of 
macroeconomic fluctuations." Inasmuch as policy interventions to exogenous 
disturbances are likely to be harmonized or restricted under currency unification, 
filtering out policy-induced impulses from the measurements of business cycles 
becomes necessary in assessing the viability of a candidate currency union. This issue 
becomes even more prominent in the case of Hong Kong with the presence of a currency 
board arrangement. Given that the currency board restricts the interest rate and monetary 
policy discrepancies between the US and Hong Kong, the method adopted by Chan 
might be biased favorably towards the US dollar at the outset. 
3.3.2 Symmetry of Disturbances 
In view of the limitations of Chan (1996), this study aims to analyze the issue of 
symmetry of disturbances at a deeper level. This study does not repeat the estimations of 
other criteria in Chan' s study, because the methods of measuring those criteria are 
relatively indisputable, and the results in Chan (1996) are quite sensible. 
Beside the insufficiencies mentioned above, there are good reasons why the issue of 
symmetry of disturbances deserves special attention. As argued previously, a major cost 
of forming a monetary union is the loss of individual monetary instruments. The size of 
this cost depends on three factors: (i) flexibility of prices and real wages ; (ii) symmetry 
of disturbances between member states; and (iii) similarity of policy objectives between 
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them. Even if prices and real wages are sluggish in the short run, as long as synchronous 
shocks dominate idiosyncratic shocks and the member states' policy objectives are 
comparable, one set of monetary instruments is still sufficient to manage the business 
cycles for all the member states. Therefore, the economic stress of surrendering 
individual monetary autonomy will be small. In a word, other things being equal, the 
more symmetric the disturbances between the member states are, the more sustainable 
the union will be. 
The diverse impacts on various European countries of the oil crisis in the 1970s and 
those of German unification in the early 1990s well demonstrate the practical 
significance of symmetry of disturbances (Mussa 1997). In the case of the EMU, the 
fiscal consolidation provision in the Maastricht Treaty, which limits the scope of 
manipulation of fiscal policies, raises the importance of synchronization of disturbances 
between the member states even further. 
The next sections estimate the symmetry of disturbances between China and Hong 
Kong. To benchmark the measurements, the symmetry of disturbances between a 
number of European countries is estimated too. Furthermore, considering the vast 
differences between various parts of China, this study also examines the symmetry 
between Hong Kong and individual Chinese provinces. 
This study aims to distinguish supply and demand disturbances. Presumably supply 
shocks are determined relatively more by structural elements, while demand shocks 
more by policy innovations (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1994a). Thus, the former 
conveys more relevant information than the latter about the sustain ability of a monetary 
union in waiting. 
There are two competing elements in determining the symmetry of disturbances between 
China and Hong Kong. On the one hand, the' two economies have very dissimilar 
economic structures. In 1997, about 19 percent of China's GDP came from primary 
industry, 50 percent from secondary and 32 percent from tertiary. In Hong Kong, 
primary industry almost does not exist, whereas tertiary industry accounts for over 85 
percent of GDP. The discrepancy in economic structure implies that they are unlikely to 
be hit by symmetric sector-specific shocks. 
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On the other hand, the two economies are deeply integrated and complementary (see 
Chapter 2). This is reflected from the fact that they are the largest trading and 
investment partners of each other in gross value terms. This connection implies that 
disturbances from one economy can easily be transmitted to the other, perceivably from 
the big economy China to the small one Hong Kong. 
In summary, the structural divergence between the two economies implies that their 
business cycles are unlikely to be correlated; the transmission channel, however, gives 
an opposite deduction. Consequently, the overall outcome depends on which competing 
factor dominates. Testing this hypothesis is the centerpiece of the following quantitative 
analysis. 
In fact, the above hypothesis has already gained support from the empirical works of 
Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997) and Husain (1997).21 Dodsworth and Mihaljek measure 
the correlation of business cycles between the US, Hong Kong, and China with output 
gaps in annual terms (Table 3.1). Output gap is measured by the difference between 
actual GDP and potential GDP; the latter is basically a measure of disturbance-freed 
growth trend. 
From Table 3.1, it can be seen that over 1978-85, 1985-91, and 1991-96, the business 
cycles between Hong Kong and China have been increasingly synchronized, and so are 
those between China and the US. Husain (1997) shows that the correlation between the 
cyclical components of Hong Kong's GDP and industrial production in China rose from 
about -0.2 in mid-1986 to about 0.9 in early 1992, but then gradually declined to 0.6 by 
1996. 
Secondly, the correlation between the US and Hong Kong was greater than that between 
China and Hong Kong before the 1990s, but the latter doubled the former during 1991-
96. Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997) suggest this is a result of the on-going economic 
integration between Hong Kong and China. On the other hand, division of labor 
between the two economies enables Hong Kong to specialize in service industries. 
21 The empirical work in this chapter had been finished before the two studies were published. 
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Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997) argue this explains why the amplitude of the business 
cycle (i.e. the standard deviation) of Hong Kong became so distant from that in China, 
but increasingly comparable to that of the US. 
Table 3.1: Correlation of Output Gaps between Hong Kong, China & the US 
1978-85 1985·91 1991-96 
Correlation between output gaps' 
Hong Kong·China -0 .51 0.07 0.63 
Hong Kong·US 0.13 0.43 0.34 
China-US 0.67 0.75 0.88 
Standard deviation of the output gap 
Hong Kong 3.17 3.36 0.54 
China 2.99 3.92 3.02 
US 2.61 1.31 0.57 
Source: Table 3 of Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997). 
Ca) Output gap is a measure of output fluctuation, equal to the difference between actual GDP and 
potential GDP. The latter is estimated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to annual GDP data in 
constant prices over the period 1961-1996. 
Despite the results of the two studies seeming to be very supportive of the hypothesis 
put forward in this study, a drawback must be pointed out. That is, like the analysis of 
Chan (1996), their measurements do not distinguish between exogenous impulses and 
policy innovations and, therefore, could be biased by the prevailing currency peg 
between the US and Hong Kong. 
3.4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
This section is to explain the quantitative method deployed to identify individual shocks 
from time series data. The estimation results are reported in the next section. 
A common empirical definition of shocks is deviations from a predictable trend. But 
there is little consensus about which decomposition methods are preferable. The method 
used in this study is one of the most common decomposition techniques in the literature, 
pioneered by Blanchard and Quah (B&Q) (1989). The method is to use V AR technique 
to decompose disturbances in output and price (or unemployment rate) into two 
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kinds of shocks, namely demand and supply shocks. 
The B&Q method is adopted partly because high frequency time series macroeconomic 
data for China were limited at the time of writing. Therefore, it has to confine the 
analysis within a bivariate system. 
As a member of the V AR model family, the B&Q method has the general advantages of 
avoiding simultaneity and exogeneity problems. Besides, a specialty of the B&Q method 
is worthwhile highlighting. Unrestricted V AR models are commonly criticized as 
atheoretical on the one side (Cooley and LeRoy 1985). Traditional well-structured 
simultaneous equation models are challenged as imposing "incredible identifying 
restrictions" on the other (Sims 1980:4)22 The B&Q method attempts to strike a balance 
between these two 'extremes' by imposing minimal restrictions on a bivariate V AR. In 
particular, only one long run restriction is imposed on output; the short run dynamic of 
output and all dynamics of price are not restrained. These restrictions allow one to link 
the V AR model with structured macroeconomic models, especially the aggregate-
demand-aggregate-supply (AD-AS) model, which is already a workhorse in 
macroeconomics. 
3.4.1 Blanchard and Quah Decomposition 
If a vector of variables XI is stationary, it can be represented by a vector moving average 
representation: 
X, = Aou, + Ajur-l +~U'_2+'" 
= A(L)u" (3 .1) 
E(uu') = 1 2 3 
22 For a brief review of relationship between V AR and structural modeling, see Diebold (1998) and 
Clements and Mizon (1991). 
23 Constant, time trend, seasonal dummies and other dummies can be added if necessary. The discussion 
will be invariant to those additional variates. 
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u/ s are the vectors of structural shocks of interested. A(L) is a matrix polynomial of lag 
operators, and matrixes A/s (j = 0, 1, . .. ) are the impulse responses of X, to u,-/s 
respectively. E(uu') = I is an imposed condition. Restricting the variances of the 
structural shocks to be one is just a normalization process. Restricting all the 
covariances to be zero implies that the structural shocks are orthogonal . 
u/s are not directly observable. However, the representation (3.1) can be recovered by 
estimating a vector autoregressive representation of X,: 
X, = BIX'_I + B2X'_2+ ... +BnX,_n + ... +e, 
= e, + Cle'_1 + C2 e'_2 + ... , (3.2) 
E(ee') = Q . 
where e, is a vector of estimated errors. 
While equations (3.1) and (3.2) look very similar, the latter can be estimated directly 
from the data, but not the former. This difference arises from the fact that the elements 
of u, are required to be uncorrelated contemporaneously, whereas no such restriction is 
imposed on e,. 
Notwithstanding, (3.1) and (3.2) must be connected in a certain way, as they are merely 
different representations of the same data generating process. ill fact, comparing (3.1) 
and (3.2) gives 
u, = Ao -Ie, (3.3) 
Aj = CjAo. (3.4) 
To convert e/s back to u/s, and to obtain A/s, it is necessary to identify the matrix Ao. 
Consider the case that X, has only two elements: change of output (L1y,) and change of 
price (L1p,)24 In this bivariate system, Ao has four elements, so it requires at least four 
24 In the case that the price level is I(2), dp is replaced by tJ'p. 
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restrictions to identify it. The first three restrictions are indeed the nonnalization and 
orthogonality conditions. They can be denoted by: 
AoAo' = Q .25 (3.5) 
The last restriction is that one of the components of u" say Ult, has no long run impact 
on output (y). The long run impact on output is equal to the sum of the impacts on Lly , 
from time zero to infinity. Since the impact of U l , on Lly, after j periods is equal to ail' 
The long run neutrality restriction on Ul, can be represented by: 
Iail =0 . (3.6) 
j =O 
The restrictions (3.5) and (3.6) provide four linear equations that can be solved for the 
four elements in the matrix Ao. Hence, the series of structural shocks, u" can be fully 
recovered by equation (3.3). After recovering the series of structural shocks for 
individual economies, the correlation of shocks between different economies can be 
calculated. 
3.4.2 Structural Shocks 
The interpretation of structural shocks basically depends on the number of variables and 
the imposed restrictions. For a system with n variates, generally no more than n shocks 
can be decomposed.26 In other words, in the above bivariate system, even if there are 
many different types of shock hitting an economy, they can be distinguished into two 
broad categories only. 
Recall that four restrictions have been imposed upon the system to make it identifiable. 
The first two are merely normalization conditions, giving no economic meaning to the 
structural shocks. The third restriction is that the two structural shocks are mutually 
25 Since e, = AoU" E( ee') = Ao E(uu ')Ao' = Ao lAo' = D. 
26 Nevenheless, this is not an absolute rule. Hanley and Whitt (1997) use a generalized method of 
moments model to identify demand, supply, transitory, and permanent shocks from a bivariate system. 
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uncorrelated contemporaneously. Although possessing no explicit economic meaning, 
this restriction upholds the robustness of the interpretation of the results (Cooley and 
LeRoy 1985). If this assumption is invalid, then the estimated structural shocks are 
essentially linear combinations of the actual but correlated structural shocks. The 
consequence is that one can hardly derive economic meanings from the estimated 
shocks and, thus, their impulse response functions (Pagan 1990). 
The fourth restriction is the soul of the B&Q method. This one restricts one of the 
structural shocks to have zero impact on output as time tends to infinity. Under the AD-
AS model framework, the shocks with transitory impacts on output are identified as 
demand shocks, and those with permanent impacts as supply shocks. Some others 
interpret them as monetary and real shocks respectively, for example }(jm and Enders 
(1991) and Lastrapes and Selgin (1994). The naming of the structural shocks is 
irrelevant, but the names chosen by different authors reveal the underlying assumptions 
about the sources of the shocks. These two interpretations merely assume respectively 
that transitory shocks are dominated by demand or nominal shocks, while permanent 
shocks are dominated by supply or real shocks. 
However, the above interpretations are not immune from challenges. The identification 
rule will break down if demand or nominal shocks have permanent impacts on output. 
This situation arises when, for instance, hysteresis of unemployment rate is taken into 
account, subjective discount rates are influenced by demand disturbances, and 
production exhibits non-constant returns to scale properties 27 
While the demand-supply interpretation shares this potential drawback with the 
nominal-real one, there is a built-in mechanism in the B&Q method to verify whether 
the demand-supply interpretation matches the data. According to the AD-AS model, a 
positive demand shock will cause an increase in price, while a positive supply shock a 
decrease in price. Since no restrictions have been imposed on the parameters of the price 
27 However, B&Q show that as long as these permanent effects on outputs due to demand disturbances are 
small compared to !be effects of supply disturbances, the identification rule is still approximately correct. 
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equation in the estimated V AR, the impulse response function of price can be used to 
verify the presumption of the underlying model. 
3.4.3 Data 
Besides China and Hong Kong, two groups of countries are examined. The first one 
consists of the G3: Japan, the US, and, Germany. The second one consists of nine 
European countries, including France, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK), Spain, Greece, 
Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and, again, Germany, referred as the E9. 
The G3 is used as a control group to capture any global disturbances. If the correlations 
of disturbances between the G3 are significant, then strong correlations between other 
countries might just be a result of international business cycles, rather than that of 
regional connections (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1994a). 
The E9 serves as a benchmark for comparison. Different kinds of countries have been 
included in the E9 such that the CMU can be compared with both core and peripheral 
European countries. In terms of the size of the economies, Germany, France, Italy, and 
the UK are large economies, and the rest are small economies. Spain and Greece are less 
developed, compared with the others. Switzerland is not a member of the EMU, though 
by all means it is a core European country; Greece was not qualified at the first round 
admission; and the UK opted out of the EMU at the first round. 
GDP and GDP deflator are used for all countries wherever they are available. 
Manufacturing output and consumer price index (CPI) are used in the case of Greece. 
Industrial output and retail price index are used in the case of China. Appendix 3 
provides more detailed descriptions about the data. 
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3.4.4 Unit Root and Co integration Tests 
Before estimating a V AR, it is necessary to ensure that its components are stationary and 
not cointegrated." The augmented Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests are 
deployed for stationarity and cointegration tests. The PP test is a generalization of the 
DF test, allowing very mild autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the error term. The 
results are reported in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Summary of Unit Root Tests of eMU, E9 and G3 
Country DF tests of y PP tests ofy DF tests ofp PP tests ofp Cointegration 
Tests 
China 1(1 )* 1(0) 1(2)* 1(1 ) Not cointegrated 
Hong Kong 1(0) 1(1)* 1(2) 1(1)* Not cointegrated 
US T( l ) 1(1 ) 1(1) 1(1 ) Not cointegrated 
Japan 1(1 ) 1(1 ) 1(2) 1(2) Not cointegrated 
Gennany 1( 1) 1(1) 1(2) 1(1)* Not cointegrated 
France T(1 ) 1(1) 1(2) 1(1)* Not co integrated 
Italy 1(2) 1( 1)* 1(2) 1(2) Not cointegrated 
Spain 1(1 ) 1(1 ) 1(2) 1(1)* Not cointegrated 
Greece I(I ) I(I ) 1(2) 1(1)* Not cointegrated 
UK 1(1 ) 1(1) 1(2) 1(1)* Not co integrated 
Austria 1( 1 ) 1(1 ) 1(1) 1(1 ) Not cointegrated 
Netherlands 1(1) 1( 1) 1(1) 1(1) Not cointegrated 
Switzerland 1(1 ) 1(1 ) 1(1 ) 1(1 ) Not co integrated 
(a) Asterisk (*) denotes the order of integration adopted in the case the two tests give different results. 
For output, it is reasonable to expect that the order of integration would not be more 
than one. Only the DF tests of Hong Kong and Italy give unexpected results. Therefore, 
it should be acceptable to take the outputs of all the countries as 1(1). 
28 If they are cointegrated. an error correction tenn must be added. For further discussion of this issue, see 
Lastrapes and Selgin (1994). 
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For prices, both 1( 1) and 1(2) are plausible. If a price is 1( 1), a disturbance will cause a 
permanent change in the price level, but the long run inflation rate will remain zero. If 
the price is 1(2), an innovation will cause a permanent change in the long run inflation 
rate. Supposing real money demand is determined by the level of real natural output and 
the velocity of money is constant, then a one-off shock will trigger a permanent change 
in the inflation rate only if there is a feedback effect from the disturbance to the money 
supply. An example is that the monetary authority tries to stabilize the real output. 
Therefore, when one decides what order of integration of prices of various countries 
should be taken, it is making inferences on their monetary policies. 
For Japan and Italy, the two tests give consistent results , so their prices are simply taken 
as 1(2). Likewise, the prices of the US, Austria, the Netherlands , and Switzerland are 
taken as 1(1). For Hong Kong, the price is taken as 1(1) as suggested by the PP test. This 
is because, as the Hong Kong dollar was pegged to the US dollar during the sample 
period, Hong Kong ' s monetary policy was exogenously determined by that of the US. 
This is also consistent with the finding of Kwan and Lui (1996) . 
For China, the result of the DF test is adopted so that its price is 1(2), since the PP test 
result of the output is quite unusual . There is some supporting evidence of its price 
being 1(2). Despite economic reform in China's financial market, it is observed that 
credit allocation is still partially determined by political considerations, particularly at 
the local level (Blejer, Burton et al. 1991). State-owned-enterprises are continuously 
treated generously in the allocation of credits in order to maintain employment and 
workers ' living standards (Blejer, Burton et al . 1991 ; Spiegel 1994). In a sense, the 
money supply in China is endogenized by targeting the employment rate and real wages. 
For Germany, the choice was to take the price as 1(1 ). This is because the Bundesbank is 
well known for its anti-inflation reputation. Therefore, taking the price as 1(2) would be 
inconsistent with this fact. For France, Spain, Greece, and the UK, no particular 
inferences are drawn on their monetary policies, and they are simply taken as 1(1). 
As the results of integration test of price for some countries are not conclusive, it is 
useful to state here that in practice the sensitivity of the V AR estimations has been 
tested by taking China's price as 1(1), and those of France, Spain, Greece and the UK as 
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1(2) respectively. The major conclusions of the study remain intact. 
3.5 RESULTS 
The following results are obtained by setting the lag length of all economies as eight 
quarters, the same as Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994a), Whitt (1995), and Blanchard 
and Quah (1989). The only two exceptions are China and Germany; the former is of a 
twelve-month lag and the latter of a five-quarter lag. The impulse response functions of 
the last two countries explode if longer lags are taken. The sensitivity of the results with 
respect to lag length will be discussed later. 
3.5.1 Impulse Responses Functions 
Impulse response functions are shown in Figures 3.1 to 3.13 ; figures in the parenthesis 
denote the order of integration of the price and the lag length. The quarterly shocks of 
China are constructed by aggregating associated monthly shocks. 
The long run impacts of the structural supply shock on price of China, Japan, and 
Germany are positive, in contrast to the predictions of the AD-AS model. The signs of 
Japan and Germany reverse if shoner lags are used, but that of China is very stable with 
respect to lag length. The non-complying outcome of China inevitably discounts any 
conclusions drawn from the study. 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994a) also find that some of the countries studied in their 
paper whose primary industries are relatively large - the same as China - show similar 
non-complying results for the price response to supply shocks. They suggest that for 
those countries supply disturbances are likely to be caused by changes in the terms of 
trade of their primary products. A favorable terms of trade shock will prompt the outputs 
of those countries due to higher expon incentives. Additionally, the shocks have 
positive impacts on real incomes due to the lower domestic price of imponed goods. 
The rise in real incomes will boost aggregate demand for non-tradable goods. The result 
is higher domestic price levels. 
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Figure 3.1: China in Quarterly (P-I(2), L-12M) 
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Figure 3.2: Hong Kong (P-I(1), L-8Q) 
0.02 Ti -----------------
0.015 
0.01 
O~~ o I 
-0.005 
-0.01~ 
o 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 
Figure 3.3: US (P-I(1), L-8Q) 
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Figure 3.4: Japan (P-I(2), L-8Q) 
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Figure 3.5: Gennany (P-I(l), L-5Q) 
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Figure 3.6: France (P-I(l), L-8Q) 
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Figure 3.7: Italy (P-I(2), L-8) 
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Figure 3.8: UK (P-I(l), L-8Q) 
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Figure 3.9: Austria (p--I(l), L-8Q) 
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Figure 3.10: Netherlands (P-I(l), L-8Q) 
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Figure 3.11: Switzerland (P-I(l), L-8Q) 
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Figure 3.12: Spain (p-I(l), L-8Q) 
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Figure 3.13: Greece (P-I(l), L-8Q) 
0.03 ~,---------------~ 
0.Q2 ~
QOI ~_~_ I 
o ' , , 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.03 
-0.04 
-0.05 L ______________ _ 
o 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 
3.5.2 Variance Decomposition 
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Tables 3.3 and 3.4 report the decomposition of variances of the forecast errors. The 
decomposition reveals the relative importance of the two structural shocks in accounting 
for the variance of output and price (inflation) in each economy. The forecasting horizon 
ranges from one quarter to five years. 
Table 3.3: Percentage of Variance of Output Due to Supply Shocks' 
No. of Quarters 2 3 4 6 8 12 20 
China 24.30 61.03 83. 19 64.33 90.75 95.99 99.95 99.92 
Hong Kong 93.54 90.15 68.64 77.45 77.81 95.73 98 .17 99.97 
US 16.33 34.07 45 .92 64.33 91.43 97.56 99.35 99.74 
Japan 96. 10 91.58 91.86 97.54 94.92 94.71 97.80 99.84 
Gennany 95.50 99.67 99.37 98.45 99.51 99.67 100.00 99.99 
France 3.23 5.11 11.70 24.32 40.26 69.32 95.97 97.62 
Italy 0.73 0.20 0.41 17.85 87.94 94.33 96.05 99.58 
UK 50.70 75.28 80.78 91.03 92.77 94.74 99.95 99.76 
Austria 53.56 65.72 77.80 87.32 97.88 98.52 99.98 99.98 
Netherlands 25.26 15.93 26.36 21.21 56.56 74.07 87.85 99.41 
Switzerland 97.04 100.00 99.83 95.58 100.00 99.06 99.98 9999 
Spain 68.11 69.63 74.72 81.55 90.44 97.06 99.75 99.95 
Greece 9.82 25.01 18.45 44.57 73.36 89.00 97.83 99.71 
(a) The percentages of variances due to Demand shocks are just equal to one hundred minus the 
corresponding figures in the table. 
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The percentages of supply shocks for outputs generally increase as the time horizon 
extends, because the long run neutrality restriction has been imposed on demand shocks. 
The variances of Hong Kong look unusual in that they are large in the short run but 
become smaller in the medium run. In general, for both Hong Kong and China supply 
shocks dominate the output fluctuations, while demand shocks dominate the price 
fluctuations. 
Table 3.4: Percentage of Variance of Price/Inflation Due to Supply Shocks' 
No. of Quarters 
China 
Hong Kong 
us 
Japan 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
UK 
Austria 
Netherlands 
Switzerland 
Spain 
Greece 
0.40 
52.37 
80.69 
1l.93 
13.39 
98.91 
99.47 
82.70 
82.66 
72.47 
12.55 
43.61 
98.55 
2 
2.19 
17.07 
75.75 
16.38 
61.17 
99.93 
98.35 
67.54 
9l.08 
72.94 
15.59 
69.36 
96.78 
3 
9.96 
0.24 
81.39 
19.61 
0.21 
99.84 
94.14 
74.67 
60.44 
77.74 
15.96 
69.45 
95.18 
4 
16.86 
0.55 
75.66 
14.75 
12.97 
99.89 
90.30 
71.65 
70.91 
74.65 
4.49 
54.25 
94.28 
6 
16.19 
0.04 
72.67 
7.92 
7.04 
99.48 
83.63 
6l.96 
52.19 
73.36 
0.00 
40.93 
93.24 
8 
20.49 
0.32 
69.23 
l.04 
35.03 
95.71 
87.55 
54.43 
27.27 
73.11 
10.21 
33.97 
89.28 
12 
17.28 
2.26 
76.04 
0.09 
57.93 
93.19 
90.84 
37.5 1 
30.34 
66.07 
19.62 
50.65 
88.15 
(a) The percentages of variances due to Demand shocks are just equal to one hundred minus the 
corresponding figures in the table. 
3.5.3 Correlation of Supply shocks 
20 
15.68 
l.23 
75.63 
2.07 
62.88 
93.37 
89.16 
36.43 
32.87 
60.52 
19.88 
57.14 
87.46 
Table 3.5 reports the correlations of supply shocks between all the countries. The 
correlations are measured across the period of 1986Q 1-1993Q3, with 31 net 
observations in quarterly terms. The significance of the correlations (p) is tested by z-
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Table 3.5: Correlation of Supply Shocks between CMU, E9, and G3 
China HK US Japan Germany France Italy UK Austria Netherlands Switzerland Spain Greece 
China 1.00 
HK -0.01 1.00 
US -0.27 -0.03 1.00 
Japan -0. 18 0.24 -0.02 1.00 
Germany -0.23 0.00 -0.12 0. 16 1.00 
Fra nce 0.18 0.0 1 0.Q2 -0.11 0.02 1.00 
Italy 0.06 -0.04 0.22 0. 12 -0.07 0.08 1.00 
UK 0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.09 -0.31 * -0.09 -0.23 1.00 
Austria -0.10 -0. 17 0.17 0.29 0. 17 0.00 -0.02 -0.15 1.00 
Netherlands 0.23 0.02 -0.21 -0.09 -0.24 0. 15 -0.07 -0.23 -0.3 1* 1.00 
Switzerland -0.12 -0. 12 0.28 0.20 -0.12 0.09 0.15 0.2 1 0.23 0. 10 1.00 
Spain -0.12 0.18 -0.05 0.39 0.23 0.30* 0.30* 0.02 0.07 0. 19 0.41 1.00 
Greece -0.03 0.07 0. 18 -0.08 -0.01 0.27 0.33* -0.04 -0.13 0.28 0.22 0.39 1.00 
Highlighting. Italian bold, and asterisk (*l denote signilicance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels respectively. With 3 1 observations, the corresponding critical values for two-tail s tests 
are ± 0.46, ± 0.35. and ± 0.30 respectively. 
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tests, based on the assumption that the correlations are asymptotically normally 
distributed. 29 
The supply shocks between China and Hong Kong have a negative correlation, but are 
insignificant at even a 10 percent level. Both economies are not positively correlated to 
any other economies. In particular, Hong Kong is not significantly correlated to its pre-
1997 sovereignty state, the UK. It is also not significantly correlated to the US, the 
country with whose currency it has pegged the Hong Kong dollar. 
The correlations between the G3 are not significant at even a 10 percent level. It 
eliminates the possibility of strong international business cycles. Lastly, the estimation 
results are not in favor of forming any monetary union within the E9 group. Whitt 
(1995) applies the same method as in this chapter on several EC members across the 
period of 1965Q2-l992Q2. He finds that Germany is strongly correlated to France, Italy, 
and the Netherlands respectively, but not to the UK. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994a) 
use annual data across 1960-90, and find that Germany, France, the Netherlands, 
Austria, Switzerland, and Italy are strongly correlated. However, Spain and the UK are 
not correlated to them. 
3.5.4 Correlation of Demand shocks 
Table 3.6 reports the correlations of demand shocks. The correlation between China and 
Hong Kong is negative but, again, insignificant. Neither the correlation between Hong 
Kong and the UK, nor that between Hong Kong and the US , is significant. The 
insignificance of the correlation between Hong Kong and the US is rather unexpected. 
As the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar, if monetary shocks dominate 
demand shocks for both economies, their demand shocks should be synchronized. 
Again, the G3 economies are not correlated. Amongst the E9, Germany, France, Italy, 
Austria, Switzerland, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, form a core. Whitt (1995) 
29 That is, under the null hypothesis p = 0, p - N(O, lin) , where n is the number of observations. At 5 
percent significance level, the critical value is 1.96In' 12 
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Table 3.6: Correlation of Demand Shocks between CMU, E9 and G3 
China HK US Japan Germany France Italy UK Austria Netherlands Switzerland Spain Greece 
China 1.00 
HK -0.06 1.00 
US 0.07 0.17 1.00 
Japan 0.19 -0.15 -0.17 1.00 
Germany 0.05 -0.24 -0.05 0.22 1.00 
France 0.09 -0.29 -0.10 0.08 0.50 1.00 
It aly -0.25 -0.12 -0.37 0.02 0.06 0.39 1.00 
UK 0.14 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03 1.00 
Austria -0.23 -0.22 -0.21 0.03 0.44 0.44 0.04 -0.17 1.00 
Netherlands -0.17 -0.27 0. 11 0.20 0.15 0.30' 0.11 -0.24 0.28 1.00 
Switzerland 0.09 -0.29 0.20 0.19 0.35 0.19 0.09 -0.05 0.12 0.12 1.00 
Spain -0.24 0.13 0.11 0.01 0.28 0.20 0.11 -0.13 0.17 -0.02 0.23 1.00 
Greece -0. 10 -0.08 -0.27 -0.02 -0.20 0.12 0.05 -0.29 0.01 0.18 0.00 -0.23 1.00 
Highlighting, Italian bold, and asterisk (*l denote significance at 1,5 , and 10 percent levels respectively. With 31 observations, the corresponding critical values for two-tails tests 
are ± 0.46, ± 0.35, and ± 0.30 respectively. 
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finds Germany is uncorrelated with Italy, but significantly negatively correlated with the 
Netherlands, France, and the UK. The findings of this study are closer to that of 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994a), who discover that most European countries are 
strongly correlated in terms of demand shocks, except Germany and the UK. 
A possible explanation for the discrepancies between the results of this chapter and the 
other two studies are the differences in data nature and time span. For example, Whitt 
(1995) uses monthly industrial output and producer prices, Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1994a) use annual GDP and the deflator, whereas this chapter uses quarterly GDP and 
the deflator. Secondly, the estimation time spans of the first two studies are similar, but 
longer than that of this study. 
3.5.5 Lag Effects 
Recall that a special feature of the CMU is that China and Hong Kong are of disparate 
economic structures on the one side, but deeply integrated on the other. The first factor 
will result in weak correlation of disturbances between the two economies, while the 
second one in a strong correlation. Previous findings indicate that both demand and 
supply shocks are insignificantly negatively correlated for the CMU. It seems to suggest 
that the first factor dominates the second one. However, the two factors may not act at 
the same phase. If the connection of business cycles between China and Hong Kong 
relies on transmission of disturbances from one to the other, there may be lag 
relationships between the disturbances they experience. Nonetheless, like Granger 
causality, the presence of any lag relationships is only necessary, but not sufficient, to 
prove the transmission mechanism. 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 report the results of testing this transmission hypothesis. It should be 
noticed that if the direction of transmission of disturbances is from China to Hong 
Kong, the shocks of Hong Kong will lead rather than lag that of China, and vice versa.3D 
30 This is because the shock U,. j actually comes a period ahead of U,. 
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Table 3.7: Correlation of Supply Shocks with Transmission Lags 
Number of leads China US Japan UK 
of Hong Kong 
0 -0.01 -0.03 0.24 -0.06 
1 (lead) -0.18 0.16 0.18 0.03 
2 0.38 -0.12 0.47 -0.11 
0.17 -0.14 0.06 0.32* 
4 0.16 0.16 -0.26 0.42 
5 -0.11 0.14 -0.18 -0.09 
6 0.25 0.24 -0.23 -0.07 
7 0.13 -0.14 -0.24 -0.08 
0.13 -0.01 -0.29 0.08 
-1 (lag) 0.13 -0.01 -0.21 0.30* 
-2 0.07 -0.07 0.13 0.07 
-3 -0.26 0.28 0.16 0.08 
-4 -0.17 0.04 -0.20 -006 
-5 -0.02 0.25 -0.22 0.16 
-6 -0.09 0.01 0.07 0.05 
-7 0.15 -0.00 0.16 0.08 
-8 -0.08 -0. 10 0.06 0.Ql7 
Highlighting, Italian bold , and asterisk (*) denote significance at 1,5 , and 10 percent levels respectively. 
With 31 observations, the corresponding cri tical values for two-tai ls tests are ± 0.46, ± 0.35, and ± 0.30 
respectively. The testing periods of 1 lag term is 1986Q2-1993Q4, of21ag terms is 1986Q3-1993Q4 etc. 
For supply shocks, the correlation is significant at two leads (at 5 percent level) but not 
at other leads. For demand shocks, the picture is not that clear. The correlations at one 
lead and five lags are positively significant at 10 percent and 5 percent levels 
respectively, but that at six leads and two lags are negatively significant at a 10 percent 
level. Therefore, as far as supply shocks are concerned, the findings are consistent with 
the China-to-Hong Kong transmission hypothesis. 
Once two leads are allowed, the correlation of supply shocks between Hong Kong and 
Japan becomes highly positively significant too. But that of demand shocks becomes 
negatively correlated. Again, Hong Kong and the US remain insignificantly correlated 
for supply shocks, but significantly negatively correlated for demand shocks. The supply 
shocks of Hong Kong and the UK are also significantly correlated with four leads. 
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Table 3.8: Correlation of Demand Shocks between Transmission Lags 
Number of leads China US Japan UK 
of Hong Kong 
0 -0.06 0.17 -0.15 -0.02 
1 (lead) 0.21 -0.04 ·0.36 0.05 
2 0.33* -0.03 0.19 -0.21 
3 0.05 -0.37 0.06 O.OS 
4 -0.07 0.11 -0.05 -0.01 
5 O.OS -0.21 0.27 -0.05 
6 -0.33* -0.00 -0.30* -0.14 
7 0.03 -0.30* -0.03 0.20 
S -0.09 -0.27 -0.02 -.020 
-I (lag) -0.2S -0.27 -0.08 0.24 
-2 -0.30* -0.03 -0.05 0.02 
-3 0.06 0.21 -0.03 -0.09 
-4 -0.19 0.05 0.33* 0.06 
-5 0.42 0.05 -O.OS 0.15 
-6 0.04 0.11 -0.11 0.03 
-7 -0.02 0.05 0.16 0.00 
-S -0.01 -0.19 0.13 O.OS 
Highlighting. Italian bold, and asterisk (*) denote significance at 1,5, and 10 percent levels respectively. 
With 31 observations, the corresponding critical values for two-tails tests are ± 0.46, ± 0.35, and ± 0.30 
respectively. The testing periods of I lag term is 19S6Q2-1993Q4, of2lag terms is 19S6Q3-1993Q4 etc. 
Hence, overall, the findings are consistent with the hypothesis put forward earlier. That 
is, as China and Hong Kong are of very diverse economic structure, they are unlikely to 
be hit by the symmetric sector-specific shocks. Therefore, their business cycles are not 
synchronous. On the other side, via the extensive economic linkage between the two, 
disturbances can be transmitted easily from the big economy China to the small 
economy Hong Kong. Significant lag correlation of supply shocks but not of demand 
shocks indicates that the synergy between the two economies are more a result of 
structural complementarity than policy coordination. This is in contrast to the finding of 
Angeloni and Dedola (1999) in that monetary policy coordination is behind the 
increased macroeconomic convergence of EMU members. 
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3.5.6 Correlation with Chinese Provinces 
So far, China is treated as a completely integrated economy. In fact, China is composed 
of thirty provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions (all denoted as 'province' 
henceforth). These provinces are of very different endowment, levels of development 
and degrees of openness. The linkages between them and Hong Kong are far from 
uniform. Therefore, it is worthwhile to disaggregate China into provincial units and 
verify whether Hong Kong is more correlated to coastal provinces like Guangdong than 
inland provinces. 
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 report the results of such an exercise. The testing period is 1990Q2-
1995Ql, with 20 net observations in quarterly terms. Due to insufficiency of data, Tibet 
is omitted in the estimation, and Hainan is included in the Guangdong province. The 
orders of integration and the lag lengths of all the provinces are taken as those of China 
as a whole. That is, output is 1(1), price is 1(2), and the number of lag is 12 months. 
Only three provinces (Heilongjiang, Hebei and Guangxi) are significantly negatively 
correlated to Hong Kong in terms of either structural shock. The results are consistent 
with the findings that Hong Kong is insignificantly correlated to China as a whole. 
Again, the correlation is tested with transmission lag terms. When one or two leads are 
allowed, couples of provinces become significantly correlated to Hong Kong at 5 
percent level in terms of supply shocks . They include Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin, Zhejian, 
Jiangxi, and Guangdong. The correlations with Beijing, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangxi, and Shaanxi are also significant at a 10 percent level. Most of them 
are the relatively more developed and open provinces around the coastal line (Figure 
3.14). Also at the two-quarter lag, the correlations with three inland provinces, Inner 
Mongolia, Heilongjiang, and Hubei, become significantly negative. 
In 1994, the positive group of provinces at a 5 percent level accounted for 32.6 percent 
of national industrial output; including the 10 percent provinces increases this share to 
85.6 percent. In comparison, that of the negative group is only 14.4 percent. Therefore, 
this is consistent with the result at the national level that China and Hong Kong are 
significantly correlated when two leads are allowed. 
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Table 3.9: Correlation of Supply Shocks between Hong Kong and Chinese 
Provinces 
0 1 lead 2 leads 3 leads lIag 2 lags 3 lags 
Beijing 0.25 0.18 0.39* -0.31 -0.02 0.16 -0.03 
Tianjin -0.16 0.45 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.30 0.19 
Hebei 0.07 0.32 -0.06 0.00 -0.08 -OA1 -0.13 
Shanxi 0.02 0.17 -0.17 0.25 0.00 -0.09 -OAO* 
In. Mongolia -0.23 0.20 -0.74 0.08 0.16 -0.13 0.17 
Liaoning 0.10 0.00 0.49 0.09 -0.20 0.31 -0.28 
Jilin 0.15 -0.\0 0.42 -0.31 -0.10 0.33 -0.09 
Heilongjiang -0.38* 0.03 -0.54 0.32 0.27 -0.\0 0.08 
Shanghai -0.19 0.31 0.19 0.25 0.03 -0.24 0.13 
Jiangsu 0.05 0.11 0.37* 0.14 -0.06 0.19 0.01 
Zhejiang -0.06 0.03 0.49 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.03 
Anhui 0.22 -0.34 OAO* -0.26 0.05 0.26 000 
Fujian 0.17 om OAI * -0.23 -0.04 0.17 0.14 
Jiangxi -0.26 0.04 0.44 -0.03 0.05 0.21 0.01 
Shandong 0.19 -0.24 0.37* -0.04 0.05 0.22 -0.16 
Henan -0.06 -0.15 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.05 -0.05 
Hubei om 0.00 -0.49 0.02 0.16 -0.47 0.13 
Hunan 0.00 0.31 0.22 0.15 0.13 -0.09 -0.08 
Guangdong 0.13 -0.05 0.46 -0.18 -0.15 0.20 -0.12 
Guangxi -0.19 0.34 0.39* 0.29 -0.06 0.16 -0.02 
Sichuan -0.12 0.06 0.02 0.28 0.27 -0.04 -0.11 
Guizhou 0.11 -0.01 0.28 0.07 -0.02 -0.13 -0.32 
Yunnan 0.28 0.05 0.35 -0.23 -0.09 0.10 -0.38* 
Shaanxi 0.25 -0.01 OAO* -0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 
Gansu -0.10 0.\0 0.35 0.19 -0.\0 0.31 -0.10 
Qinghai -0.20 0.07 -0.04 -0.05 0.15 0.06 0.30 
Ningxia 0.27 -0.01 0.27 0.25 0.25 -0.09 -0.34 
Xinjiang 0.26 -0.02 0.16 -0.07 0.13 -0.21 -0.35 
Underline, highlighting, Italian bold, and asterisk (*) denotes significant at 0.1, 1, 5 and 10 percent level 
respectively. With 20 observations, the corresponding critical values of two-tails tests are ± 0.58, ± OA4, 
and 0.37 respectively. Testing periods for zero lag is 1990Q2-1995Ql, for 1 lag is 1990Q3-1995Q2 etc. 
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Table 3.10: Correlation of Demand Shocks between Hong Kong and Chinese 
Provinces 
0 1 lead 2 leads 3 leads lIag 2 lags 3 lags 
Beijing -0.12 0.07 0.24 0.11 -0.10 -0.22 -0.21 
Tianjin -0.06 0.17 -0.37* -0.19 0.22 0.15 -0.07 
Hebei -0.45 -0.27 -0.41' -0.11 0.11 0.44 0.27 
Shanxi -0.03 -0.07 -0.52 0.08 -0.02 -0.28 -0.06 
In. Mongolia 0.14 0.11 -0.09 -0.06 -0.19 -0.30 -0.37* 
Liaoning 0.13 0.35 -0.15 -0.17 -0.08 -0.57 -0.42* 
Jilin 0.19 -0.15 -0.11 0.12 0.10 -0.07 -0.18 
Heilongjiang -0.33 0.24 0.06 0.17 -0.40* 0.20 0.28 
Shanghai -0.10 0.22 -0.40* -0.26 -0.07 -0.15 -0.15 
Jiangsu 0.12 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.16 -0.16 -0.19 
Zhejiang 0.05 0.31 0.03 -0.01 -0.23 -0.54 -0.24 
Anhui 0.31 0.27 0.16 -0.40* -0.22 -0.30 0.13 
Fujian -0.03 0.25 0.06 -0.03 -0.11 -0.41 * -0.01 
Jiangxi 0.30 -0.22 -0.20 0.06 -0.12 -0.11 0.10 
Shandong 0.19 0.28 -0.04 0.07 -0.07 -0.53 -0.28 
Henan 0.09 -0.02 -0.15 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24 0.15 
Hubei -0.13 -0.02 -0.28 -0.21 -0.10 -0.10 0.02 
Hunan 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.12 -0. 14 -0.32 -0.16 
Guangdong -0.12 -0.16 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.05 -0.30 
Guangxi -0.37* -0.37* 0.20 0.23 -0.04 -0.01 -0.19 
Sichuan 0.27 0.14 -0.23 -0.24 -0.12 -0.31 0.11 
Guizhou -0.30 0.15 -0.29 -0.20 -0.14 -0.07 0.55 
Yunnan 0.20 -0.11 0.31 0.20 -0.01 0.02 -0.19 
Shaanxi 0.14 0.20 -0.27 -0.29 0.03 -0.14 0.16 
Gansu 0.05 -0.12 -0.19 0.25 0.07 -0.05 -0.31 
Qinghai 0.09 0.04 -0.35 -0.28 -0.10 0.Q2 0.26 
Ningxia 0.17 -0.13 -0.23 -0.11 0.12 -0.26 -0.16 
Xinjiang -0.07 0.16 -0.18 -0.42 -0.16 -0.10 0.31 
Underline. highlighting, Italian bold, and asterisk (*l denotes significant at 0.1 , 1,5 and 10 percent level 
respectively. With 20 observations, the corresponding critical values of two-tails tests are ± 0.58, ± 0.44, 
and 0.37 respectively. Testing periods for zero lag is 1990Q2-1995QI, for I lag is 1990Q3-1995Q2 etc. 
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Figure 3.14: Provinces Correlated to Hong Kong in Supply Shocks 
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Figure 3.15: Provinces Correlated to Hong Kong in Demand Shocks 
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In terms of demand shocks, Hong Kong is only significantly positively correlated to 
Hebei with two lags and Guizhou with three lags at a 5 percent level (Figure 3.15). But 
it is contemporaneously negatively correlated to Hebei. Hong Kong is also negatively 
correlated to a number of other provinces with various lags and leads; but no shape 
pattern emerges. 
3.5.7 Sensitivity Tests 
It is not uncommon that the scaling of business cycles is sensitive to the number of lags 
(Hafer and Sheehan 1991). To ensure the robustness of the results , their sensitivity with 
respect to the lag length is examined. The estimations are repeated by selecting the lags 
for individual countries and provinces according to the Akaike's information criterion 
(AlC) except Japan, for which two lags are imposed3 ! 
It turns out that, surprisingly, for most countries the AlC suggests only one lag, except 
for China, the US, Greece, and Japan. Compared to the previous case, this can be 
considered as an extreme test case. Some major findings concerning the CMU remain 
intact. In particular, for both demand and supply shocks, Hong Kong is not correlated to 
China, the UK or the US. Again, when two leads are allowed, the correlation of supply 
shock between China and Hong Kong becomes significant at a 5 percent level. On the 
other side, the correlations of supply shocks among the E9 have greatly increased, 
whereas those of demand shocks decreased. In contrast to the previous case, Hong Kong 
is not particularly correlated to coastal provinces even if lags or leads are allowed. 
Lastly, uniformly four lags has been tested for all economies except Japan. The results 
are similar to those of AlC lags. The sensitivity has also been tested with respect to 
different degrees of integration of the prices of the E9 countries with AlC lags. The 
conclusions reached in sections 3.5.1-3.5.6 are also roughly intact. 
31 For the case of Japan, a shorter lag length is used because the four lags suggested by AlC leads to 
'abnormally' volatile fluctuations in the impulse response functions. 
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3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing conclusions about the relative sustainability of the CMU and its European 
counterpart is not an easy task, given that this kind of decomposition exercise is quite 
sensitive to the many steps involved. Factors that can affect the results range from the 
source and period of data, decomposition technique, and degree of cointegration, to the 
number of lags. Therefore, it would be more comprehensive to take the results of other 
related studies into account, especially Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997), Husain (1997), 
Chan (1996), Whitt (1995) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994a). 
For both supply and demand shocks, if no lag term is allowed, Hong Kong and China 
are far from being correlated. In general, certain EMU members are more correlated 
than Hong Kong and China in terms of business cycles, though the exact combination of 
the EMU core varies between studies. Hong Kong is correlated neither to the US nor to 
the UK. This is in contrast to the conclusion of Chan (1996) in that the business cycles 
of Hong Kong are more synchronous with those of the US than with China or the UK. 
However, once a transmission lag term is allowed, the magnitude of the correlation of 
supply shocks in the CMU becomes quite comparable to that in the EMU. The finding 
shows support for the hypothesis that disturbances from the big economy China are 
transmitted to the small economy Hong Kong. The result indicates that the transmission 
takes about two quarters to work through. 
The difference in demand and supply correlations hints that the synergy between the 
Chinese and Hong Kong economies are based more on their structural complementarity 
than on policy coordination. The findings are compatible with those of Husain (1997) 
and Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997). Again, the findings are merely consistent with the 
above hypotheses, but far from being a rigorous proof. 
In addition, disasggregating China into 30 provinces shows that Hong Kong is not 
uniformly correlated to all the provinces. The relatively more developed provinces 
around the coastal line have stronger correlation with Hong Kong than their inland 
counterparts. The result is fairly sensible, albeit not insensitive to the lag length. 
Overall, there is still lack of strong evidence that the CMU is a vital idea at this stage. 
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Even though the business cycles of Hong Kong and China can be synchronized via some 
transmission channels, a significant time lag is involved. If a statement must be drawn 
on the relative sustainability between the EMU and the CMU, the conclusion will 
probably be in less favor of the latter, although many studies show that the EMU itself is 
also vulnerable to intra-union economic stress. 
The findings also suggest that Hong Kong and the US do not constitute an OCA. 
Nevertheless, what supports the choice of the US dollar as the nominal anchor for Hong 
Kong and other economies like Argentina is its stability and acceptability in the 
international money market. This credibility factor, in fact , is the primary reason why a 
fixed exchange rate regime is needed for those economies. In this regard, the renminbi, 
which is yet a fully convertible currency, can hardly make a case comparable to the US 
dollar in the foreseeable future . 
Lastly, it is necessary to restate one of the caveats of the findings . That is, all 
measurements are essentially ex ante; potential endogenous changes in business cycle 
linkages are ignored. In particular, a number of European countries have harmonized 
their monetary policies through the ERM for quite some time (at least before the 
unification of Germany), and countries like Austria have a long history of pegging its 
currency with the Deutschmark. This kind of distinction in the institutional 
arrangements may cause differences in the symmetry of disturbances between the EMU 
and the CMU members. 
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Appendix 3 
Data Source 
Data for all the OECD countries except Japan obtained from the International Economic 
Data Bank (IEDB), Australian National University (ANU). The primary sources are 
International Financial Statistics published by the IMF. Data of Japan are obtained from 
the Nikkei Data Bank, Australia-Japan Research Center, ANU. National Data of China 
are obtained from its central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBC) ; provincial data 
are obtained from Chinese Monthly Statistics, various issues. Data of Hong Kong are 
provided by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority. The sample periods for all the 
countries are listed in Table 3.Al. 
Table 3.Al: Sample Periods of Tested Countries 
Country Period Country Period 
China 1985MI-1996M8 Netherlands 1977QI-1996Q2 
Hong Kong 1984QI-1996QI Switzerland 1973QI-1996Q2 
US 1973QI-1996Q3 UK 1973QI-1996Q3 
Japan 1973Q 1-1996Q3 Austria 1973QI-1995Q4 
Germany 1979QI-1996Q3 Spain 1973Q 1-1996Q2 
France 1973QI-1996Q2 Greece 1973QI-1996Q2 
Italy 1973Q 1-1993Q3 
All the data are in quarterly terms. The only exception is China; those data are in 
monthly terms. The monthly structural shocks of China are measured, and then 
aggregated into quarterly shocks to compare with those of other countries. This is 
because the time span of the Chinese data is only about ten years. If the monthly data are 
aggregated into quarterly data, there will only be about 40 observations, which are not 
quite enough for estimations. 
It should be noted that although the correlations of the structural shocks between various 
countries are measured across the same period, the structural V ARs of various countries 
are estimated across different time spans . This is because the data of China are from 
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1985Ql onward, but that of Italy are before 1993Q3. If the sample periods of all the 
countries are required to be the same, the usable observations will be too few for 
estimations. Therefore, the V ARs of the countries are estimated across different data 
sample periods. Once the structural shocks are obtained, their correlations can be 
calculated across a common period. All countries' data are already deseasonalized, 
except those of China, Hong Kong, and Greece. The data of these three countries are 
deseasonalized by being regressed against seasonal dummies. 
The estimation period of Hong Kong starts from 1984Ql to avoid a structural break at 
the end of 1983 . Hong Kong changed its exchange rate regime in October 1983 from 
free floating to pegging with the US dollar. 32 Likewise, since 1992, there have been 
some disturbances in the ERM. Italy and UK were forced to depart from the ERM and 
realigned their NERs in September 199233 In July 1993, the exchange rate band of the 
ERM was widened from plus or minus 0.25 percent to 4 percent, to 5 percent. The 
Germany unification in 1990 might cause a structural break in the data of Germany. 
These potential structural breaks for the E9 are not tested (and allowed) since it would 
shorten the time span for comparison. 
Chinese Data 
Some problems about the use of Chinese data must be stressed. First of all, the official 
monthly price index is reported on a year-on-year basis, so they can not be used directly 
to measure monthly inflation. The following example is used to illustrate this point. 
Suppose Table 3.Al records the official statistics of years 2 to 4. 
According to Chinese official statistics, the price index of January of year 3 (ll2) is 
measured relative to that of year 2 (101). Therefore, the inflation rate between January 
and February of year 3 should not be calculated as L1p/p = (107-112)/1 12. 
32 Kwan and Lui (1996) confirm that there is a structural break of data around the end of 1983. 
33 Actually the history of UK's participation in the ERM is very short compared to the time span of its 
data. So in principle, there may be two structural breaks, one corresponds to its participation and the other 
to its departure. 
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Table 3.A2: Official Statistics 
Month Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Jan 101 112 105 
Feb 106 107 111 
March 108 102--T - 104 
etc. 
If somehow a complete monthly data set of a particular year, said year 1, is available, 
then the inflation rate can be calculated for all other years on a monthly basis. However, 
no such starting point data set can be obtained. To get around this problem, an annual 
inflation rate of a particular year is used to construct a series of monthly price index by 
assuming a constant compound monthly rate such that the annual rate just matches the 
reported data of that year. 
Suppose the reconstruction of the price index starts at year 1. Data of annual inflation 
rates of any years are available for China. Suppose that of year 1 is 110 per cent. The 
price index of January of year 1 is normalized to 100. Assuming that monthly inflation 
of year 1 is constant and equals to n, then n is given by 100*(1 +n)11 = 110, or n = 
0.0087. 
The reconstructed price indexes of the following years are shown in Table 3.A3. Now, 
the inflation between January and February of year 3 can be calculated as usual. That is 
,'jp/p = (114.40-113.12)/113.12. 
However, since the monthly data of year 1 are obtained by construction, some errors 
could be borne in the reconstructed data set. Firstly, some data are missed in the official 
reports. Those blank. figures are 'guessed' by referring to figures of neighboring 
provinces. Secondly, the credibility of Chinese official data is always a disputable issue. 
Chen and Hou (1986), and Feltenstein and Ha (1991) find that Chinese official figures 
understate the inflation rate. And mass media continues to report that the Chinese 
authorities tend to use administrative means to manipulate inflation index figures (Hong 
Kong Standard 1996). 
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Table 3.A3: Reconstructed Statistics 
Month I Year 1 ! Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
I January I 100 
I 101 
I 
113.12 118.78 I 
! l I = 100*1.01 = 101 *1.12 = 113.12*1.05 
February I 100.87 i 106.92 114.40 126.98 
i = 100*( 1.0087) I = 100.87*1.06 = 106.92*1.07 = 114.40*1.11 
March 
: 
101.75 I 109.89 112.09 116.57 I 
= 100*(1.0087)2 I = 101.75*1.08 = 109.89*1.02 = 112.09*1.04 
etc. ... ! . .. 
! December I 110 I ... . .. ! =100*(1.0087)" I I i 
Any error in the guessed figures or falsification in the reported data would be multiplied 
by the reconstruction process. This is because a reconstructed figure is based on all its 
previous figures; any distortion of the original figure of a particular month in a particular 
year will be transmitted to the reconstructed figures of the same month of all succeeding 
years. 
To illustrate this problem, reconsider the same set of data in Table 3.A2 . Suppose the 
authorities falsely published a lower figure in the February of year 2 (104 instead of 
106). Now Table 3.A2 would look like Table 3.A4. 
Table 3.A4: Official Statistics (with error) 
Month Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Jan 101 112 105 
Feb 104 (error) 107 111 
March 108 102 104 
Taking the same process of reconstruction as previously, Table 3.A3 now becomes 
Table 3.AS. 
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Table 3.A5: Reconstructed Statistics (with error) 
I Month Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 i Year 4 
January 100 101 1 113 .12 I 118.78 
i February 100.87 104.90 I 112.25 1 124.60 
I 
= 100.87*1.04 . = 104.90* 1.07 I = 112.25*1.11 
; March 1 101.75 i 109.89 ! 112.09 1 116.57 
Although there is 'only' one error in the original data set, the error will ripple to all the 
following years through the reconstruction process. The consequences are that it will 
affect the calculation of monthly inflation rates between January and February, and 
February and March of year 2 and all successive years. 
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Chapter 4 
Chinese Monetary Union 
Pari II 
Synopsis 4 
This chapter examines the prospect of using uniform monetary policies to manage the 
macroeconomic activities of the heterogeneous Chinese provinces in the light of the 
optimum currency area COCA) literature. It is found that a single market has not yet 
formed in China, largely attributed to local protectionism. In terms of symmetry of 
disturbances, Chinese provinces are not as correlated as their European and American 
counterparts. Only a group of eastern provinces are consistently strongly correlated. The 
result suggests that treating China as an integrated economy might be misleading not 
only at the micro level, but also at the macro level, especially in understanding its 
business cycles. The finding also casts doubts on the effectiveness of using uniform 
monetary policies to manage the business cycles of all the provinces. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since China started its 'long march' of economic refonn in the late 1970s, its fast 
growth has been characterized by a volatile swing of macroeconomic cycles (Khor 
1992; Tseng, Khor et al. 1994). A fundamental cause of these abrupt business cycles is 
over administrative decentralization and under economic decentralization (Blejer et al. 
1991). Economic refonn has only partly removed economic power from the hands of the 
central government to the market, and, perhaps, more into the hands of local authorities. 
The pre-refonn larger-sized national command economy has been transfonned into a 
number of smaller-sized local command economies (Jia and Wang 1994). Without 
sufficient coordination, especially in the presence of inter-regional competition, local 
policies were distant from being consistent with national macroeconomic objectives. 
In the journey of building a "socialist market economy" in which the market will be a 
primary mechanism for resource allocation, there are two key aspects in maintaining 
macroeconomic stability. As pointed out by Breslin (1995), the central authorities 
should regain the control of macro management instruments from the hands of local 
government. Secondly, as recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
command type controls should give way to other instruments that are more compatible 
with market mechanisms, such as monetary, fiscal , and exchange rate policies (Blejer, 
Burton et al. 1991). 
In macroeconomic management, monetary policy has a vital role. In the pre-refonn era, 
the functions of money were largely suppressed, perhaps except as a unit of accounting. 
Money was "essentially a monitoring device exercised by the central authority on the 
perfonnance of different micro units in fulfilling their assigned obligations or quotas" 
(Li 1995:4). In the refonn period, money has been reestablishing its role as a medium of 
exchange and a means of saving. Li (1995) estimates the causal relationships between 
currency in circulation, inflation, interest rate and investment for both the pre-refonn 
(1952-79) and refonn (1980-91) periods. He concludes that the use of money increased 
in the refonn period, but the causal relationships between money supply and the other 
three variables were still weak. Using slightly more recent data from 1985 to 1993, 
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Tseng, Khor et al. (1994) find that broad money and net domestic assets are significant 
variables in explaining both industrial production and inflation. The results seem to 
signal the rapid progression of monetization of the Chinese economy. 
Even if the economy is increasingly monetized, ironing out business cycles with 
monetary instruments might not be an easy task for the central authorities, given that 
China is a structurally diverse economy. China is of stretched size and huge population. 
In terms of administration, it consists of 30 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous 
regions (hereafter all denoted as "provinces" unless specified otherwise). Different 
provinces have vastly different levels of development and openness, not to mention the 
gap between rural and urban areas within each province. Trade barriers between 
provinces are also considered high. 
Questioning the prospect of using one set of monetary instruments to manage the 
macroeconomic activities of numerous Chinese provinces is essentially the same as 
asking whether China constitutes an optimum currency area (OCA). 
As stated in the last chapter, in the OCA paradigm there are three fundamental elements : 
flexibility of prices and wages , symmetry of disturbances, and similarity of policy 
objectives. Primarily all the OCA criteria are about how to mitigate the impacts of 
asymmetric disturbances between member states, when prices and wages are too 
sluggish to adjust in the short run. The more dissimilar the economic structures of the 
member states, the more likely they will be hit by asymmetric shocks. Further, if other 
compensating factors, such as labor mobility, do not work effectively to equalize the 
impacts of idiosyncratic shocks, uniform monetary policies across the nation might not 
be sufficient to manage the business cycles of all provinces. Provincial fiscal authorities 
will be forced to take a greater role in macroeconomic management. Then it will 
inevitably touch a politically sensitive issue - fiscal transfers between affluent and less 
prosperous regions. 
On the other side, a key shortcoming of most OCA applications is that they fail to take 
account of the dynamic impacts of monetary unification. As advocators of the EMU 
have claimed, zero exchange risk and foreign exchange transaction costs are likely to 
stimulate intra-union trade and investment (CEC 1990). Stronger economic 
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interdependence will lead to more effective transmission of disturbances between the 
member states (Frankel and Rose 1996). 
In this study this pitfall of OCA theories can be turned into an advantage. The People' s 
Republic of China (PRC) has adopted a single currency since it was established in 1949. 
Although money's functions were largely suppressed in the pre-reform period, it did not 
preclude the provincial economies from the potential benefits of zero exchange rate risk 
and zero currency exchange cost. After 50 years, all benefits of monetary unification 
should be largely materialized, in respect to the given institutional arrangements. 
Therefore, if China is yet found to fulfill the OCA criteria, it means that either the 
provincial economies are structurally too dissimilar to be in the same currency area, or 
there are institutional settings hindering them from fully realizing the benefits of 
monetary unification. 
Following this logic, the next section compares China with two other monetary unions 
in terms of a number of OCA criteria. The criteria include openness, fiscal integration, 
factors and commodities mobility, and similarity of economic structure. Section 3 
estimates the symmetry of disturbances experienced by the provinces, and the last 
section concludes. 
4.2 ECONOMIC FRAGMENTATION 
At the outset, the prospect that China constitutes an OCA is undermined by the 
widespread phenomenon of economic fragmentation amongst the provinces. Economic 
fragmentation was nurtured before the reform by progressive decentralization of the 
economy. What first set the ground for this was Mao Zedong' s self-sufficient (zili 
gengsheng) policy, under which the provinces were required to be economically 
independent (Zhao 1994). Later, in the late 1970s, after almost three decades of political 
movements, the central authority urgently needed remedies to cure the damaged 
economy. To mobilize local enthusiasm in production, the central government decided 
to conduct the "fenquan rang Ii" policy. The principle was to decentralize administrative 
power and to allow local authorities and enterprises to retain part of their revenues. 
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It is commonly recognized that decentralization has been one of the engines behind the 
fast growth of the Chinese economy over the past two decades. However, this growth 
has not come without costs. Cannon and Zhang (J 996) observe that local protectionism 
became stronger and more common in the reform era. The decentralized power of 
economic decision-making has not passed fully to enterprises (ibid.). Local authorities 
have as much, or even more, control and self-interest over those enterprises. Local 
governments are reluctant to invest in other regions to avoid losing revenues. To protect 
local enterprises, import embargoes of substitutes, and export embargoes of production 
materials, are not uncommon (Goodman 1994). Neither capital nor commodities is/are 
completely free to move across provincial borders. To a certain extent, the provinces 
have evolved into aristocratic or cellular economies (Jia and Wang 1994). 
To obtain a more scientific assessment about the degree of economic fragmentation in 
China, the extent to which China satisfies several major OCA criteria has been 
examined. Two unions - the US and the European Community (EC) - are used as a 
benchmark for comparison.' The results for inter-union comparison are reported in 
Table 4.1 and those for inter-province comparison in Table 4.2. 
It should be warned at the start that the figures for the US and EC are cited from other 
publications, so there may be discrepancies in the method of compilation. For example, 
in the case of labor mobility, the figures for the US and EC are measured by the 
percentage of total population that moved across regions within the unions. While that 
of China is measured by the percentage of total labor in the state-owned, collective-
owned, and other ownership units that move across provinces. 
Furthermore, the Chinese figures are based on official statistics. The credibility of 
Chinese statistics is always subject to scrutiny, as there have been reports about the 
authorities manipulating statistical figures. Nevertheless, as long as any errors in the 
provincial data are systemic and comparable, they will tend to cancel each other in the 
measurements of provincial differences. 
, The EC comprises 12 countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ponugal , Spain, and the UK. 
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Table 4.1: Comparison of DCA Criteria between China, the US, and the EC 
Items China US EC 
Number of Member Economies 30 Provinces 50 States 12 Countries 
Year a 1994 (1987) 1986·1988 1986·1988 
Demand GDP per captia (US$) b 
Mean 497 (316) 16936 10 752 
Standard Deviation (STD)lMean 0.67 (0.70) 0.22 0.38 
Fiscal transfer from the central to locals as 36.07 20.9 
% of local expenditures C 
Openness d 
Mean 0.32 14.7 18.5 
STDlMean 1.09 
Mobility as % of workforce e 0.17 2.7 0.81·1.35 
Relative size of primary industry (% ) f 
Mean 22.9 (36.0) 4.1 7.4 
STDlMean 0.40 (0.39) 0.71 0.51 
Relative size of secondary industry (%) , 
Mean 44.0 (49.6) 51.7 35.2 
STDlMean 0.20 (026) 
Relative size of tertiary industry (%) h 
Mean 33.1 (14.4) 44.2 56.2 
STDlMean 0.14 (021) 0.07 0.18 
Sources of US and EC figures: Eichengreen (1990); sources of China data: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 
1989 and 1996, and China Labour Statistical Yearbook 1995 . 
(a) Figures of the US and EC of different items are for different years. See the original source for more 
details. Data on relative size of the primary industry of EC members are for 1980 and 1983. 
(b) Figures in parentheses are for 1987 for comparison. 
(c) Figure for the US is for 1987, and that for Chinese is for 1995. Figures of Chinese provinces are 
calculated by the difference between locally collected revenue minus local expenditures, and are national 
values instead of provincial mean. 
(d) Openness is measured by the total external trade, which is equal to export plus import, as a percentage 
ofGDP. 
(e) Labor mobility of the US in Ehrengerg's article is measured by total population that moved across 
regions in 1987. Figures of the EC is calculate according to an estimation that labor mobility in the US 
was about two to three times that in the EC (OECD 1986). 
(f) The primary industry comprises agriculture sectors. 
(g) Sizes of the secondary industry of the US and EC are calculated by 100 minuses the percentages of 
primary and tertiary industries. The secondary industry of China comprises mining, manufacture, water, 
energy, and construction. Sizes of industries of the US and EC are measured by shares of labor force, 
while those of China are measured by shares of industrial output in GDP. 
(h) The tertiary industries of the US and EC comprise service sectors, and that of China comprises 
transportation, postal and telecommunication services, and commerce. 
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Table 4.2: Ordering of Provinces According to OCA Criteria 
Order of Provinces 
Per Captia Primary Secondary Tertiary Labor External Transferl 
Demand Industry' Industry Industry Transfer I Trade/GDP Expenditure 
GDP Employment 
(Descending) (Descending) (Descending) (Descending) (Descending) (Descending) (Ascending) 
Shanghai Tibet Shanghai Beijing Hainan Guangdong Shanghai 
Beijing Guizhou Tianjin Hainan Qinghai Beijing Beijing 
Tianjin Jiangxi Jiangsu Shanghai Beijing Shanghai Guangdong 
Guangdong Hainan Heilongjiang Tianjin Guangdong Tianjin Jiangsu 
Zhejiang Hunan Zhejiang Tibet Ningxia Fujian Tianjin 
Liaoning In. Mongolia Shanxi Shaanxi Xinjiang Hainan Liaoning 
Jiangsu Guangxi Liaoning Ningxia Hebei Liaoning Zhejiang 
Fujian Sichuan Guangdong Liaoning Gansu Zhejiang Fujian 
Hainan Xinjiang Anhui Qinghai Guizhou Jiangsu Hainan 
Shandong Jilin Shandong Fujian Jilin Tibet Shan dong 
Heilongjiang Hubei Henan Shanxi Shaanxi Shandong Shanxi 
Xinjiang Henan Hebei Guangdong Jiangxi Jilin Hebei 
Jilin Yunnan Beijing Gansu Guangxi Heilongjiang Hubei 
Hebei Gansu Gansu Xinjiang Tianjin Guangxi Hunan 
Hubei Qinghai Yunnan Guangxi In . Mongolia Shanxi Anhui 
In. Mongolia Anhui Fujian Hunan Heilongjiang Shaanxi Sichuan 
Qinghai Ningxia Hubei Yunnan Hunan Yunnan Henan 
Shanxi Shaanxi Jilin Zhejiang Shanghai Xinjiang Heilongjiang 
Guangxi Fujian Qinghai Hebei Iiangsu In . Mongolia Jiangxi 
Hunan Hebei Sichuan Iiangxi Hubei Hebei Guangxi 
Ningxia Shandong Ningxia In. Mongolia Shandong Hubei Jilin 
Anhui Heilongjiang Shaanxi Shandong Yunnan Ningxia Shaanxi 
Sichuan Zhejiang Xinjiang Hubei Fujian Gansu Guizhou 
Yunnan Jiangsu Guangxi Jilin Anhui Jiangxi In. Mongolia 
Henan Guangdong In. Mongolia Sichuan Zhejiang Guizhou Yunnan 
Jiangxi Shanxi Guizhou Jiangsu Shanxi Sichuan Gansu 
Shaanxi Liaoning Hunan Heilongjiang Tibet Anhui Xinjiang 
Tibet Beijing Jiangxi Anhui Henan Hunan Ningxia 
Gansu Tianjin Hainan Henan Sichuan Qinghai Qinghai 
Guizhou Shanghai Tibet Guizhou Liaoning Henan Tibet 
(a) The second to forth columns refer to the measurements of industrial output to GDP ratio. 
Finally, how to draw the boundary of ' indivisible ' sub-union units is crucial. For 
instance, dividing China into 12 regions (i.e. the number of the EC countries) could give 
very different results from dividing it into 30 provinces. Fiscal autonomy or integration 
is commonly regarded as an appropriate criterion in defining the domains of sub-union 
units. The way the data are collected also poses a practical constraint on how to draw the 
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domains. 
4.2.1 Income Gap & Fiscal Integration 
Measured in the standard deviation (normalized by the mean), the per capita GDP of 
China is more dispersed than those of the US and EC. In 1994, the three provinces with 
the highest per capita GDP were Shanghai (US$1764), Beijing (US$1l91), and Tianjian 
(US$947), while the lowest three were Guizhou (US$180), Ganus (US$223), and Tibet 
(US$230). Nonetheless, comparing the figures of 1994 and 1987 shows that there is a 
slight convergence of per capita income across the provinces. 
A large income gap between the provinces inevitably raises pressure to redistribute the 
national wealth. Data on fiscal transfers from the central authority to provinces are not 
available. Thus, the difference between the expenditure and revenue of each province is 
used as a proxy. From Table 4.1 , it can be seen that fiscal transfer from the central 
authority to locals is much· higher in China than in the US, implying a high degree of 
fiscal integration in China. Secondly, the size of transfer is quite diverse between 
provinces. In general, provinces around the coastal line require less central transfers than 
inland ones. Shanghai (13.3 percent), Beijing (18.5 percent), and Guangdong (26.4 
percent) have the lowest ratios, whereas Tibet (91.6 percent), Qinghai (68.0 percent), 
and Nignxia (60.48 percent) have the highest. This means that, in effect, some affluent 
provinces were subsidizing their less prosperous siblings. 
4.2.2 Openness 
According to McKinnon (1963), openness matters in forming a currency area because 
the more open an economy, the larger the proportion of imported goods in price and 
wage indexes. Thereby monetary policies will be less effective in affecting real wages, 
and the cost of losing individual monetary autonomy in a union will be smaller. It is 
unclear how prevalent money illusion is in China's labor market. However, it is 
observed that state-owned enterprises are under pressure to maintain workers' real 
incomes against rising living standards (Blejer, Burton et al. 1991). 
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Openness can be measured by the ratio of external trade to GDP. In terms of the mean 
value, China is still not as open in 1994 as the US and EC in the 19S0s. In fact, in 1994, 
the EC and US ranged first and second in world merchandise trade, while China ranged 
only seventh (WTO 1995). The most open provinces are Guangdong (1.6S), Beijing 
(1.00) and Shanghai (O.SS), whereas the most closed provinces are Henan (O.OS), 
Qinghai (O.OS), and Hunan (0.09). 
4.2.3 Factors Mobility 
The US is expected to have the highest labor mobility among the three unions, as no 
legal barrier exits between the states. The EC has also unified the labor markets since 
1965, by applying a number of regulations to facilitate labor movement across the 
community.' Nevertheless, labor mobility within the EC is obstructed by invisible 
barriers such as differences in language, culture, and society security arrangements 
(Ehrenberg 1994). 
In contrast, labor mobility in China is intentionally restricted by the authorities. The 
purpose is to control the growth of population in city areas. Under the household 
registration system (hukou zhidu) , people who want to change registration status are 
required to obtain permission from the authorities. Before the economic reform, city 
residences almost completely relied on their affiliated unit (danwei) for job replacement, 
housing, and rationed foods (Yan 1990). The counterpart in rural areas was people 
communes (renmin gongshe). The affiliation and registration systems together provided 
an effective means of controlling labor migration. Davis (1992) observes that even labor 
movement between firms in the same city was subject to impediments. Nonetheless, as a 
consequence of economic reform, the planning system has been giving way to the 
private market in the provision of foods and jobs. This development has encouraged 
higher mobility of labor, especially from inland rural to coastal urban areas. 
2 Spain and Portugal were admitted to the program in 1993. 
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Comprehensive and systematic reports on inter-province labor migration in China are 
rare. The 1987 interim census reveals that inter-province migration accounted for only 
20.7 percent of internal migrants (Wakabayashi 1990). In due course, the inter-province 
labor mobility in three major production units - state-owned, urban collective-owned 
and other ownership units' - is used as a proxy. Using this proxy, the mobility of labor 
in China is estimated to be about 0.06 times of that in the US, and about 0.13 to 0.21 
times of that in the EC. Ehrenberg (1994) reports that the labor mobility within the four 
largest EC members: France (22 regions), Germany (11 Lander ), Italy, and the United 
Kingdom (UK) (10 regions) are 1.3, 1.1 , 0.5, and 1.8 respectively, all larger than that in 
China' It should be pointed out that, as only registered workers are counted, Chinese 
statistics probably understate the actual mobility. 
In general, the more developed provinces like Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong, 
and Hainan have larger shares of incoming migrated workers. The island province 
Hainan gained the status of province only by 1988. Therefore, the large movement of 
labor might be merely a transitional phenomenon. Excluding Hainan, Guangdong and 
Beijing have the highest ratios of incoming workers, up to 26 percent and 19 percent, 
respectively, in 1994. On the other side, less developed provinces like Inner Mongolia, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang, have larger shares of outgoing migrated 
workers in their workforces. Excluding Hainan, the highest ratios of outgoing worker 
are found in Qinghai and Gansu, reaching 47 percent and 19 percent, respectively, in 
1994. 
Compared to labor, capital is far more homogenous and less inhabitant dependent. 
However, capital is not necessarily free from provincial barriers. Blejer, Burton et al. 
(1991) noted that, after a decade of reform, credit was still allocated largely by 
commands in China. More importantly, local authorities are able to influence the 
regional branches of the People's Bank of China (PBC) to extend credit to local 
3 Other ownership units include the following types of enterprises: joint management; stock ownership; 
and foreign funded , including those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 
, Northern Ireland is excluded from the estimation of the UK. 
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enterprises. In this sense, capital is a localized rather than a mobile factor across 
provinces. An examination of the ratios of inter-province to total local investment for 
Guangdong, Shaanxi, Beijing, Liaoning and Shanghai during 1985-92 shows that only 
in Shanghai did this ratio rise significantly (World Bank 1994). The ratios for the first 
three provinces actually fell. These five provinces accounted for about 30 percent of 
total national investment. 
Another indicator of the degree of capital mobility is the capital return differential 
across provinces. Over 1986-90, the variation of profit rates of firms across provinces 
increased from 0.19 to 0.66 (ibid.). Furthermore, it is found that inter-province 
investment was induced more by tax concession differential than by real difference in 
capital productivity (ibid.). Lastly, stock and bond markets are supposed to be effective 
channels of inter-regional investment. However, as they are still considered 
experimental financial infrastructures by the central authority, they have not been widely 
adopted. 
4.2.4 Commodity Market Integration 
Besides labor and capital, goods and materials mobility is also important from the point 
of view of macroeconomic management. Firstly, materials are essential inputs for 
production. Secondly, when labor and capital are not mobile enough to equalize 
disturbances between regions, flows of goods and services can be a substitute. In 
particular, Frankel and Rose (1996) provide evidence that monetary unification could 
reinforce correlation of business cycles between member states probably through 
strengthening intra-union trade. In a microeconomic perspective, intra-province trade 
allows the exploitation of comparative advantages between provinces and of the benefits 
of economies of scale. 
Notwithstanding, domestic protectionism in China is widely documented; for example, 
see Goodman (1991), Cannon and Zhang (1996), Hao and Wang (1994), and Breslin 
(1995). Cannon and Zhang (1996) observe that domestic protectionism has become 
stronger and more widespread as a consequence of increasing local autonomy. The 
motivations behind local protectionism are wide ranging. For instance, they include 
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protection of local infant industries, retaining the capacity of exporting and hence of 
earning foreign exchange, maintaining sufficient local supply and, thus, avoiding 
inflation. Barriers exist in the forms of tariffs , quantitative controls, or even physical 
barricades. Breslin (1995) concludes that to a certain extent Chinese provinces are more 
open toward the outside world than toward each other. 
Kumar (1994) provides quantitative evidence for the above observations. He tests for a 
couple of provinces and finds that while external trade as a percentage of provincial 
GDP has increased over time, that of inter-province trade has declined in general. The 
total inter-province trade as a percentage of national GDP in 1988 and 1990 were 21.0 
percent and 18.9 percent, respectively, whereas that of the EC in 1989 was 28.3 percent. 
However, Kumar also provides some possible 'positive' explanations about the decline 
of internal trade, such as slow growth of a transportation system or an increase in local 
demand. 
Similar to the use of return differential in gauging capital mobility, price differential can 
be deployed to assess commodity mobility. The World Bank (1994) finds that, for seven 
daily consumer goods, the standard deviations of prices across provinces in 1991 were 
all higher than in 1986. On the other hand, that of five production materials fell in 
general between 1990 and 19925 
4.2.5 Production Diversity 
To obtain a rough measurement of production diversity, the output of each province is 
divided into three broad sectors: primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. Secondary 
industry consists of heavy and light industries, and construction; and tertiary industry 
consists of transportation, postal and telecommunication services, and commerce. The 
relative size of each sector is expressed in percentage of provincial GDP. 
5 The seven consumer goods include flour, rice, vegetable oil , apples, white cotton cloth, color TV, 
resident use coal , and kerosene. The five production materials include steel sheet, copper, coal, cement, 
and timber. 
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Again, from Table 4.1, it can be seen that the relative size of primary industry in China 
is much larger than in the US and the EC. The distribution of primary industry is more 
even in China than in the other two unions. The situation in the tertiary industry is just 
the opposite. China has a relatively smaller but more locally concentrated tertiary sector. 
For secondary industry, Kumar (1994) finds that the differentiation of industrial 
production in China is lower than that in the US and the EC. 
The comparative results clearly indicate the difference in the development stage 
between China and its western counterparts. It also implies that shocks upon the tertiary 
industry are more vital for China, as they are likely to be more asymmetric than, say, 
shocks upon the primary industry. 
The diversification of provincial production has reduced during 1987-94 for both the 
secondary and tertiary sectors, and that for primary industry has increased only very 
marginally. This suggests that China has not exploited the benefits of economies of 
scale. Some studies investigate the change of components of GDP across provinces and 
across time instead; the conclusion is similar. For example, Kumar (1994) (and the 
references cited there) shows that the detailed compositions of provinces are very 
similar and their similarity has actually increased over the reform period. 
4.3 SYMMETRY OF DISTURBANCES 
Previous discussion concludes that a single market has not yet formed in China. In terms 
of production structure, there is a trend of convergence across the provinces. The 
situation is somewhat like a mirror image of that between Hong Kong and China as a 
whole. Recall that Hong Kong and China are structurally dissimilar but economically 
deeply integrated. As discussed at length in the last chapter, similarity in production 
structure will enhance the correlation of business cycles between the provinces, whilst 
market fragmentation will dampen the transmission of disturbances across them. The 
overall result depends on which factor overwhelms the other. This section focuses on 
the issue by measuring the symmetry of disturbances across provinces. Once again, the 
Blanchard and Quah (B&Q) (1989) method is deployed. For details of the method and 
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data, refer to the last chapter. 
4.3.1 Estimation Results 
Table 4.3 reports the correlations of supply shocks. These are mapped into Figure 4.1. A 
large group of correlated provinces can be identified. They include Liaoning, Jilin, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hunan, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Yunnan, Gansu, Ningxia, and, to a lesser degree, Shanxi and Sichuan. In 
1994, this group of provinces accounted for 60.7 percent of national industrial output. 
Table 4.4 reportS the correlations of demand shocks. These are mapped into Figure 4.2. 
A similar, but smaller and much weaker, group of provinces emerge. Anhui, Guangxi, 
Yunnan are excluded, while Beijing is included marginally. Sichuan becomes more 
significant, while Gansu becomes a marginal case. In 1994, this core group of provinces 
accounted for 53.4 percent of national industrial output. 
Again, the correlations between the nine European countries (E9) across the period of 
1986Ql to 1993Q3 are used for comparison. As reported in Chapter 3, in terms of 
supply shock, less than half of the E9 are correlated at a 1 percent level. In terms of 
demand shock, most are insignificantly correlated. Whitt (1995) finds that in terms of 
supply shock, the correlation between Germany and four other EC members (the UK, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands) were -0.08, 0.56, 0.46 and 0.40, respectively. While 
that of demand shock were -0.32, 0.02, -0.24, and -0.34, respectively. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1994) use annual data and evidence stronger correlations between 
European countries . They also find that the correlation of supply shocks between six out 
of seven US regions ranged from 0.43 to 0.81, and that of demand shocks ranged from 
0.43 to 0.79. 
When all the Chinese provinces are included, no clear conclusion can be drawn about 
the relative coherence between them and the E9. Nevertheless, among the 28 provinces , 
the correlations between certain provinces are comparable to, if not stronger than, those 
of the E9. The results of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994a) seem to suggest that the US 
regions are more correlated than the Chinese provinces and the EMU members. 
Nonetheless, the comparison may not be on an equal basis. Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
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Table 4.3 
Beijing 
Tianjin 
Hebei 
Shanxi 
Inner Mongolia 
Liaoning 
Jilin 
Heilongjiang 
Shanghai 
Ji.tngsu 
Zhcjiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Jiangxi 
Shandong 
Henan 
Hubci 
Hunan 
Guangdong 
Guangxi 
Sichuan 
Guizhou 
Yunnan 
Shaanxi 
Gansu 
Qinghai 
Ningxia 
Xinjiang 
Correlation of Supply Shocks between Chinese Provinces 
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Figure 4.2: Correlated Chinese Provinces in Demand Shocks 
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(1994a) use annual data and group the 30 states of the US into only seven regions, some 
short-term intra-regional asymmetry might be averaged out. 
4.3.2 Sensitivity Tests 
Again, to ensure the robustness of the results , their sensitivity in respect to different lag 
lengths is tested. The exercise is repeated by selecting the lags for individual provinces 
according to the Akaike's information criterion (AlC). As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, all lags suggested by the AlC are very short, either one or two months. 
Compared to the previous 12 lags, it can be considered an extreme test case. The 
correlation patterns become sharper than in the case of uniform 12 lags. The correlation 
of supply shocks clearly divides China almost exactly into a western and eastern sphere, 
with Heilongjiang and Guangxi at the ends of the diagonal. The only exception is 
Sichuan, which is still correlated to eastern provinces. The correlation patterns of 
demand shocks changes even more dramatically. Almost all the provinces are strongly 
correlated. 
In the last chapter, it is mentioned that Chan (1996) uses the decomposition method of 
Cohen and Wyplosz (1989) to disentangle the correlation of disturbances between Hong 
Kong and other economies. We are not aware of any attempts to apply this method on 
the Chinese provinces to date. Despite the limitations of the method mentioned 
previously, it can still serve as a sensitivity test to verify the groupings of provinces 
suggested by the B&Q method. The method has various estimation specifications, such 
as different lag lengths or different growth trends. Since it is for the purpose of 
illustrating the sensitivity of the V AR results, any plausible specifications which 
manage to provide alternative results will fulfill the purpose. The one being chosen here 
is one of the specifications in Karras (1996). 
The method is to decompose fluctuations of output and inflation separately into 
common and specific shocks: 
X iz = W i + P il X ir- 1 + P i2X it-2 +' ,+Pik X it - k + C t + Sir ; 
where the subscript i and t denote province and time respectively. x is the change of 
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logarithm output (L1y) or inflation (L12p); w is the real growth rate; c is a cornmon shock; 
and s is a specific shock. The lag terms of x are to capture the persistence of shocks. 
Three and two lags are used in the output and inflation regressions, respectively. 
Cornmon shocks are those that affect all provinces to the same degree, specific shocks 
affect individual provinces only. The more effective the transmission of shocks across 
provinces, the more dominant cornmon shocks relative to specific shocks will be. It is 
found that the ratio of the variances of cornmon to specific inflation shocks ranges from 
12.5 for Inner Mongolia to 1.3 for Beijing. The ratios for all but nine provinces are 
actually above 3.3. On the other hand, that for output shocks ranges from 2.3 for Hebei 
to 0.2 for Jiangsu. The ratios for only three provinces are above 1.0, while those for 12 
provinces are below 0.5. 
Furthermore, the more effective the transmission between two provinces, the stronger 
the correlation of their specific shocks will be. Since the variance ratios of cornmon to 
specific output shocks are generally small, the correlation of output specific shocks 
becomes more important. Two groups of provinces with strong correlation can be 
identified: (i) Liaoning, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi and Hunan; and (ii) Guizhou, 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai and Xinjiang. The first group is located in eastern China, while 
the second group is in western China. More interestingly, these two groups are roughly 
significantly negatively correlated to each other. 
In terms of correlation of specific inflation shock, three groups of integrated provinces 
can be identified: (i) Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangdong; (ii) Jiangsu, Zhejiang 
and Anhui; and (iii) Hunan, Sichuan and Guangxi. The composition of the first group is 
tangible, as the members are the most open provinces. The second and third groups of 
provinces are close neighbors in eastern and northern China, respectively. 
Overall, the regional groupings identified both by using shorter lag lengths and by the 
univariate method are quite different from the previous findings . It means that any 
conclusions about regional integration will , at most, be suggestive. On the other hand, a 
small group of provinces, which are consistently strongly correlated under most 
estimation specifications, can be identified. They include Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, Fujian, and Hunan. They are close neighbors in eastern China. 
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4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Tests of selective OCA criteria suggest that a single market has not yet formed in China. 
As described by the World Bank (1994), China is an economy where "major elements of 
economic union including a single currency and a common external tariff are combined 
with a lack of some basic features of a free trade area, such as the free movement of 
goods and factors". Nevertheless, one of the definitive features of a currency area is the 
free flow of capital (Cohen 1994). Even if the Chinese provinces are using a single legal 
tender, capital is not perfectly mobile between them. Therefore, China is not quite a 
currency area either. 
Despite the heterogeneity of the Chinese provinces, based on the selective OCA criteria, 
a group of more developed provinces can be identified; these include Beijing, Tianjin, 
Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, and Hainan. 
They are all characterized with high per capita GDP, relatively large secondary and 
tertiary industries (and, thus, a small primary industry) ,' high openness, and low 
dependence on fiscal transfers from the central government. The only item that does not 
match this general regional pattern is labor mobility. This is because labor mobility 
takes into account both incoming and outgoing labor. As far as the size of incoming 
labor is concerned, this group of provinces has outstandingly high levels. 
Nevertheless, using symmetry of disturbances as a gauge of economic integration 
indicates different groupings of provinces. It is found that the shocks experienced by the 
provinces are not uniformly correlated. Different estimation specifications suggest 
different groupings of provincial economies . However, it is found that a group of several 
eastern provinces are consistently strongly correlated. The group consists of Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Fujian, and Hunan. The result suggests that treating China as 
an integrated economy might be misleading not only at the micro level, but also at the 
macro level, especially in understanding its business cycles. 
6 A more detailed breakdown will show that the secondary industries of this group of provinces are 
dominated by light rather than heavy industries. 
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Overall, the finding rejects the proposition that China constitutes an OCA. Hence, it 
casts doubts on the effectiveness of using uniform monetary policies to manage the 
macroeconomic activities of the highly heterogeneous Chinese provinces. The 
segregation between provinces attributes to distorting local policy regimes as much as, if 
not more than, structural differences. The experience of the EMU shows that forming a 
common market should be a prerequisite for adopting a single currency (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen 1997). In the case of China, a single currency has long been in place, but a 
truly common market is still not in sight. The comparison reconfirms that encouraging 
thorough economic decentralization but avoiding over administrative decentralization is 
the key to delivering the benefits of economic reform. 
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Chapter 5 
Choices ifNominalAnchors & Entrepot Trade 
Synopsis 5 
This chapter considers a special but ignored issue in the literature of trade and exchange 
rate regimes, namely the interrelation between entrepot trade and monetary standard. A 
theoretical three-country model is constructed to illustrate the role of entrepot trade in 
the choices of monetary standard for small open economies . Analytical results 
demonstrate that trade structure can substantially change the impact of exogenous 
shocks on a small open economy. Most importantly, it is found that the current structure 
of indirect trade between the United States (US), Hong Kong and China could reduce 
the opportunity cost of choosing between the US dollar and the renminbi as the nominal 
anchor for the Hong Kong dollar. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the onset of the Asian financial crisis in mid-1997, the currency board system in 
Hong Kong had been under severe pressure. There were rumors that Hong Kong would 
eventually switch from the US dollar zone to the Chinese renminbi zone, and thus 
demolish the link with the greenback. Although the speculative attacks against the Hong 
Kong dollar were ultimately deterred by August 1999, the crisis sparked a lot of debate 
in relation to whether the exchange rate parity with the US dollar is sustainable and 
beneficial for Hong Kong in the long term. 
One criticism of the prevailing system is that pegging the Hong Kong dollar to a strong 
US dollar will weaken the export competitiveness of Hong Kong. However, the 
government has pronounced that, because Hong Kong trade is dominated by entrepot 
trade, the choice of the nominal anchor is irrelevant to export competitiveness. This 
view is shared by some private investors; for example, see Hong Kong Bank (1997a). 
In the literature of monetary standard, trade is considered a major factor in determining 
the nominal anchor. A typical proposition being if a small country decides to peg its 
currency to a foreign currency, it should choose the currency of its largest trading 
partner, or if there is no single dominant partner, a basket of the currencies of all its 
major partners. The rationale is, ceteris paribus, a more stable exchange rate will help 
enhance trade and investment. Therefore, pegging to the largest trading partner, or to a 
basket of all the major partners, will maximize the benefits. 
If the small country has a weak capacity to conduct stabilizing macroeconomic policies, 
pegging the domestic currency to a reputed currency also helps strengthen its 
credibility. This is essentially the idea behind the currency board arrangements of some 
inflation-prone economies like Argentina and Estonia (Balino and Enoch 1997). 
However, it can work the opposite way, in that the peg amplifies the spillover effects of 
domestic monetary disturbances in the anchor country. 
The literature on choices of exchange regimes for small open economies is extremely 
rich. In most studies, direct trade is assumed and indirect trade is ignored. Such an 
assumption is justifiable for most countries, as indirect trade is usually negligible when 
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compared with direct trade. However, the situation is significantly different for Hong 
Kong. In 1998, the total value of Hong Kong re-exports was about 6.2 times that of 
direct exports, placing Hong Kong at the top of the world list of entrepots. In terms of 
value-added, the contribution of re-exports to the gross domestic product (GDP) was 
about 16 to 17 percent (Dodsworth and Mihaljek 1997), more than double that of direct 
exports.' In fact, the sizable indirect trade between the US and China via Hong Kong is 
a key factor underlying the dispute over the trade balance between the two economies 
(Fung and Lau 1999). 
The distinct trade structure of Hong Kong adds a new aspect to the old topic of choice 
of monetary standard. It raises the question of whether entrepot trade affects, or even 
changes, the choice of the nominal anchor for small open economies under fixed 
exchange rate regimes. 
At first glance, a fundamental difference between direct trade and entrepot trade is that 
the former involves only two countries, and therefore a single exchange rate, while the 
latter involves three countries, and two exchange rates. Unless its trading partners peg 
their currencies together, the entrepot can not expect to gain the benefits of exchange 
rate stability on both sides. 
Furthermore, in terms of the transmission of exogenous disturbances, the presence of 
entrepot trade might complicate the mechanism. Consider the impacts of a fiscal 
expansion in the US on the trade flows between the US , Hong Kong and China under 
the Mundell-Fleming model framework. The first case is purely direct trade. In the short 
run, due to price rigidity, the US dollar appreciates against the renminbi. At the same 
time, the US increases imports from Hong Kong, due to higher income. If the Hong 
Kong dollar is pegged to the renminbi it will depreciate against the US dollar. So both 
the income and substitution effect will increase demand for Hong Kong export. If the 
Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar it will appreciate against the renminbi and 
export demand from China will be reduced. The world interest rate will go up in both 
, Another IMF study states that the contribution of re-exports to the GDP is only about 13 percent 
(Mihaljek, Hussain et aL 1998:20). 
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cases. Overall, the pressure on the output of Hong Kong will be larger if the Hong Kong 
dollar is pegged to the renminbi. 
In the case of entrepot trade, if the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the renminbi, both the 
Hong Kong dollar and the renminbi will depreciate against the US dollar. As a result, 
indirect exports from China to the US will increase, but those of the US to China will 
reduce. As before, there will be greater demand from the US for the direct exports of 
Hong Kong and a higher world interest rate. The overall impact on Hong Kong is thus 
ambiguous. On the other side, if the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the US dollar, when 
both the Hong Kong dollar and US dollar appreciate against the renminbi, the indirect 
exports of China to the US will increase, and those of the US to China will decrease. 
Again, the overall result is indeterminate. Under either fixed exchange rate regime, the 
impact on the output of Hong Kong depends on the relative size of its re-exports to the 
US and China, respectively, and on the relative size of its direct exports and re-exports . 
The above simple example illustrates that involving one more trading partner actually 
creates several more channels to transmit disturbances across countries, making the 
choice of the optimal nominal anchor less obvious than in the case of purely direct 
trade. Indeed, this paper argues that trade structure can substantially change the impacts 
of exogenous disturbances on a small economy and its opportunity cost of choosing one 
foreign currency instead of another as the nominal anchor. 
There are a number of studies about the trade structure of Hong Kong, including Hsia 
(1984), Sung (1988), Sung (1991), Sung (1995), Sung (1998) , Soesastro (1992) and 
Tuan and Ng (1998). Nevertheless, regarding the choice of exchange rate regime for 
entrepots, Tom (1989) and Tom (1964) are the only two noticeable studies. However, 
both studies focus on the situation before the 1950s. 
This chapter examines how indirect trade affects the impacts of exogenous shocks on an 
entrepot and its choice of the nominal anchor, should it decide to adopt a fixed exchange 
rate regime. The indirect trade between the US, China and Hong Kong, as well as the 
controversy over the US dollar versus the renminbi as the nominal anchor for the Hong 
Kong dollar, provide a useful case study to illustrate the arguments. This study aims 
only to point out the importance of entrepot trade, and the trade structure in general, in 
the consideration of the exchange rate regime from a theoretical perspective rather than 
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attempting to pick the favorite between the US dollar and renminbi zone. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background 
about indirect trade between the US, China and Hong Kong; Section 3 reviews the 
limited literature on the issue from a historical perspective; Section 4 puts forwards a 
three-country model to examine the issue; Section 5 discusses the results ; and Section 6 
concludes the study by drawing some implications from the findings, and pointing out 
possible further improvements for the model. 
5.2 ENTREPOT TRADE IN HONG KONG 
It is useful to first clarify some of the terminology. In this thesis, "entrepot trade" and 
"indirect trade" are used interchangeably, and so are "re-export" and "indirect export," 
and "domestic export" and "direct export," respectively. 
According to the Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong (1997:34), re-exports 
are "products which have previously been imported into Hong Kong and which are re-
exported without having undergone in Hong Kong a manufacturing process which has 
changed permanently the shape, nature, form or utility of the product." Sung (1991) 
categorizes entrepot trade as being where a third party (i.e. entrepot trader) has held the 
legal possession of the goods at certain stages. As a result, both transshipment (i .e. via 
Hong Kong with through bills of lading) and direct shipment (i.e. without touching 
Hong Kong) are excluded from the official external trade figures and treated as separate 
items from entrepot trade in Sung (1991).2 
Whether such precise and restrictive categorizations are necessary depends on the task 
at hand. Entrepot trade is essentially trade in intermediary services, which includes 
communications, transportation, financing, insurance, marketing and packaging. Those 
services are embodied in the traded goods and usually not traded separately (Sung 
1998). Therefore, separating transshipment and direct shipment from conventional 
merchandise entrepot trade risks missing part of the picture. Indeed, as far as the 
2 More about transshipment and direct shipment is discussed below. 
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mechanism and implication of the model developed in this study are concerned, any 
form of intermediary services provided by the entrepot should be taken into account. 
5.2.1 China Factor 
There are only a handful of countries that have noticeable re-export sectors, compared 
with their direct export sectors. Table 5.1 reports the ratios of re-exports to direct 
exports of the top eight countries whose data are available. Only the first four countries 
have ratios greater than 0.1 , with the performance of Hong Kong being the most 
outstanding. 
Table 5.1: Re-export to Domestic Export Ratio 
Hong Kong Cyprus Singapore Jordan US Australia New Dominica 
Zealand 
1980 0.44 0.61 0.40 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
1985 0.81 0.54 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 
1990 1.83 0.66 0.52 0.15 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.04 
1991 2.31 0.78 0.54 0.27 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 
1992 2.95 0.96 0.56 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.01 
1993 3.69 1.09 0.58 0.22 0.06 0.09 0.04 
1994 4.27 1.17 0.66 0.24 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.02 
1995 4.80 1.33 0.70 0.24 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 
1996 5.59 0.71 
1997 5.89 
1998 6.15 
Source: various issues of the Yearbook of Statistics of Singapore; International Economic Data Bank, 
Australian National University; the Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong. 
As mentioned, the statistics of Hong Kong do not include direct shipment and 
transshipment. With an annual growth rate of up to 15 percent, outward transshipment 
and seaborne exports have been evolving into a significant component of the services 
exported by Hong Kong (Tuan and Ng 1998). In other words, the official figures do not 
fully reflect the middleman capacity of Hong Kong when a broader definition of 
entre pot trade is used. 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the development of entrepot trade in Hong Kong. During the 1960s 
140 
and 1970s, the exports of Hong Kong were dominated by domestic manufactured 
products. In 1978, the year before China launched the open-door policy, the gross value 
of the re-exports of Hong Kong was only 32 percent of that of domestic exports. But as 
economic reform rooted in China re-exports picked up rapidly. In 1988, the gross value 
of re-exports bypassed that of direct exports for the first time, and grew almost at an 
exponential rate thereafter. 
Figure 5.1: Re-exports, Domestic Exports and Imports 
of Hong Kong 
250 
U 
" >§. 200 
;:: 
" :: 150 
" ~
" .s: 100 
is 
a 50 (/J 
:J 
0 
1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 
Source: The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Government 
(http://www.info.gov.hklcenstatd/hkstatlfas/ttradel .htm) . 
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The rapid growth of re-exports since the 1980s is primarily ascribed to the migration of 
the Hong Kong manufacturing industry to the Pearl River Delta region to take 
advantages of its abundant factor resources (Tuan and Ng 1998). By the end of 1991, it 
is estimated that in Guangdong alone, Hong Kong firms operated about 14,000 
enterprises and employed about 3 million workers, more than half the then Hong Kong 
population (Dodsworth and Mihaljek 1997)' On the other hand, by freeing up resources 
from upstream manufacturing production, Hong Kong has been able to specialize in 
downstream trade services in which it has plentiful expertise and efficient infrastructure. 
The flourishing of entrepot trade in Hong Kong has not only come with the opening of 
the Chinese economy, but also with the decentralization of foreign trade in China. 
Before 1979, almost all foreign trade was monopolized by just ten state trading 
corporations; by 1984, the number of trading corporations had mushroomed to 1000 
(Sung 1998). The fact that trading agencies have been increasingly scattering 
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in China raises the searching cost and the demand for an intermediary. Due to 
geographical proximity, cultural affiliation, and abundant trading expertise, Hong Kong 
has every comparative advantage to be the middleman between China and the rest of the 
world. 
5.2.2 Outward Processing Related Trade 
The shift of resources from domestic exports to re-exports boosts the trade figures of 
Hong Kong spectacularly in gross value terms. During the periods 1970-80 and 1980-
90, the annual growth rates of re-exports reached 16.1 percent and 22.8 percent, 
respectively, far ahead of GDP (9.3 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively) and ahead of 
total exports (10.5 percent and 1404 percent, respectively) (Hong Kong Bank 1992). 
This comparison is somewhat misleading, as the value-added in re-exports is normally 
less than that in other productions, so that the same amount of real resources deployed 
in the latter can feed the former with multiple volume. 
More importantly, about 65 percent of the entrepot trade of Hong Kong comes from 
outward processing activities (Sung 1998:75).3 That is , manufacturers import semi-
products and materials from other countries via Hong Kong to China, and then export 
the final products via Hong Kong to other countries. Consequently, there is double 
counting in outward processing related trade (OPRT). Table 5.2 demonstrates that 
during the period 1978-96 total exports of Hong Kong grew at an average annual rate of 
16.5 percent; however, after adjusting for OPRT, the growth rate of the total exports of 
final goods was only lOA percent. 
The double counting problem due to OPRT also distorts the rankings of Hong Kong's 
trading partners. Table 5.2 shows that unadjusted trade figures suggest that, by 1996, 
China had already bypassed the US as the foremost market for Hong Kong exports 
(34.3 percent versus 21.2 percent). But the adjusted figures indicate the US was still the 
largest end-user market for the territory (25.2 percent versus 21.9 percent). 
3 In 1997 ,76. 1 percent of the domestic exports and 44.7 percent of the re-exports of Hong Kong to China 
were related to outward processing (Sung 1998). At the same time, 81.2 percent of the imports from 
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Table 5.2: Growth Rate and Market Share of Hong Kong Exports 
Growth rate (% ) Market Share (%) 
Total US China Japan EU 
1978-96 1978 1996 1978 1996 1978 1996 1978 1996 
Domestic exports 6.6 37.2 25.4 0.2 29.0 4.6 5.3 26.7 
Domestic exports 5.3 37.2 31.9 0.2 11.0 4.6 6.7 26.7 
of final goods ' 
Total exports 16.5 30.3 21.2 0.5 34.3 7.7 6.5 21.7 
Total exports of 10.4 30.3 25.2 0.5 21.9 7.7 7.9 21.7 
final goods b 
Source: Sung (1998). 
(a) Domestic exports of final goods equal domestic exports minus domestic exports to China involving 
outward processing. 
(b) Total exports of final goods equal total exports minus total exports to China involving outward 
processing. 
5.2.3 Value-added 
17.4 
21.9 
14.9 
17.7 
Re-exports dominate the trade of Hong Kong not only in tenns of gross value, but also 
in tenns of total value-added. Surveys conducted by the Census and Statistics 
Department of Hong Kong indicate that in 1989 the margins of the re-exports of 
Chinese origin and other origins, comparably, stood at 13.0 percent and 11.5 percent, 
respectively (Sung 1998). Since then the fonner increased rapidly, reaching 34.4 percent 
in 1996, while the latter declined to 6.6 percent; together they gave an average value of 
21.4 percent (ibid.). 
The reason why the markup associated with Chinese exports has increased so much is 
not clear, given that the Hong Kong middleman market is seemingly open and 
competitive. Possible explanations include that part of those markups are actually 
returns of Hong Kong's investments in China, and Chinese exporters trying to transfer 
capital out of the country illegally via under-invoicing (Fung and Lau 1999). 
China to Hong Kong and 88.4 percent of the re-exports of Chinese origin were outward processing 
related . 
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Since the value of the re-exports of Hong Kong is over six times that of domestic 
exports, using the average value of re-export margins of 21.4 percent, the total value-
added of the former is about 120 percent of the latter. Nonetheless, since Hong Kong 
virtually does not produce any raw materials, its value-added in domestic exports is 
unlikely to be 100 percent. Sung (1988) estimates that during 1977-84 the value-added 
of Hong Kong in its manufactured goods was only about 30 percent. Supposing the 
figure remains steady, the total value-added of re-exports is about 400 percent of 
domestic exports. If one deflates the volume of re-exports to take into account the 
double counting in OPRT, the total value-added of the former is still about 270 percent 
of the latter.' 
5.2.4 Trading Partners 
China, the US , the European Union (EU), and Japan are Hong Kong' s largest trade 
partners, for both domestic exports and re-exports. For these four destination countries, 
the ratios of the re-exports to direct exportS of Hong Kong basically follow the overall 
trend, that is starting to rise since the mid 1980s (Figure 5.2). This is because China has 
made use of Hong Kong as a springboard for its products to the other three economies, 
as well as to channel imports from them. 
The ratio for China exhibits some irregularities. This is because, before the 1980s, both 
the direct exports and re-exports from Hong Kong to China were so small (Figures 5.3 
and 5.4) that the ratio becomes very sensitive to slight changes of either component. 
Figures 5.3 , 5.4 and 5.5 portray the growing significance of China, relative to other 
countries, as the primary trading partner of Hong Kong. The share of China in the total 
trade of Hong Kong rose spectacularly from 6.4 percent in 1980 to over 34 percent in 
1996 (Hong Kong Bank 1997b). The second most important trading partner is the US. 
The re-exports of Hong Kong have been increasingly concentrated on the big four 
partners, compared to domestic exports and imports. 
4 This figure comes from the fact that about 65 percent of the entrepot trade of Hong Kong is related to 
outward processing. If one reduces the volume of OPRT by half, then the ratio of the total value-added of 
re-expons over that of domestic exports is equal to (65 %*6*0.5+35%*6)*0.2/0.3 = 270%. 
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Figure 5.3: Share of Re-exports of Hong Kong by Destination 
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University for data of 1980-95. 
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Figure 5.5: Share of Imports of Hong Kong by Source Countries 
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Figure 5.6 reveals the degree of utilization of China, the US and the world as a whole, 
on the entrepot services of Hong Kong, respectively. The curve "China-to-US" denotes 
the ratio of the indirect exports via Hong Kong over the direct exports of China to the 
US, and so forth. The larger the ratio, the more the source country makes use of Hong 
Kong for its exports to the destination country. 
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Figure 5.6: Ratio of Indirect Exports via Hong Kong 
to Direct Exports 
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Source: The Census and Statistics Department of the Hong Kong Government 
(http://www.info.gov.hklcenstatd/hkstatlfas/ttradel.htm); UNCOMTRADE, IEDB, Australian National 
University for data of 1980-95. 
It can be seen that China utilizes Hong Kong more than either the US or the world as .a 
whole. In 1993, the ratio of "China-to-US" dropped dramatically because of the 
reclassification of exports of China. Since then re-exports via Hong Kong to a third 
country (if traceable) have been counted as exports to that country instead of to Hong 
Kong, as they used to be (Fung and Lau 1999). The reclassification is a means to settle 
the disagreement between China and the US over the measurement of their trade 
balance. 
Despite the reclassification, the ratio of "China-to-US" is still much larger than that of 
"China-to-World", implying that Chinese products utilize Hong Kong as a gateway to 
the US market more than to elsewhere. Similarly, the US makes use of Hong Kong as 
its trading port mainly for the Chinese market. Combining all the evidence, it can be 
inferred that the US-China-Hong Kong triangle constitutes the largest indirect trading 
bloc in the world. 
5.2.5 Offshore Trade 
Since the mid-1990s, there are signs that the growth of Hong Kong exports has been 
slowing down. As evidenced in Figure 5.7, throughout 1996 domestic exports even 
registered negative growth on a year-on-year basis. The tremble in export growth was 
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due to a decline in global demand plus a strengthening of the US dollar. The latter 
propagated into a real appreciation of the Hong Kong dollar by over 12 percent from 
mid-1995 to end-1996 CMihaljek, Hussain et al . 1998). Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997) 
estimate that, for Hong Kong, a 1 percent rise in the reaJ exchange rate leads to a 0.5 
percent decline in export volume. 
Figure 5.7: Year-on-year Growth Rate of Hong Kong Exports 
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The dwindling in trade growth has intensified since the onset of the Asian crisis. This 
was only partly related to the disruption in the East Asian market, and more to 
weakening import demand in China. In the second half of 1998, the year-on-year 
growth rate of exports to China fell by 15.9 percent. 
A feature of Figure 5.7 is that the two growth rates are highly synchronous . A 
hypothesis could be made that re-exports and domestic exports were subject to 
symmetric negative shocks, but that the former were better weathered than the latter. 
Notwithstanding, the performance of re-exports during this period was indeed more 
striking than it appeared when measured against the buoyant export growth of China. In 
the first half of 1997, China's exports grew by 26.2 percent on a year-on-year basis, 
whereas Hong Kong' s re-exports only grew by 3 percent CHang Seng Bank 1997). 
In fact, the contrast in export growth between Hong Kong and China signals another 
structural change of Hong Kong trade, in that traditional re-exporting activities are 
gradually replaced by transshipment, and, further, by direct shipment. Transshipment is 
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where goods are exported by one country to others via Hong Kong' s ports, but without 
changing the legal possession of the goods from overseas exporters to Hong Kong 
traders. Direct shipment is commonly referred to as "offshore trade." The goods 
involved do not even pass through Hong Kong; the role of Hong Kong traders is to 
provide brokerage services between offshore producers and buyers. Over one third of 
trading companies in Hong Kong are now engaged in offshore trade; their major 
customers are Asian countries (Dodsworth and Mihaljek 1997). 
Statistics released by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council indicate that of the 
Chinese products sold by Hong Kong traders in 1997, 72 percent were re-exported via 
Hong Kong, compared with 81 percent in 1992 (Sung 1998). In contrast, the shares of 
transshipment and direct shipment increased from 11 to 12.4 percent and 8 to 15.8 
percent, respectively. For the non-Chinese products, the shares of re-exports and 
transshipment fell from 52 to 40.4 percent and from 12.2 to 7.7 percent, respectively, 
whereas that of direct shipment rose from 36 to 52 percent. In a word, Hong Kong has 
progressively evolved from a traditional entrepot into a "control room directing flows of 
goods and investment across the globe" (Hang Seng Bank 1997). As official statistics 
exclude transshipment and direct shipment from entrepot trade, Figure 5.7 actually 
understates the growth rate of re-export services. 
This transformation is consistent with the changing comparative advantages between 
Hong Kong and China. On the one hand, Hong Kong is land and labor scarce. Although 
re-export requires much less factor resources than domestic export, up to a certain point 
it is also labor and land intensive, as both factors are used extensively for cargo terminal 
operation (Sung 1998). 
On the other hand, due to rapid improvement in its own infrastructure, the reliance of 
China on Hong Kong's port facilitates has been reduced recently. During 1996-98, the 
average annual growth rate of traffic in the northern ports of Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Qingdao reached 30 percent (Hang Seng Bank 1997). In the south, the fastest growing 
Yantian port located in Shenzhen registered an upsurge of throughput by about 70 
percent during 1996-97 (ibid.). 
China has gradually abolished the preferential treatment granted to foreign investment 
in coastal areas . The policy is now preserved for less-developed inland provinces as a 
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means to combat regional disparity (Hong Kong Bank 1997a). The benefits enjoyed by 
Hong Kong due to its close linkage to the Peal River Delta region is thus diluted.' The 
impact of this shift of development gravity in the mainland upon Hong Kong is reflected 
in the diminishing momentum of OPRT since the mid-1990s. In 1990, outward 
processing related total exports to and imports from China grew at annual rates of 19.7 
and 27.9 percent, respectively (Sung 1998). By 1997, the growth rates had dropped to 
10.0 and 8.3 percent, respectively (ibid.). 
As a consequence, shifting resources from conventional entrepot trade to transshipment 
and offshore trade, in particular, can help maintain the competitiveness of Hong Kong 
as a trading center both in the bigger China and in the region. 
5.2.6 Remarks 
The recent structural shift in Hong Kong trade by no means undermines the importance 
of analyzing how the exchange rate regime interacts with entrepot trade. 
First of all, despite signs of slowing down, Sung (1998) expects the indirect trade 
between China and Hong Kong to keep growing in absolute terms. The driving force 
behind this development is the continuous decentralization of the foreign trade system 
in China and the growth of Hong Kong investments in processing operations in China. 
To surf the wave of policy changes in the mainland, Hong Kong manufacturers have 
started relocating lower value-added production to inland provinces and freeing up the 
capacity in coastal provinces for a higher value-added one (Dodsworth and Mihaljek 
1997). 
Secondly, the lack of coordination in infrastructure development in the mainland 
hinders its ports from overtaking Hong Kong in the near future. As pointed out by Sung 
(1998), due to scale economies, a container port has to operate at or above the level of 
1.5 million containers a year to make it efficient. This figure is 2.5 times the freight 
5 For instance, the share of Guangdong province in China' s exports increased rapidly from 10.2 percent in 
1984 to a peak of 44 percent in 1994, but then slid back to 41.6 percent in 1997 (Sung 1998:14). 
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volume handled by Yantain in 1996,' 15 times the volume handled by Shekou - another 
container port in Shenzhen. As China has excessively expanded its container port 
capacity at one point, it has actually reduced the competitiveness of each port relative to 
Hong Kong. This is reflected in the fact that 93 percent of Guangdong' s cargo in 1996 
was still handled by Hong Kong (ibid.). 
Furthermore, due to the significant economies of scale and economies of agglomeration 
in trading activities, being an established trading hub, Hong Kong will be in an 
advantageous position to compete with other late comers. Indeed, many Chinese 
companies have established subsidiaries in Hong Kong to handle their trade in order to 
take advantage of those scale economies (ibid.). 
Last, as stated previously, the contraction in official re-export figures merely represents 
a reallocation of resources from traditional entrepot trade to new entrepot trade -
transshipment and offshore trade. In 1997, in terms of re-exports , Hong Kong handled 
two-fifths of China's trade. But when transshipments, direct shipments, and direct trade 
with Hong Kong are included, the ratio rises to two-thirds (ibid.) . 
Considering all these factors , it can be concluded that, although the format of entrepot 
trade has been shifting, the prospect of Hong Kong as an international trading hub 
remains promising. 
5.3 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
For Hong Kong, choosing the anchor currency between the Chinese currency and the 
US dollar is not a new problem. About 125 years ago, Hong Kong was confronted with 
exactly the same problem' This section provides an historical perspective of the 
economic relationship between the US, China and Hong Kong during 1840-1950. The 
6 In 1997, Yantain's capacity was merely about 0.6 million containers per year, compared to 13.5 million 
containers processed by Hong Kong in 1996. Notwithstanding, the potential capacity of Yantain is 
estimated at over 16 million containers a year. This indicates that there is a huge unexplored port capacity 
in the mainland. 
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choice of monetary standard for the Hong Kong dollar during that period will be 
emphasized. 
When the United Kingdom (UK) colonized Hong Kong in 1842, its objective was to 
make Hong Kong its trading port in the Far East, primarily for China's market. As a 
result, commerce and entrepot trade activities bloomed rapidly in Hong Kong. Entrepot 
trade was the dominant activity, as there were virtually no domestic products exported. 
The economic structure of Hong Kong started to change when the People's Republic of 
China was established in 1949. Internally, China was willing to trade only with the 
former Soviet Union Bloc. Foreign trade was completely centralized and conducted on a 
state-to-state basis without involving middlemen (Sung 1998). After diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union turned sour in the late 1950s, instead of developing 
economic ties with other countries, China retreated into a policy of self-sufficiency. 
Consequently, imports of consumer goods were heavily curtailed. The engagement of 
China in the Korean War in 1951 led to an export embargo on essentials and strategic 
goods to China by the United Nations, and an import embargo on Chinese products by 
the US. China's share of Hong Kong's total exports shrank from 39.3 percent in 1950 to 
4.2 percent in 1956, and to less than I percent by 1966 (Ho 1992). 
However, during the 100 years between the 1840s and the 1950s, China dominated the 
trade activities of Hong Kong. This intimate trade relationship created a dilemma for 
Hong Kong in the 1870s, when there was a big shift of monetary standards among a lot 
of countries. 
In 1870, western countries started to abandon the bimetallism system and used only 
gold as their monetary standard. However, countries in the Far East, including China 
maintained the silver standard. This resulted in two currency areas in the world - the 
gold and silver standards - roughly corresponding geographically to the West and the 
East. In 1873, the value of silver relative to gold began to fall, and fluctuated widely 
throughout the following decade. The depreciation of silver promoted Chinese exports, 
and therefore Hong Kong trade (Nugee 1995). A number of eastern countries, including 
Japan, decided to switch to the gold standard. Nevertheless, China maintained the silver 
standard for another 60 years, until 1935. China abandoned the silver standard after the 
US heavily purchased silver in the international market and caused large silver outflows 
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from China and Hong Kong. As a result, Hong Kong also left the silver standard. 
Therefore, during 1873-1935, Hong Kong was confronted with the problem of choosing 
between the gold and silver standard. In contrast to the contemporary situation, Hong 
Kong chose to stay in the silver zone, thereby effectively pegging the Hong Kong dollar 
to the Chinese currency. During that period, the Hong Kong dollar fluctuated heavily 
against the currencies under the gold standard, including the pound sterling. Tom (1989) 
put forwards several reasons to justify why Hong Kong chose the silver instead of the 
gold standard; however some of his arguments are subject to scrutiny: 
o Relative size of trade. At that time China was accounted for the majority of the trade 
activities in Hong Kong. During 1931-35, just before China abandoned the silver 
standard, about 70 percent of Hong Kong' s trade was related to China. Tom 
suggests that if Hong Kong had adopted the gold standard, its trade with China 
would have decreased and that with other countries would have increased. Since the 
volume of the former was larger than the latter, Hong Kong was better off staying in 
the same monetary zone with China. Notwithstanding, a breakdown of the figure 
shows that re-exports of Chinese products to other countries accounted for 24.4 
percent of total Hong Kong trade, the re-exports of other countries' products to 
China 38.4 percent, while intra-China trade accounted for only 6.7 percent (ibid.). 
So, in total , over 90 percent of trade involved other countries. If a clear majority of 
those countries adopted the gold standard, then silver and gold were of equal 
importance in the trade of Hong Kong. Therefore, Tom's argument may not be that 
solid. 
o Quoting currency. At that time, while the prices of imports and exports traded with 
Britain were quoted in pound sterling, those traded with Guangdong were quoted in 
Hong Kong dollars. Tom argues that the silver standard helped strengthen Hong 
Kong's trade with Guangdong by eliminating the exchange risk faced by 
Guangdong merchants. This argument presumes that absorbing the exchange risk 
between the Hong Kong dollar and the pound sterling incurred no cost to Hong 
Kong merchants (it could be true given the next factor). Indeed, unless the two 
trading parties peg their currencies together, an entrepot can not expect to eliminate 
exchange rate risks on both sides. 
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o Effectiveness of forward market. During that period, a forward exchange market 
already existed between London and Hong Kong, but not between Guangdong and 
Hong Kong (ibid.). Since the exchange risks between the pound sterling and the 
Hong Kong dollar could be hedged in the forward market, it would be more 
beneficial for Hong Kong to maintain a stable exchange rate with China. 
o Familiarity with the anchor currency. Silver was traditionally used as a monetary 
standard. Even if during the period of the pound sterling standard from 1844 to 
1863, the enforcement of using it was not strong (ibid.). The familiarity of handling 
silver implied a cost of adjustment should Hong Kong switch to the gold standard. 
Overall, despite Tom (1989) raising some relevant issues, a rigorous and consistent 
theoretical framework is not yet in shape. The mechanism involved is barely explained. 
As a result, some of the logic appears to be rather ad hoc. In view of this insufficiency, 
the next section introduces a mathematical three-country model to disentangle the 
interaction between entrepot trade and monetary standard. The analytical result of the 
model indicates that the nature of disturbances, the relative size of direct and indirect 
trade, and the shares of value-added in indirect trade, all have effects on the choice of 
monetary standard. 
5.4 THREE COUNTRY INDIRECT TRADE MODEL 
By and large the models in the literature of exchange rate regimes fall into two 
categories. The first is a two-country model, such as in Dornbusch (1980),7 and the 
second is a multicountry model, such as the Multimod, MSG2, and MX3 models in 
Gagnon, Masson et al. (1996). Two country models restrict the choice of exchange rate 
regime for a small country between either a globally fixed or globally floating regime. 
Under such "all or nothing terms," a fixed regime will internalize all the disturbances 
from the big country (Kenen 1984). On the other hand, the complexity of multi country 
7 Another class of "small open economy" model like the classic Mundell-Fleming-Dornbush model is 
indeed of a two-country setting in which one of the countries (i.e. the world) tends to infinitely large. 
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models makes them less appealing for theoretical studies. This paper uses a three-
country model as a balance between the two extremes. 
Three-country models are not that popular in the literature, possibly because they are 
still relatively complex. Thus, it is common to impose some simplifying assumptions 
onto the models. For example, Sedio (1971) uses a partial equilibrium three-country 
model to examine the balance-of-payments for Canada. Lane (1990) assumes 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in his study of strategic issues of exchange rate 
arrangements. As pointed out by Kenen (1984), imposing PPP onto a model precludes 
the effects of real exchange rate variations. Another common simplifying assumption is 
that one country is small, so that the activities of the two big countries are independent 
of the former, examples include Argy, McKibbin et al. (1989) and Son (1987). 
The model used for this study is based on Argy, McKibbin et al. (1989), which is a 
precise refinement of Marston (1984). The model is a static, three-country model. It 
consists of two big countries B and C, and one small entrepot A. There are two markets 
in each country: goods and money markets. This study focuses only on the short run 
scenario. This is because the model possesses money neutrality, so in the long run, 
when prices and wages are fully flexible, exchange rate regimes are irrelevant to the 
outcome. Furthermore, in this model trade structures have effects on the results when 
there are real exchange rate movements. A plausible and simple way to introduce such 
movements is to fix the prices, such that PPP does not hold. Most importantly, to allow 
simulation experiments to be conducted the trade structure has to be exogenous. In a 
longer time horizon, it will be more appropriate to treat trade structure as endogenous. 
Countries are linked by trade and capital flows , domestic agents hold only foreign bonds 
but no foreign currencies. Capital is perfectly mobile internationally, so real interest 
rates are equalized across all the countries by arbitrage. As wages are fixed in the short 
run, labor markets are omitted. Thus, supplies are perfectly elastic, and outputs are 
completely demand determined. Every country produces one distinct good, for all the 
purposes of domestic consumption, direct exports and indirect exports. There are a total 
of eight routes of trade: six routes of direct trade between the three countries and two 
routes of indirect trade between B and C via A. Overall, the model has a strong flavor of 
the Mundell-Fleming model. 
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The notations of the model are listed in Appendix 5. Nominal exchange rates are 
defined in the way that e: is A$ per B$; that is , if e: increases, A$ is depreciating against 
B$. Ws are exogenously determined trade structure parameters. If 81 increases, the 
exports of A to B are increasingly dominated by direct exports , and so forth. Indirect 
exports are composed of the outputs of both the source country and the entrepot. For 
example, if 85 increases, the value-added of A increases relative to that of C in their 
indirect exports to B. 
5.4.1 Goods Market 
The aggregate demand equations are derived from a simple utility maximization 
process. For example, the utility maximization problem confronted by a representative 
agent i in A is given by: 
maximize Uia (Cia , Cib, C;') = (Cn '" (Cib )'" (C;')'" subject to 
(l-Si)ry;a = rct +pbe: Cib +pce; c t · 
ct , C/ and C/ are the consumption of the domestic products and the imported goods 
from B and C, respectively; (UI+U2+U3) E (0, I); and Si is the saving rate. The utility 
function is of the Cobb-Douglas form. Labor supply is not incorporated into the 
consumption decision making process as the nominal wage is fixed in the short run. It is 
assumed that no transaction cost of trade arises from differences in monetary standard.' 
The maximization problem confronted by a representative agentj in B is given by: 
maximize UJ(CJ, Cl, C;c ) = (CJ )"'(Cl )"' (C;c )'" subject to 
(l_S)pb ~b = pbCJ +pce;C; +[(1-86 )(pbe; )+86 (re!) ]C;C. 
The expression for the agent j in B is different from that in A in two aspects. Firstly, as 
Band C are big countries, following Argy, McKibbin et al . (1989), the direct exports of 
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A are assumed to be negligible in the consumption of the agent in B. Secondly, besides 
the domestic outputs and the direct exports from C, the agent also consumes the indirect 
exports from C, Cr. The price of indirect exports is equal to the sum of the prices of 
manufactured output and trading services, respectively, weighted by their shares of 
value-added in the indirect exports. 
Individual demand equations will be obtained by solving all the maximization problems. 
The demand equations can be further aggregated and transformed into linear logarithm 
forms for small changes: 
y; = Qya _ Ar+ fla + /(1 [Qyb _7)(pa - e; - pb)]+ /(2[QyC _7)(pa - < - pC)] 
+(1-/(1){Qyb +7)[(1-86)(pb -e~ - pC)-86(pa -e; _ pb)]) 
+(1-/(2){QyC -7)[(1-8s)(pb -e~ - pC)+8s(pa _< _ pC)]) (S.la) 
y! =Qyb -Ar+flb +/(3[Qyc _7)(pb -e~ - pC)] 
+(1- /( 3){Qyc -7)[(1- 8 s)(l- e~ - p C) + 8 s(pa _ < _ pC)]) (S.lb) 
y~ = Qyc _ Ar+ fl c +/(4[Qyb +7)(pb - e~ - pC)] 
+(1-/(4){Qyb +7)[(1-86)(pb -e~ - pC)-86(pa -e; _ pb)]) . (S .lc) 
For simplicity, the income elasticities of all the countries are set to be the same, and so 
are the price and interest elasticities, respectively. 
All the items weighted by (l-ICj)' s are indirect export items; for example, the last two 
terms in equation (S.la) are the re-exports of A to B and C, respectively. All the items 
weighted by /(/s are direct export items; for example, /(1[Qyb _7)(pa -e; - pb)] is the 
direct export of A to B. lCj's are constructed in such a way to guarantee that, all the 
countries are trading with each other for any values of 8i within the range of [0,1]. For 
8 It contrasts to a common "iceberg" specification in the literature of monetary unification, for example, 
Ricci (1997) and Bayoumi (1994). 
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instance, if the size of the indirect export sector of B contracts, its direct export sector 
will expand correspondingly. The value-added of direct exports is assumed to be 100 
percent. This setting is indeed to maintain a constant base for the export sector of each 
country and essential to comparing the outcomes under different trade structures. 
It should be noted that every trade structure parameter attaches to a real exchange rate 
term. Hence it gives the real exchange rate a crucial role in driving the result in that the 
influence of trade structure on the impact of a disturbance will come with, and only 
with, real exchange rate movements. 
Assuming goods markets clear, and using composite parameters (defined in Appendix 
S), (S.la)-(S.lb) can be rewritten as: 
ya = -0'1 + U2f.1a +U3(/ + yC)-u4(pa - e; - pb) -us(pb - e: _ pC) (S.2a) 
/ =-u1r+u 2f.1 b +U3y c - f3 4 (pa - e; - pb) - f3 S (ph - e: _ pC) (S.2b) 
yC =-u1r+u2f.1 c +u 3/ - E 4 (pa - e; - ph) + E 5 (pb _ e: _ p C) (S.2c) 
5.4.2 Money Market 
Money markets are of 'standard' specifications, including continuous market clearing: 
rna = ya -cpr+ pa +7ra (S.3a) 
m
b 
= /-cpr+ l +7rb (S.3b) 
me = y' -cpr+ pc +7rc. (S.3c) 
To simplify the model, the income elasticities of money demand are set to one. It 
implies the velocities of money to be constant. Moreover, domestic output prices rather 
than consumer price indexes are used in the money demand functions for simplicity. 
5.5 ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
There are a number of possible combinations of exchange rate regimes between the 
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three countries. The objective of this study is to assess how trade structure affects the 
choice of nominal anchor should the entrepot decide to adopt a fixed exchange rate 
regime. If B$ and C$ are pegged together, pegging A$ to either one of them will be 
equivalent. Obviously, the most relevant case is that B$ and C$ are floating vis-a-vis 
each other and A$ is pegged to either one of them. The result for this case is 
summarized in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Impacts on the Output of Entrepot A 
Regime /1' tf /1' 1f tf 1f 
A$ pegs to B$ + (+) 0 (- ) 
dXld() j 0 + 0 + 
dXld(), o. (+) H 0 (+) H 
dXld()6 0 0 
A$ pegs to C$ + (+) 0 H 
dXld()2 0 + 0 + 
dXld()3 0 (- ) (+) 0 (- ) (+) 
dXld()s 0 0 
(peg to B$ - peg to C$)2 0 (+) H 0 (+) (- ) 
dV!d() j or dVld()2 0 (+) (+) 0 (+) (+) 
dV!d()3 or dVld(), 0 (-) H 0 H H 
dVld()s or dVld()6 0 0 
(a) X = dy'ld(shock); V = variance of X between pegging A$ to B$ and to C$, respectively. A question 
mark indicates that the sign of result is ambiguous; and a bracket indicates that the sign is very likely but 
not absolutely to be the one in the bracket. 
In Table 5.3 , "X" denotes the impact of the corresponding shock on the output of the 
entrepot. For example, in the first column, X is equal to dy"/dIlQ , and "dXld8/, denotes 
the influence of the trade structure parameter 8j on the impact. The last four rows refer 
to the opportunity cost between pegging to C$ and B$, respectively. "\I" stands for the 
variance of X between the two regimes. A question mark indicates that the sign of the 
result is ambiguous; a bracket indicates that the sign of the result is very likely but not 
absolutely to be the one in the bracket, depending on whether the values of the 
parameters are 'moderate. ' 
Note that when A$ is pegged to B$, 82, 83, and 85 have no effects on the impacts of 
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shocks, and so are 81, 84 , and 86 when A$ is pegged to C$. The first three parameters 
determine the trade structure between A and B, while the last three determine the 
structure between A and C. When A$ is pegged to B$, the exchange rates of A$ and B$ 
vis-a-vis C$ move at the same proportion. As a result the price movements of the direct 
exports and re-exports of A to C are perfectly synchronized, rendering the relative size 
between them and, hence, the trade structure parameters between A and B irrelevant. 
The results for the two fixed exchange rate regimes are like mirror images. This is 
because, as there are only three countries, a shock from B under the currency area of B$ 
is qualitatively equivalent to a shock from C under the currency area of C$, and so forth. 
Therefore, the next two subsections discuss the results for the currency area of B$ only. 
Furthermore, Table 5.3 only reports the results of expansionary real demand shocks and 
contractionary nominal shocks. The results for contractionary real demand and 
expansionary nominal shocks are simply the reverse of their counterparts, and so are 
skipped. 
The solution for the output of A, y", under the currency area of B$ is given by: 
ya = a2!1a 
+a2Ca6ES - a s)Cf35 + Es)-'!1b 
+a2 Ca6ES + a s)Cf3s + Est'!1 c 
+[a6C£s -a3f3s)- a 3 Cf3s + £s) - as(l +a3)]Cf3s + Est' n b 
+[a6(£s - a 3f3s) - a 3 Cf3s + Es) + as(l +a3 )]Cf3s + Est' nC. 
The impacts of shocks from Band C, respectively, on A are fairly symmetric, except for 
the terms involving a5. This indicates that the key difference between the impacts of the 
two sources of shocks relies on indirect trade. Given the symmetric set up of various 
elasticities, the shocks from the anchor country B have smaller expansionary effects on 
the output of A than their counterparts from C. 
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5.5.1 Domestic Shocks from A 
A nominal shock from A, rt, has no real impact, simply because A$ is pegged to B$. 
The domestic impact of a real shock from A, fLa, is given by: 
dy" IdfLa =(l-£2f'. 
This is a typical short run result for a small economy under the Mundell-Fleming model. 
The result is independent of the choice of the nominal anchor as well as trade structure, 
since all items of dX I de j are equal to zero. This is because shocks from the small 
country do not affect the nominal exchange rate between the two big countries . When 
A$ is pegged either to B$ or to C$, the nominal exchange rate of A is also fixed. 
Additionally, in the short run, prices are rigid. Consequently, there are no real exchange 
rate movements at all. Since the effects of changes in trade structure come from real 
exchange rate movements, in this case the trade structure ceases to have any effects on 
the results. 
5.5.2 Expansionary Real Demand Shock from B 
The domestic impact of an expansionary real demand shock from B, fLb, is given by: 
dy" I d,.l = X, = a 2 (a 68s -as)(8s + f35f'. 
Strictly speaking, the sign of dlldl is ambiguous. On the one side, the larger incomes 
in B and C bring about a higher demand for the direct exports of A. Offsetting this is a 
higher world interest rate. Regarding the entrepot trade, the appreciation of B$ and A$ 
vis-a-vis C$ raises the indirect exports of C to B, but reduces those in the opposite 
direction. Overall, dyaldfLb is likely to be positive. It, in tum, requires (X(; and, in this 
case, Ci.(,85 - a5, to be positive. The positive condition on Ci.(, is assumed to hold for the 
rest of the paper. 
To examine how trade structure influences the results, Xl is differentiated with respect 
to trade structure parameters: 
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dXI I del = -0: 2 (1- e6)(2 + K4 e6 - e6r l (dKI I del) < 0 (S.4a) 
dXI Ide 4 = 0:2e6[0:6 +(Kl + e6 - Kle6)](2 + K4e6 - e6)-2(dK 4 I de 4) > 0 (S.4b) 
dXI I de6 = 0:2(2+K4 e6 -e6r 2 {[0:6(K 4 -1)+KI(l+K 4 )-2] 
-(1-e6)(2+K4 e6 -e6)(dKI I de6)+e6[0:6 +(Kl +e6 -Kle6)](dK 4 I de 6)} ><0 
(S.4c) 
where: 
dKI I del = e6[e l +(1- el )86r2 > 0 
dKI Ide6 =-e l(l-e l )[el +e6(1-e l )r2 <0 
dK4 I de 4 =(1-e6 )[1-e6(l-e4)r2 >0 
dK4 I de6 =e4(1-e4)[1-e6(l-e4)r2 > O. 
It is worthwhile to point out that the sign of dX/dej does not depend on the assumption 
upon (Xo. Figure S.8 provides a graphical illustration of equations (S.4a)-(S.4c). 
Figure 5.8: Effect of Trade Structure on the Impacts of an 
Expansionary Real Demand Shock from B 
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The figure is a plot of the percentage deviation of X j from the benchmark case of purely 
direct trade. In the figure, the value of iX6 is set to be 1.2, which gives dy"ld,.l a positive 
sign. The four curves correspond to different values of ej and e4; "Theta 1" stands for ej 
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and so forth. At the two ends of the curves, 86 is equal to 0 and 1, respectively, 
resembling the benchmark case. 
When 81 increases from 0.3 to 0.6, while keeping the value of 84 constant, the value of 
XI falls (i.e. from black lines to white lines). It implies that an increase in the share of 
gross output of the direct exports in the total exports of A to B unambiguously dampens 
the impact of the real shock on A's output. As B$ appreciates against C$, the demand of 
B for the exports of C increases, leading to a higher demand for the trade services of A. 
If the re-exports to B make up a smaller proportion in the total exports of A to B, the 
pressure on the trade service of A will be correspondingly lower. 
Secondly, when 84 increases, X2 rises (i.e. from triangular lines to rectangular lines). It 
means that an increase in the share of gross output of the direct exports in the total 
exports of C to B will amplify the impact on A. At first glance this appears to contradict 
the previous result, in the sense that a larger share of direct exports in the total exports 
of C should lower the demand for the trade services of A. The positive result is due to 
the income effects of C. Since the price of the indirect exports of C are composed of the 
output prices of A and C, the impact of the appreciation of B$ on the indirect exports of 
C is less than on its direct exports. Therefore, the larger the share of direct exports in the 
total exports of C to B, the larger the rise of income in C which, in tum, increases the 
demand of C itself for the direct exports and re-exports of A. 
Thirdly, when 86 increases across the x-axis, the effect on XI is ambiguous, depending 
on the values of 81 and 84. On the one side, the larger the value-added of A in its re-
exports to B, the smaller the impact of the appreciation of B$ on the re-exports, as the 
impact is diluted by the appreciation of A$. The demand for the output of A is retarded 
as a consequence. On the other side, a larger share of value-added raises the demand for 
the output of A in every unit of the re-exports. Thus, the overall result is ambiguous. 
For the curve "US-China-Hong Kong", some approximating figures are used to 
resemble the structure of the indirect trading bloc in that 81 is equal to 0.15, 84 equal to 
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0.4, and 86 equal to 0.20 at the circular point! It can be seen that, at the circular point, 
the impact is amplified by over 150 percent! The result is largely ascribed to the fact 
that the gross value of the indirect exports of Hong Kong is much larger that its direct 
exports, that is, 81 is small. 
This reveals that the trade structure of Hong Kong could be quite ineffective in 
sheltering its output from the real demand shocks from the anchor country - the US. 
Obviously, the result is conditional on the values of various elasticities as well as the 
accuracy of the model in representing the economies. Nevertheless, it clearly 
demonstrates the neglected role of indirect trade in the consideration of exchange rate 
regimes can actually be very substantial. 
5.5.3 Expansionary Real Demand Shock from C 
dya / dJ.1' = X2 = a 2 (a6f3s + as)(Es + f3srl 
dX2 / d8 l = a 2(l-86)(2+K486 - 8Jl (dKI / d81) > 0 
dX2 / d8 4 = -a 286[a6 + (K l + 8 6 - KI86 »)(2 + K486 - 86r2(d K4 / d8 4 ) < 0 
dX2 / d86 = -a2(2+K 486 -86r 2 {[a6(K 4 -1)+K,(l+K4 )-2) 
-(l-86 )(2+K486 -86)(dKI / d86)+86[a6 +(K l +86 -KI8 6 »)(dK6 / d86)} >< O. 
The value of dyaldJ.1c is unambiguously larger than dy"ldJ.1b by 2a2a5(E5+f35y1. This is 
because as A$ is pegged to B$, an expansionary real demand shock from C will incur 
depreciating pressure on A$. Both the income and substitution effects work at the same 
direction to raise the output of A. The signs of the derivatives of dy"ldJ.1c are the opposite 
to those of dy"ldJ.1b, and so are the explanations. 
9 Despite the re-export margins of Chinese goods and goods of other origins being quite different, a figure 
close to the average margin is used here for simplicity. 
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5.5.4 Contractionary Nominal Shock from B 
dy" ! dn b = X3 = [cx 6 (£s - cx 3f3s)- (£s + f3s)cx 3 - (1 + cx 3 )CX S ](£s + f3srl 
dX3 ! d8 1 = -(1 + cx 3 )(1- 86)(2 + /(486 - 86r l (d/(l ! d8 1) < 0 (5.5a) 
dX3 ! d8 4 = 8 6(1 + CX 3 )[CX6 + (/(I + 86 -/(186)](2 + /(486 - 8 6 )-2(d/(4 ! d8 4) > 0 
(5.5b) 
dX3 ! d86 = (1+cx 3 )(2+/(48 6 -86r 2{[CX 6(/(4 -1)+/(1(1+/(4 ) -2] 
-(1- 8 6 )(2 + /(48 6 - 86)(d/(1 ! d86) + 86[CX 6 + (/(I + 8 6 -/(186)](d/(4 ! d86)} >< O. 
(5.5c) 
Strictly speaking, the sign of dy"/dJt' is ambiguous. On the one hand, the exports of A 
and B to C are suppressed by the appreciation of their currencies. Along with this is a 
higher world interest rate. On the other hand, a higher income in C increases the 
demand for the exports of A. Overall, dya/dJt' is more likely to be negative. Figure 5.9 
provides a graphical illustration of equations (5.5a)-(5.5c). 
Figure 5.9: Effect of Trade Structure on the Impacts of a 
Contractionary Nominal Shock from B 
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The signs of the derivatives are the same as those of dy"/dl . This is because, for both 
the expansionary real demand shock and contractionary nominal shock, B$ and A$ 
appreciate against C$. So, the directions of the movements of real exchange rates and, 
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hence, the signs of the derivatives are the same. However, it does not mean that the 
effects of trade structure on the impacts are the same in both cases. This is because the 
value of dy"ld,f is likely to be negative, so a positive derivative actually implies that the 
impact of the nominal shock is mitigated rather than augmented. That is why Figure 5.9 
looks like a mirror image of Figure 5.8.In Figure 5.9, the changes of the trade 
parameters are the same as Figure 5.8. Setting C1{; to 1.2 gives dyQld,f a negative sign. 
Therefore, a larger value of 81 amplifies the impact, whereas a larger value of 84 
tempers it. Again, the effect of a change in 86 is ambiguous. In contrast to the case of 
real demand shocks, the trade structure of the US-China-Hong Kong trade triangle is 
actually effective in weathering the output of Hong Kong from the anchor country' s 
nominal shocks, even if the percentage change is much smaller than in Figure 5.8. 
5.5.5 Contractionary Nominal Shock from C 
dya / dn' = X4 = [£X 6 (j35 - £X )£5) - (£5 + 135 )£X ) + (1 + £X 3 )£X 5](£5 + j3y' 
dX4 / d8, = (1+ £X ) )(1- e6)(2+ 7(486 -86r'(d7( , / d8,) < 0 
dX4 / de 4 = -86(1 + £X ) )[£X6 + (7( , + e6 -7(,86)](2 + 7(4e6 - e6)-\ dK4 / d8 4) > 0 
dX4 / d86 =-(I+£X 3 )(2+K 486 -e6r 2 {[£X6(K 4 -1)+KJI+K4) -2] 
-(1-8 6 )(2+K486 -e6 )(dK, / de 6 )+e6 [£X 6 + (K, +86 -7( ,86 )] (d7(4 / d86) } >< 0 . 
Similarly to the case of dyQld/l and dy"ld/l , the value of dy"ld7f is unambiguously 
larger than dy"ld,f by 2£X5(1+£X3)(£5 +135)"1. This is because the substitution effect on A 
is stronger when C$ appreciates than when its anchor currency B$ does. Again, the 
signs of the derivatives of dy"ld7f are the same as those of dy"ld/.l. However, since the 
signs of dyQld7f and dy"ld/1 themselves are likely to be opposite, the trade structure 
parameters have reverse effects on the impacts for the two cases. 
5.5.6 Opportunity Cost of Choosing The Nominal Anchor 
The previous few subsections examine the net cost for A to peg its currency to B$ under 
various shocks. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the choice of the nominal anchor is 
166 
concerned, it is the opportunity cost rather than the absolute cost that matters. The 
variance of the impacts between pegging to B$ and C$, respectively, is used as an 
estimation of the opportunity cost. For a real shock from B, the variance of impacts is 
given as follows: 
v; = (XI _X;)2 = [(dyQ / dj1b)BS -(dy" / dj1b)CS· 
Solutions for the impacts under the currency area of C$ can be easily obtained by 
switching the parameters between B and C. For example, by knowing that 
(dya / dj1b)BS = XI = a 2 (a 6eS -(5 )(/35 +esrl 
(dyQ / dj1')BS = X2 = a 2(a6e5 +(5)(/35 +e5 )-I, 
it can be deduced that: 
(dyQ / dj1b)CS = X; = a z (a6e; - a;)(/35 + e;rl. 
Since V; = (XI - X;)2, the derivative of Vj with respect to 8J is given by: 
dV; / d8 1 = 2(XI - X; )(dXI / d81)· 
It is easy to prove that: 
XI -X; = a 2 [(2+/(486 -86)(2+/(385 -85)rl {[(1-/(3)85 -(1-/(4)86] 
-(/(1 +86 -/(186)(2+/(J85 -85)-(/(2 +8 5 -/(28S)(2+/(48 6 -86»)· 
Strictly speaking, the sign of XI - X; is ambiguous. However, if /(3 z 14, and 85 Z 86, 
then [(1-/(3)85 - (1-14)86] is approximately equal to zero, and the sign of XI -X; is very 
likely to be negative. In terms of composite parameters: 
XI -X; = -a2[a 5(/35 +eyl -a;(/35 +e;)-I] <0. (S.6a) 
That is, for a real demand shock from B, pegging A$ to C$ has a greater expansionary 
effect than pegging to B$. The result actually echoes the difference between dya/dj1c and 
dya/dj1b under the currency area of B$. 
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As it is already known that the sign of dX/d8I is negative, it can be stated that: 
dV; Id8, =2(X,-X;)(dX, Id8,»O. 
In a similar way, it can written down that: 
dV; I d8 2 = 2(X; - X, )(dX; I d8 2 ) > O. 
dV; I d8 3 = 2(X; - XI )(dX; I d83 ) < 0 
dV; I d 8 4 = 2( XI - X; )( dXI I d 8 4) < 0 
dV; I d8 S = 2(X; - XI)(dX; I d8 S ) >< 0 
dV; I d8 6 = 2(XI - X;)(dX, I d8 6 ) >< O. 
To visualize the impacts of trade structure on the opportunity cost, the percentage 
deviations of VI from the benchmark case of purely direct trade are plotted in Figure 
5.10. For simplicity, 81 is set to be equal to 82, 83 equal to 84, 85 equal to 86, and a2 
equal to 1.5; the figures on the x-axis are 85 and 86. 
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An increase in 81 and 82 raises the deviations dramatically, especially when 85 and 86 
are small. Secondly. as 83 and 84 increase, the deviations are reduced. Lastly, the effects 
of changes in 85 and 86 are ambiguous. Overall. the smaller the opportunity cost of 
choosing the anchor currency, the larger the shares of indirect exports in the total 
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exports of A to B and C and the shares of the direct exports of B and C in their total 
exports. At the circular point of the curve "US-China-Hong Kong", the opportunity cost 
is reduced by about 60 percent. The outcome is mainly attributed to the fact that the 
trade sector of Hong Kong is predominately occupied by re-export activities. 
Similarly, the square of the variance of impacts for a monetary shock from B is given 
by: 
\-i = [(dya / dn b ) BS - (dya / dn b )cS· 
Again, by assuming 7(3 :: /C4, and e5 :: e6, it can be written down that 
X3 - X; :: -(1 +CX3)[CX 5(J3 5 + £5)-1 + CX;(/35 + £;rlj < 0 (S.6b) 
dV2 / del = 2(X3 - X;)(dX3 / del) > 0 
d\-i / dez = 2(X; - X3)(dX; / de z) > 0 
dV2 / de3 = 2(X; - X3)(dX; / de3) < 0 
dVz / de. = 2(X3 - X;)(dX3 / de.) < 0 
d\-i / de 5 = 2(X; - X3)(dX; / de 5 ) >< 0 
dVz / de 6 = 2(X3 - X;)(dX3 / de 6 ) >< o. 
Comparing equations (S.6a) and (S.6b) it can be seen that the trade structure parameters 
have almost the same impacts on Vj and V2, provided that the approximations are valid. 
A plot of V2 is shown in Figure S .11. In the figure CX3 is set to 1. Again, the trade 
structure of the US-China-Hong Kong trade triangle is quite effective in lowering the 
opportunity cost. Furthermore, the above findings, and Figures S.lO and S.l1 remain 
unchanged for both contractionary real demand shocks and expansionary nominal 
shocks. 
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Overall the results seem to suggest that the opportunity cost for the entrepot to choose 
the nominal anchor is significantly reduced as far as the short run impacts of demand 
shocks are concerned. Nevertheless, it does not mean that the entrepot is definitely 
better off by conducting indirect trade. This is because the smaller variances of impacts 
between the currency areas are achieved by magnifying the impacts under one regime 
and reducing those under the other. For example, if the real demand shocks from B 
dominate those from C, and A$ is pegged to B$, then A will be better off if it exports to 
B directly only. In other words, while indirect trade reduces the opportunity cost of 
choosing the nominal anchor, it may also increase the net cost of fixing the domestic 
currency if the entrepot chooses the regime that actually incurs a lower cost under 
purely direct trade. 
5.5.7 Other Scenarios 
If A$ is pegged to a basket of B$ and C$, it is actually to maintain an effective exchange 
rate of A$ constant. The outcome is merely a weighted sum of the results for the two 
fixed exchange rate regimes, respectively. It is known that the signs of the derivatives 
with respect to various trade structure parameters under the two regimes are just 
opposite. So, ceteris paribus, the net outcome depends on the relative weighting of the 
two currencies in the basket. 
If A$ is floating, no matter whether B$ and C$ are floating or pegged together, the 
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impacts of both foreign and domestic shocks on A as well as the influences of trade 
structure on the impacts become ambiguous. This is because, as the exchange rate of A 
is flexible, the changes of the prices of re-exports involve the movements of two 
exchange rates. Therefore it affects the re-exports of A in both directions and 
significantly raises the ambiguity of the results. 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS 
In the past the trade structure of Hong Kong has experienced several major transitions. 
In each change China was the most influential attribute. The development of Hong 
Kong as an entrepot in the nineteenth century was induced by the attractiveness of the 
Chinese market to western merchants. The disappearance of entrepot trade and the 
development of domestic exports in the mid-twentieth century was a consequence of 
China's isolation on the international political stage. The resurrection of Hong Kong as 
an entrepot in the late twentieth century was triggered by the opening up of the Chinese 
economy. The rapid growth of entrepot trade in Hong Kong is clearly a result of 
division of labor with the Chinese hinterland, adherent to the law of comparative 
advantages. 
The increasingly close trade tie between Hong Kong and China inevitably raises the 
question of whether it makes better economic sense to peg the Hong Kong dollar with 
the renminbi instead of with the US dollar. The analysis of this chapter, while not 
contending which currency zone is more preferable, clearly points out that the distinct 
trade structure of Hong Kong renders the choice of the nominal anchor a less crucial 
issue, as far as trade is concerned. The following factors lead to such a conclusion. 
As noted above, China has become an increasingly important trading partner of Hong 
Kong, along with the US , Japan and the EU. Insofar as China's business cycles are 
171 
isolated from those of the developed countries (see Chapter 3), involving China in Hong 
Kong's trade can diversify the risk of market cycles'O 
Entrepot trade also has a diversification effect on production risk. During the last 
decade, due to increasing global competition, many Asian economies have been 
compelled to specialize in accordance with their comparative advantages (Hong Kong 
Bank 1997b). While specialization can deliver benefits, such as economies of scale, it 
also raises the vulnerability of the economy toward sector-specific disturbances (ibid.).l! 
Shifting resources from direct exports to re-exports can avoid specialization in certain 
end-user products, and thus insulate the economy from the interruption of product 
cycles. 
Additionally, by relocating labor-intensive production to China, the domestic 
manufacturing capacity in Hong Kong can be devoted to higher value-added products. 
Presumably, the two types of products look for very different markets. Thus, this can 
further diversify production and market risks. 
In the Mundell-Fleming model, pegging the domestic currency to a foreign currency 
will hamper the impacts of real demand shocks from the anchor country, but amplify 
those of nominal shocks. Therefore, the net benefit of joining a particular currency zone 
depends on the relative prominence of the two types of shock." The modeling results of 
this chapter show that, if certain conditions are fulfilled, entrepot trade can narrow this 
tradeoff by augmenting the impacts of real demand shocks from the anchor country and 
diminishing those of nominal shocks. With the same conditions, but more importantly, 
entrepot trade can reduce the opportunity costs of choosing one foreign currency instead 
of another as the nominal anchor. 
10 However, over the 1990s, Hong Kong is the only economy with an increasing market concentration 
ratio amongst a number of Asian economies, including Cbina, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand (Hong Kong Bank 1997b). The rising concentration ratio for Hong Kong 
is largely attributable to OPRT. 
l! An example of this is the episodic contraction of the demand for electronic products in the 1990s. 
" Here we are concerned with the choice of the nominal anchor, so the impacts of domestic shocks are 
supposed to be given. 
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These conditions include: (i) the economy has a relatively large indirect trade sector, (ii) 
its value-added in re-exports is small, and (iii) its trade partners have relative large 
direct export sectors. In general, the trade structure of Hong Kong satisfies these three 
requirements. 
Before concluding this chapter, it is worthwhile pointing out possible extensions of the 
model. The model in this chapter was developed to examine the interaction between 
entrepot trade and fixed exchange rate regime. Accordingly, the structure of trade is set 
exogenously. A drawback of this setting is that the model can not account for the 
evolution of the trade structure of Hong Kong. To extend the model in this direction, 
one can incorporate in the model endowment differentiation as in the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson model, or productivity differentiation as in the Ricardian model. 
Furthermore, the discussion in the text emphasized the influence of China's policy 
regime upon the development of entrepot trade in Hong Kong. The interrelation 
between trade structure and fixed exchange rate regime is presented in a static context. 
One may incorporate in the analysis endogenous interaction between trade volume and 
exchange rate regime. For instance, Devereux and Voss (1997) demonstrate that a fixed 
exchange rate regime can promote trade flows by enhancing production specialization. 
By the same token, it is also plausible that a higher degree of division of labor between 
two economies reinforces the need to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime between 
them. 
REFERENCES 5 
Argy, V., W. McKibbin, et al. (1989). "Exchange-Rate Regimes for a Small Economy 
in a Multi-Country World." Princeton Studies in International Finance 67 . 
Balino, T. J. T. and C. Enoch (1997). Currency Board Arrangements: Issues and 
Experiences. IMF Occasional Paper. Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund. 
Bayoumi, T. (1994). A Formal Model of Optimum Currency Areas. IMF Working 
Paper. Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund. 
Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong (1997). Hong Kong Annual Digest of 
Statistics. Hong Kong. 
Devereux, M. and G. Voss (1997). "Exchange Rate Regimes, Specialization and Trade 
Volume." Mimeo, University of New South Wales. 
173 
Dodsworth, J. and D. Mihaljek (1997). Hong Kong, China: Growth, Structural Change, 
and Economic Stability During the Transition. Washington, D.C. , International 
Monetary Fund. 
Dornbusch, R. (1980). Open Economy Macroeconomics . New York, Basic Books, Inc. 
Publishers. 
Fung, K. C. and L. J. Lau (1999). New Estimates of the United States-China Bilateral 
Trade Balances. AsiaJPacific Research Center Occasional Papers, Institute for 
International Studies, Stanford University. 
Gagnon, J. E., P. R. Masson, et al. (1996). "German Unification: What Have We 
Leamed from Multi-Country Models?" IMF Working Paper WP/96/43. 
Hang Seng Bank (1997). "Rising Offshore Trade to Accelerate Hong Kong's 
Development as a Service Centre. " Hang Seng Economic Monthly June. 
Ho, Y. P. (1992). Trade, Industrial Restructuring and Development in Hong Kong . 
London, Macmillan. 
Hong Kong Bank (1992). "Hong Kong's Re-export Trade." Economic Report January. 
Hong Kong Bank (1997a). "Hong Kong's External Trade Sector." Economic Report 
November. 
Hong Kong Bank (1997b). "Hong Kong's External Trade Structure." Economic Report 
January/February. 
Hsia, R. (1984). The Entrepot Trade of Hong Kong with Special Reference to Taiwan 
and The Chinese Mainland. Mainland China Economic Series. Taipei, Chung-Hua 
Institution for Economic Research. 
Kenen, P. B. (1984). "Comments on: Exchange Rate Unions as an Alternative to 
Flexible Rates: The Effects of Real and Monetary Disturbances". Exchange Rate Theory 
and Practice. J. F. O. Bilson and R. C. Marston (eds.). Cambridge, Mass., National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Lane, T. D. (1990). "National Sovereignty and International Monetary Order. " Journal 
of International Economics 29: 351-68. 
Marston, R. C. (1984). "Exchange Rate Unions as an Alternative to Flexible Rates: The 
Effects of Real and Monetary Disturbances". Exchange Rate Theory and Practice. J. F. 
O. Bilson and R. C. Marston (eds.) , Cambridge, Mass., National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Mihaljek, D. , A. Hussain, et al. (1998). People's Republic of China Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region: Recent Economic Development. IMF Staff Country Report. 
Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund. 
Nugee, J. (1995). "A Brief History of the Exchange Fund". Money and Banking in Hong 
174 
Kong(eds.). Hong Kong, Hong Kong Monetary Authority: 2-24. 
Ricci, L. A. (1997). A Model of an Optimum Currency Area. IMF Working Paper. 
Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund. 
Sedio, R. A. (1971). "Price Trends, Economic Growth, and the Canadian Balance of 
Trade: A Three Country Model." Journal of Political Economy 79(3) : 596-613. 
Soesastro, H. (1992) . "The Changing Hong Kong's Entrepot Role in the Region." 
Occasional Paper of Centre for Strategic and International Studies M81192. 
Son, 1. (1987). "The Choice of an Optimal Exchange Rate System for a Small Country 
under the Three Good and Three Country Model." International Economic Journal 
1(2): 25-45. 
Sung, Y. W. (1988). "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Entrepot Trade: Hong 
Kong and Singapore and Their Roles in China's Trade". Pacific Trade In Services. L. V. 
Castle and C. Findlay (eds .). Sydney, Allen & Unwin: 173-286. 
Sung, Y. W. (1991). The China-Hong Kong Connection: The Key to China 's Open-
Door Policy. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Sung, Y. W. (1995). "Patterns of Economic Interdependence in the Natural Economic 
Territory". Southern China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan: Evolution of a Subregional 
Economy. J. Khanna (eds.). Washington, D.C. , The Centre for Strategic & International 
Studies: 14-4l. 
Sung, Y. W. (1998) . Hong Kong and South China: The Economic Synergy. The Hong 
Kong Economic Policy Studies Series. Hong Kong, City University of Hong Kong 
Press. 
Tom, J. C. F. (1964). The Entrepot Trade and the Monetary Standards of Hong Kong, 
1842-1941. Hong Kong, K. Weiss. 
Tom, J. C. F. (1989). Monetary Problems of an Entrepot. New York, Peter Lang. 
Tuan, C. and L. F. Y. Ng (1998). "Export Trade, Trade Derivatives, and Economic 
Growth of Hong Kong: A New Scenario." The Journal of International Trade & 
Economic Development 7(1): 111-137. 
175 
Appendix 5 
Table S.Al: Definitions of Notations and Composite Parameters 
Symbol 
c; 
Cij 
m; 
p; 
r 
/d 
/ 
Ji 
7i 
Q 
A 
17 
rp 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
1\:1 
1\:2 
1\:3 
'" 
Definition and Note 
Consumption of export from country i 
Consumption of indirect export from country j that passes through country i 
Nominal supply of country i 
Domestic output price of country i 
The world real interest rate 
Saving rate 
Real aggregate demand of country i 
Real output of country i 
Expansionary real demand shock in country i 
Contractionary nominal shock in country i 
Income elasticity of consumption 
Interest elasticity of investment 
Price elasticity of exports 
Interest elasticity of money demand 
Share of gross output of the direct exports in the total exports of A to B 
Share of gross output of the direct exports in the total exports of A to C 
Share of gross output of the direct exports in the total exports of B to C 
Share of gross output of the direct exports in the total exports of C to B 
Share of value-added of A in its re-exports to C 
Share of value-added of A in its re-exports to B 
Note: ~ E [O,l],j = 1,2, ... ,6 
= 81[81+8,i1-81)]"1; 
share of total value-added of the direct exports in the total exports of A to B 
= 82[82+ 85(l-82)r1 ; 
share of total value-added of the direct exports in the total exports of A to C 
= 83[1-85(1-83)r1 ; 
share of total value-added of the direct exports in the total exports of B to C 
= 84[1- 86(1- 84) r1 ; 
share of total value-added of the direct exports in the total exports of C to B 
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Chapter 6 
Properry Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement 
Part I 
Synopsis 6 
Property related activities dominate a lot of economic areas in Hong Kong, such as loan 
making, employment, government revenue, and national output. The government has 
almost monopolized all land resources. Consequently, delivering appropriate land and 
housing policies becomes extremely important for both social and economic 
considerations. The monetary instrument has been surrendered under the currency board 
arrangement, limiting the demand side management capacity of the authorities. As a 
result, supply side management has become increasingly in demand. The partial 
equilibrium model developed in this chapter shows that unanticipated demand shocks 
could lead to overshooting in housing price. On the other side, anticipated supply 
shocks could cause overshooting in housing output. The result highlights the challenges 
in using land and housing policies for macroeconomic management. 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The study of property markets is already a well-developed and 'self-contained' area, 
lying between the disciplines of economics and urban studies. An overwhelming 
proportion of the studies in this area focus on the microeconomic issues of real estate 
markets, such as inter-regional price and rental rate differentials, labor migration and 
housing demand, property taxes, and housing finance . The macroeconomic aspects of 
property markets, such as the supply side impact of land policies on business cycles, and 
the effectiveness of property taxes in absorbing demand shocks, have been largely 
overlooked. ' Whereas the interrelation between property markets and the rest of the 
economy has already been quantitatively examined (Meen 1990). On the policy making 
front, housing investment is widely used as one of the indicators for short- to medium-
term economic forecasts. During the recent Asian economic crisis, it was observed that 
several disrupted economies experienced significant property booms before their 
currency problems surfaced. One hypothesis is that rocketing property prices raised 
production costs in those economies and, hence, severely undermined their 
competitiveness. 
The Hong Kong property market has been one of the most buoyant in Asia and probably 
the world. The list of statistics in Table 6.1 clearly indicates the unique and crucial role 
of property markets in the Hong Kong economy. For instance, about 40 percent of GDP 
and 50 percent of government revenue comes from real estate related activities 
(Granitsas 1999; Shaw 1999). In 1992, purely property and construction stocks made up 
about one quarter of the total stock market capitalization, compared to below 5 percent 
in the US, 6 percent in Japan, 11 percent in Singapore, and 19 percent in Thailand 
(Walker, Chua et al. 1995). The inclusion of other real estate related stocks further 
raises the share to 45 percent (ibid.). In 1998, over 45 percent of the total credit made by 
the financial sector was property related (Yeh 1999). 
1 A noticeable exception is Matsuyama (1990). 
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Table 6.1: Statistics of Hong Kong Property Markets 
Item 
Value of property as an 
asset 
Contribution to Gross 
Domestic Product 
Provision of employment 
Contribution to Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation 
Stock market 
capitalization 
Loans for construction and 
property development 
Public expenditure and 
revenue 
Demand for public 
housing 
Household expenditure on 
private housing 
Statistics 
In 1993, the estimated value of the total stock of private property 
was close to US$400 billion. Per capita wealth of property assets 
was USS70,000, and that for each economically active person was 
almost double. 
During 1982-91, the average contribution of the property and 
construction related activities to GDP was over 24 percent. In the 
late 1990s, the proportion rose to no less than 40 percent. 
During 1983-92, the property and construction sector alone 
employed over 8 percent of the total labor force on average, not 
yet including the employment in other property related activities. 
During 1983-92, over 60 percent of annual gross fixed investment 
was on property development. 
In 1992, purely property and construction stocks made up about 
25 percent of the total stock market capitalization. The inclusion 
of other real estate related stocks raises the share further to 45 
percent. 
During 1984-93, over 35 percent of all bank loans went to the 
property and construction sector. In 1998, over 45 percent of total 
loans were property related. 
During 1984-93, revenues from property related activities 
contributed over 33 percent to total government revenue. The 
figure increased to 40-50 percent in the late 1990s. In the mid-
1990s, over 30 percent of all government expenditure was on 
property. 
Over half the total population currently lives in subsidized 
housing. One public housing unit is completed every 13 minutes. 
During 1989-90, housing absorbed 30 percent of household 
income on average. The share rose to 70 percent during the boom 
period of 1996. 
Source: Walker, Chua et al. (1995), Lui (1997), Shaw (1999), Yeh (1999), and Granitsas (1999). 
At the same time, the property market of Hong Kong has also been one of the most 
volatile in the region. Throughout the 19905, a swing of property prices over 20 percent 
per annum was not unusual. The strong business cycles are the result of external 
influences as well as internal constraints. 
Externally, the property boom during 1991-94 was triggered by China's economic 
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recovery and exacerbated by expansionary monetary policy from the US. When the bout 
of property asset bubbles was lurking right around the comer, the Asian crisis unfolded. 
Property prices were dragged down by about 50 percent. In the last quarter of 1998, the 
price index of residential dwellings was back to its pre-1994 level, and that of private 
offices was below its 1993 level by almost one-third. 
Before the Asian crisis, in spite of strong cyclical fluctuations , by and large property 
prices in Hong Kong had maintained very strong surging momentum. During 1987-96, 
the average annual inflation rate of private residential housing was over 18 percent, 
more than double of that of the consumer price index (CPl). A fundamental cause of 
such high property inflation is an internal constraint - the scarcity of land resources. 
With a special leasehold land system, almost all land resources in Hong Kong are 
possessed by the government. High property prices have put enormous financial 
pressure on most households. A rough estimation shows that in 1996 mortgage 
payments for an average residential flat absorbed as much as 70 percent of the income 
of a median level income family (Lui 1997). Indeed, over half the total population is 
currently living in various types of subsidized housing. 
The fact that the government monopolizes most land resources and runs extensive 
public housing programs gives rise to its enormous influence over private property 
markets. In fact, in the run up to the hand-over, it was observed that the government has 
adopted a more activist land policy (Husain, Duenwald et al. 1999). For example, 
during the Asian crisis, when the slump in property prices posed a serious threat to the 
banking sector, which has vast exposure to mortgage loans, the government 
straightforwardly suspended land sales for nine months to stabilize property prices. An 
authority under a freehold land system does not have the lUXury to resort to such a 
policy. 
The special institutional features and high volatility of the Hong Kong property market 
have obviously raised a lot of theoretical and policy issues. A list of references is in 
order. Walker, Chua et al. (1995) and Churchouse (1990) provide useful statistics and 
facts about Hong Kong property markets. Tse (1994) conducts a comprehensive 
theoretical and empirical comparative study of the property markets in Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Taiwan. Renaud, Pretorious et al. (1997) introduce readers to an intuitive 
diagrammatic model for Hong Kong property markets, along with detailed evaluation of 
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recent government policies. Ho (1992) analyzes the function of rent control as a 
substitute for public housing. Wong and Liu (1988) and Li and Yu (1990) study the 
redistribution effects of public housing programs. Consumer Council (1996) addresses 
the issue of imperfect competition in property markets. Blundell (1996) reviews housing 
policy in Hong Kong before the hand-over. And the series of "The Other Hong Kong 
Report" provides comprehensive background information for the development of Hong 
Kong property markets. 
Despite all these research efforts aimed at understanding the microeconomics of Hong 
Kong property markets, two issues have largely been neglected. Firstly, while it is 
widely accepted that the peg between the Hong Kong dollar and the US dollar attributed 
to property inflation in the mid-1990s (Lui 1997), there is a lack of systemic studies of 
the interaction between the exchange rate arrangement and property markets. Secondly, 
there has long been a vacuum of general equilibrium analyses of land and housing 
policies in Hong Kong, especially under an open economy framework. In view of these 
insufficiencies, this study aims to disentangle the interrelation between the exchange 
rate arrangement, property markets, and the rest of the economy. 
The study is divided into two parts, corresponding to this chapter and the next chapter, 
respectively. This chapter provides a review of the latest developments in Hong Kong 
property markets. A partial equilibrium model is presented to explore some basic but 
important economic features of property markets. The next chapter extends the model 
into an intertemporal general equilibrium model. Both models are used to evaluate some 
government policies in Hong Kong. 
The next section describes the features of Hong Kong property markets and the role of 
government. Changes in government policies during the transition and the Asian 
economic crisis, along with their impacts, are reviewed. Section 3 presents the partial 
equilibrium model and some analytical results , and the last section concludes. 
6.2 PROPERTY MARKETS OF HONG KONG 
It has long been praised that positive non-interventionism is the gospel of policy making 
in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, this assertion is far from being accurate when it comes to 
housing. The Hong Kong government commenced the first public rental housing 
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program in 1953, in order to shelter a large number of inhabitants who had lost their 
hillside squatters in a blaze. The government' s participation in residential housing 
markets has been deepening ever since. In 1972, the percentage of the total population 
living in various types of public-subsidized housing had reached 41 percent, and further 
increased to 52 percent in 1996 (Lai 1994; Howlett 1997). Nowadays the public housing 
program consists mainly of public rental housing, Home Ownership Scheme, Sandwich 
Class Housing Scheme, and Home Purchase Loan Scheme (Dodsworth and Mihaljek 
1997). The last three schemes are to assist households to purchase their own units. 
The role of the Hong Kong government in property markets is not limited to the 
provision of public housing. It has extensive influence in all real estate markets, due to 
its monopolistic position in controlling land resources . In a lot of market economies, 
most land is permanently owned by the private sector. That is, the land is freehold land. 
However, in Hong Kong almost all the land is possessed by the government (statutorily 
by the Crown before 1997)2 The private sector can access public land resources only 
through a leasehold system, under which land is leased by the authorities for a certain 
period of time as well as for a specified function. Before the hand-over the standard 
lease term was 75 years. After the hand-over the term is 50 years (Mihaljek, Hussain et 
al. 1998). 
Land is disposed via three channels: public auction, public tender, and private treaty 
grant (Yeh 1999). Public auction is an open bidding process. Public tender is called 
normally for land with very restricted purposes and, thus, few interested parties. Private 
treaty grant is used mainly for public constructions such as public housing, public 
utilities, schools, hospitals, and projects related to charity and religious activities. The 
disposal of land via public auction and public tender is commonly referred to as "land 
sale" in Hong Kong, even though the land is leased rather than actually sold. 
2 A limited amount of freehold land can be found in the New Territory where indigenous people had 
inhabited before Britain colonized Hong Kong in 1841. 
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6.2.1 The Days of Being Hong Kong, Britain 
6.2.1.1 Supply and Demand 
Complying with a fundamental economy principle, property prices in Hong Kong are 
governed by demand and supply. There are several factors that give rise to a continuous 
growing demand for housing (Lai 1994): 
o a sustained growth of household income;' 
o low interest rates imported from the US via the currency board arrangement; 
o huge foreign capital inflow into property markets, particularly from China;' and 
o a steady growth of the population plus a continuous contraction in unit household 
. 5 
sIze. 
On the other hand, the supply of housing is constrained by some other factors (ibid.): 
o geographical features such as a small overall size with numerous hills ;' 
o controls over urban densities, plot ratios , and renewal of private agricultural land; 
o the shortage of construction labor; and 
o the Sino-British agreement on land disposal. 
The demand side determinants are either largely out of the hands of the administration 
(like capital inflow) or locked in by other policy considerations (like the currency peg). 
As a result, government intervention mainly resides on the supply side. It should be 
emphasized that although the geographical size is largely inherited, the supply of land in 
, Over the period 1975-95, real per capital GDP grew by 300 percent (Renaud, Pretorious et al. 1997). 
Furthermore, Tse (1994) finds that the income elasticity of housing demand in Hong Kong is over one. 
4 Hastings and Li (1996) estimate that China accounted for nearly US$2 billion investment in Hong Kong 
property markets in 1991 and 1992. 
5 The rate of household formation over 1975-95 was 4.9 percent per annum, while the population annual 
growth rate was only 1.3 percent (Renaud, Pretorious et al. 1997). 
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Hong Kong is far from inelastic. Through massive land reclamation, hill terracing, and 
urbanization of rural areas, the government has managed to increase the amount of 
utilizable land. In 1999, the total area of Hong Kong is 1,095 square kilometers/ about 
5.5 percent of which came from reclamation, equivalent to 75 percent of the current size 
of Hong Kong Island (EIU 1998-99). 
However, raising the supply of utilizable land does not imply a simultaneous increase in 
land disposal. The 1997 issue had imposed a constraint on the latter before rather than 
after the hand-over. In 1984, London and Beijing signed the Sino-British Joint 
Declaration, which has provided the blueprint for transitional and post-1997 
arrangements in Hong Kong. According to the Declaration, before the hand-over, land 
disposal was statutorily limited to 50 hectares a year, excluding land granted for the 
construction of public facilities. The rationale for this rigid arrangement is political. The 
Chinese government tried to prevent its counterpart from excessively selling land before 
1997 and, thus, reducing land sale revenues for the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (SAR) government. 
To cater for unforeseen situations, additional amounts of land could still be leased, but 
only after the British/Hong Kong authorities had sought agreement from the Chinese 
side. As a means to stabilize property prices, from 1994-95 onwards, the amount of land 
disposed every year substantially exceeded the 50 hectares limit. Figure 6.1 records the 
amount of residential land disposed over the period of 1985/96 to 1997/98. But the 
decelerating effect on property inflation was short-lived (see below). More importantly, 
as the negotiation was conducted on a year-by-year basis, it precluded the possibility of 
pre-announcing future land sale programs to thwart speculation. 
6 The total area of Hong Kong territory is only about 1050 kilometer square, but 80 percent of this is 
mountainous (Renaud, Pretorious et al. 1997). 
7 This includes Hong Kong Island (80 sq km), Kowloon (47 sq km) , New Territories (794 sq km) , and 
outlying Islands (174 sq km). 
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Figure 6.1: Residential Land Disposal in Hong Kong 
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Source: The Housing Bureau of the Hong Kong Government (http: //www.i nfo.gov.hk/hbl). 
(a) For the period between 1985-86 and 1996-97, the figures represent the total residential land approved 
by the Sino-British Land Commission. For 1997-98, the figure represents the total area ofresidentialland 
disposed. 
6.2.1.2 Property Inflation 
Being a monopolist of land resources the government can easily extract economic rent 
from the public. During the booming period of 1996-98, the average annual contribution 
of land sales to total government revenue stood at 28 percent (Yeh 1999). Land cost 
accounts for approximately 60 to 70 percent of the total value of property assets 
(Renaud, Pretorious et al. 1997). Not surprisingly, the impact of the scarcity of land was 
transmitted into sky-high pricing of real estate. 
Figure 6.2 plots the price and rental indexes of private domestic (residential) housing 
during 1987-96: Over the decade, property inflation was far higher than general 
inflation. The price index of overall residential housing increased by an average annual 
rate of more than 18 percent, and the rental index by nearly 11 percent, compared to 
below 9 percent of CPr. This implies that during this period capital gain instead of rental 
payment constituted the main source of profits in real estate investment. There were also 
8 Private domestic units are defined as "independent dwellings with separate cooking facilities and 
bathroom (and/or lavatory)" (Rating and Valuation Department 1997:27). 
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noticeable differences between small units (less than 100 meter square) and big units, 
with the price of the latter being more volatile. 
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Figure 6.2: Price and Rent Indexes of Private Domestic 
Housing in Hong Kong 
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Source: The Housing Bureau of the Hong Kong Government (http://www.info.gov.hk/hb/). 
The upsurge of property prices was particularly strong over 1991-94, when China was 
rapidly recovering from post-Tiananmen economic depression. Due to strong business 
linkages between the two economies, that led to a boom in Hong Kong. Fueling the 
situation was the lowered interest rates imported from the US via the linked exchange 
rate system. As the Hong Kong inflation rate was well above the US level, domestic real 
interest rates and, hence, the user cost of housing capital - defined as the real mortgage 
rate less the appreciation rate - became negative (Renaud, Pretorious et al. 1997). 
Thereby, a straightway means of profit making was to borrow from banks to invest in 
real estate markets. This inevitably encouraged property speculation. Furthermore, as 
property inflation overwhelmed general inflation, inflation-hedging assets were sought. 
Naturally, real estate itself could provide an answer to that request. A property inflation 
spiral was thus formed, especially in the residential housing market. 
187 
Judging that the fierce property inflation was largely ascribed to speculation,' the 
government set up a task force to combat speculative activities. Under the currency 
board arrangement, monetary instruments have already been surrendered. Consequently, 
the authorities resorted to administrative measures such as property transaction taxes, 
mortgage limits, and restrictions on pre-sale practices. For instance, developers were not 
allowed to pre-sell unfinished flats until nine months before completion, and buyers 
were not allowed to resell their flats until they had been finished and delivered.1O As 
well, the authorities 'recommended' to the banks a ceiling of 70 percent on loan to value 
ratios in 1991, and a limit of 50 percent on debt-service to gross household income 
ratios in 1994 (Renaud, Pretorious et al. 1997). Notwithstanding, the authorities were 
criticized as impeding the flow of market information conveyed by speculators (Lai 
1994; Lui 1997). Lui (1997) points out that those measures actually raised the risk borne 
by developers, resulting in a fall in the housing supply during 1995-96. 
Due to the actions of the government, residential housing prices declined substantially. 
By the end of 1995, prices of residential and office property had fallen by 20 percent 
and 25 percent, respectively, from their peak values in April 1994 (Mihaljek, Hussain et 
al. 1998). Rental rates for prime office space became more competitive and comparable 
to that in Singapore. As the construction and real estate sectors contributed on average 
10 percent to GDP (Dodsworth and Mihaljek 1997), in addition to the wealth effect 
associated with the downward adjustment of property prices, economic growth 
significantly weakened throughout 1995 until the second half of 1996. 
Nevertheless, the downturn of the property market was short-lived. Property prices 
rebounded dramatically in 1996. The ground lost in the residential housing market 
during 1994 and 1995 was completely recovered in just half a year. From the last 
quarter of 1995 to the second quarter of 1996, the residential property price climbed 
from the bottom back to the peak level of 1994 (Figure 6.3). The reversal of property 
prices was due to the growth in demand from returning emigrants, a sustained income 
9 This judgement is dismissed by some people; for example, see Lui (1997). 
10 Also helping to cool down the markets were the contraction monetary policies in the US and China, 
respectively, after 1994, which led to outflow of foreign capital from Hong Kong property markets (ibid.). 
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rise, and negative interest rates, as well as a shortage in supply that had lasted from the 
previous cyclical downturn (Husain, Duenwald et al . 1999). 
Figure 6.3: Property Price Indexes of Hong Kong 
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Source: The Housing Bureau of the Hong Kong Government (http: //www.info.gov.hk/hb/). 
The momentum of property inflation was deemed to be almost unstoppable in the run up 
to the hand-over. This raised concerns about whether property prices had already 
deviated from the movement of fundamentals and, thus, posed a risk of asset bubbles 
onto the economy. Mihaljek, Hussain et al. (1998) point out that, over 1996-97, the 
number of households increased at a pace faster than the production of both private and 
public housing, creating a demand push effect on property prices . Besides, from the 
second quarter of 1994 to that of 1997, residential property prices rose by 32 percent, 
compatible to the rise of nominal payroll per person (55 percent) and construction costs 
(28 percent). However, a more recent IMF study suggests otherwise. Husain, Duenwald 
et al. (1999) assert that their preliminary empirical research shows clear evidences of 
asset bubbles. ll 
An interesting aspect of Figure 6.3 is that the price fluctuation of private flatted 
factories is much more moderate relative to those of others. In fact, both the rental rate 
and the price of private factories have gone down continuously since 1994, even 
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compared to the CPr. This is largely ascribed to the shift of space-intensive 
manufacturing industries to neighboring China (Mihaljek, Hussain et al. 1998). 
6.2.1.3 Monopolistic Developers 
The flaming property inflation inevitably sparked social discontent. The government 
was accused of colluding with property developers . In an article in Time magazine, 
Shaw (1999) denounces "The developers serve as both de facto tax collectors and as a 
construction arm for the government, for which they receive profit margins and 
privileges few monopolists dare dream of." According to his estimation, over the past 
five years, the average pre-tax profit margin of the alleged monopolist Microsoft was 42 
percent, whereas those of the two largest developers in Hong Kong were 133 percent 
(Cheung Kong) and 71 percent (Henderson Land), respectively. 
The Hong Kong Consumer Council also put forward massive evidence to indicate the 
possibility of developers manipulating market powers (Consumer Council 1996). The 
Council's study reveals that the first hand market in Hong Kong has a high degree of 
concentration. During 1991-94, 25 percent of new private housing was supplied by only 
one developer, 55 percent by four developers, and 70 percent by seven developers . After 
1981 , no new firms were able to capture 5 percent or more of the first hand market. The 
long-term vacancy rate of the flats owned by developers was 11 percent in 1995, more 
than double the 4 percent overall market rate. Nevertheless, the study stops short of 
judging major developers as oligopolies, citing that economies of scale, a large degree 
of market segregation, a high market entry cost, successful business strategies and a 
limited supply of land could also attribute to the outcome. 
Besides the affordability of residential housing, there have been concerns about whether 
property inflation will erode the comparative advantage of Hong Kong that has arisen 
from a low tax system. The apprehension is legitimate, as land cost is virtually a hidden 
tax. Before the Asian currency crisis, Hong Kong had once bypassed Tokyo in 
11 But they do not report the details of the empirical evidence. 
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becoming the most expensive place for doing business in the world." High running 
costs have already forced companies like Cathay Pacific and the Hong Kong and 
Shanghai Bank Corporation to move parts of their operations to other countries (Yeh 
1999). 
6.2.2 The Days of Being Hong Kong, China 
Under the leadership of the first chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, the SAR government 
seems to emphasize long-term objectives as much as positive non-interventionism. On 
top of the government's agenda is the housing issue. As emphasized repeatedly by Tung 
(1998): 
"Property is one of the most important components of the economy . .. the residential 
property market in particular serves as both a major vehicle for the personal investment 
of wealth and a public barometer of social stability." 
A long-term housing policy was announced soon after the inauguration of the SAR 
government. The policy mix consists of three major ingredients : 
o expanding annual housing production from 80,000 in 1997 to 85 ,000 units by 2000, 
out of which 50,000 are public housing and 35,000 private (Table 6.2) ; 
o increasing the rate of home ownership to 70 percent by 2007, part of which will 
come from the sale of 250,000 public rental apartments to tenants; and 
o shortening the waiting period for public rental housing from 6.5 to three years by 
2005. 
Behind the policy initiatives are economic as well as political considerations. As 
depicted previously, high property prices continued to be the major problem facing most 
households during the transition. Measures introduced in 1996 to speed up land 
development, and in 1997 to curb speCUlations, were considered ineffective (Yeh 1999). 
" High property prices also engender high labor wages. A survey on the median salary of senior 
managers ranked Hong Kong the highest in the Asian and Pacific region in 1997-98 (Yeh 1999). 
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Property prices rocketed up throughout the first three quarters of 1997 (Figure 6.3). That 
raised the alarm of property asset bubbles which had just ruined the Japanese economy. 
On the other side, demographic projection suggests that the population will grow by 
over 15 percent in just ten years (Tung 1998), partly attributed to a continuous influx of 
Chinese migrants. Against such a background, easing the housing problem becomes 
critical to stabilizing the economy. 
Table 6.2: Projection of Housing Production Before and After the Asian Crisis 
Projection in August 1997 Projection in September 1998 
Public Private Total Public Sandwich Private Total 
housing a housing housing b class housing 
housing 
1997-1998 43,000 22,000 65 ,000 
1998-1999 39,000 36,000 75,000 20,900 5,400 12,900 39,200 
1999-2000 51,000 40,000 91,000 57,700 12,400 7,700 77,800 
2000-2001 113,000 54,000 167,000 94,600 12,400 23,000 130,000 
2001-2002 60,000 38,000 98,000 42,300 3,200 5,200 50,700 
2002-2003 47,100 3,200 5,000 55,300 
2003-2004 261 ,000 45 ,000 10,000 6,300 61 ,300 
2004-2005 37,300 10,000 11 ,000 58,300 
Total 757,000 472,600 
Source: Chiu (1999). 
(a): This includes public rental housing, Home Ownership Scheme, Private Sector Participation Scheme, 
and Sandwich Class Housing Main Scheme. 
(b): This includes public rental housing, and Home Ownership Scheme. 
Moreover, Figure 6.4 reveals that in terms of owner occupation ratios Hong Kong is not 
only incomparable to Singapore and Thailand, but also behind the US , the UK, and 
Japan. Promoting home ownership by encouraging tenants of public housing to switch 
to owner occupation tenures will economize the subsidies on public housing (Chiu 
1999). 
Politically, the endeavor of the government, if it flourishes, will boost the image and 
reputation of the newly established SAR government (ibid.). This is essential, as the 
public perceived that the 'election' of Tung as chief executive was virtually arranged by 
Beijing, in which they had no participation. 
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Figure 6.4: Owner-occupation Rates in Hong Kong & Other 
Countries 
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Source: The Housing Bureau of the Hong Kong Government (http://www.info.gov.hk/hb/). 
Accompanying the new housing target is a renewed land policy. As the 50 hectares 
restriction has ceased to exist with the change of sovereignty, the SAR government is 
now free to announce medium- to long-term land disposal programs. In his first policy 
address Tung (1997) signifies the crucial aspect of doing so: 
"It is not just a matter of producing more flats , but of ensuring an even annual supply 
and a high degree of predictability that supply will be sustained. That is the only way to 
ensure moderate prices." 
To achieve this task, the authorities have committed to formulating a rolling five year 
land disposal program against a ten year planning horizon, as well as to streamlining the 
procedures for housing development. Furthermore, to meet the demand for more land in 
the future, the government has speeded up the urbanization of rural areas and island 
districts, and the redevelopment of old urban areas. 
6.2.3 The Stormy Days of Being Part of Asia 
The promised growth in supply under the new housing policy crashed with an 
unanticipated collapse in demand triggered by the Asian crisis. To defer speculative 
attacks against the Hong Kong dollar, interest rates were maintained at high levels 
throughout 1998. The average interest rate charged on new mortgages was raised from 9 
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percent in July 1997 to 11 percent in June 1998 (Chiu 1999). The economy was brought 
into recession for the first time in 13 years. 
High interest rates, credit crunches, rising unemployment and economic uncertainty 
dragged property prices down by 50 percent in the 12 months following October 1997 
(Figure 6.3). The slump in the luxury apartment market was even larger, reaching 60 
percent (ibid.). The two largest property developers, Cheung Kong and Herderson Land 
Development, reported net profit plunges of 65.3 percent in 1998 and 76.8 percent for 
the second half of 1998, respectively (SCMP 1999). Reacting to this situation, major 
developers pressed the government to suspend land sales to stabilize property prices. 
Table 6.3: Loans for Use in Hong Kong by Sector 
Sectors June 1995 Out of June 1998 Out of 
(HK$ million) total (%) (HK$ million) total (%) 
Manufacturing 96,394 7.25 105,950 4.82 
Transport and transport equipment 69,812 5.25 105,866 4.81 
Wholesale and retail trade 157,275 11.83 195,428 8.89 
Financial concerns 160,086 12.05 254,397 11.57 
Building, construction, property 255,555 19.23 440,286 20.02 
development and investment 
Individuals to purchase flats under 40,323 3.03 66,685 3.03 
the HaS and the PSPA ' 
Individuals to purchase other 280,300 21.09 499,404 22.71 
residential property 
All Others 269,298 20.26 530935 24.14 
Total 1,329,043 100 2,198,951 100 
Property market related loans 550,951 41.45 1006,375 46.00 
Source: Monthly Statistical Bulletin, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, December 1995 and June 1998 
(the second one cited from Yeh (1999». 
(a): HaS is House Ownership Scheme, PSPA is Private Sector Participation Scheme. 
The fall in property prices has had enormous spillover effects on the financial sector, as 
almost half of the loans in Hong Kong were property related (Table 6.3). The position 
of the banking sector was already weakened by fierce competition in the mortgage 
market before the crisis. The interest rate margin between the lending rate and the prime 
rate fell from about 1.75 percent in 1996 to not more than 0.75 percent in 1997 (Cheng, 
Wong et al. 1998). The dramatic price slump turned real estate from an inflation-
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hedging asset into a negative equity (Chiu 1999). Allowing further decline of property 
prices could risk solvency of the banking sector. 
On the other hand, artificially dampening the downward adjustment of property prices 
might come at a cost of prolonging the economy's recovery from recession. This point 
is important because, given the rigidity of the monetary regime and the prudence of the 
fiscal regime, Hong Kong has been relying on its high flexibility in factor prices and 
resource reallocation in maintaining economic balance (Dodsworth and Mihaljek 1997). 
Once price flexibility is impeded by policy intervention, the economy may have lost the 
only remaining adjustment mechanism. 
Recognizing the pressure on the banking system, the administration eventually decided 
to scale down the original long-term housing program." The Sandwich Class Housing 
Scheme, which provides subsidized owner occupation tenures for middle income 
families, has been suspended. The most drastic and controversial move came in June 
1998. A moratorium was imposed on land sales for nine months until the end of March 
1999. In effect, this decision held off 30,000 housing units (Yeh 1999). This was the 
first time the government had suspended land sales in more than 20 years (EIU 1998-
99). 
During September to December 1998, the government took further action to stimulate 
the property markets, lifting almost all the anti-property-speculation measures 
introduced during 1994-97 (Chiu 1999). For instance, the Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority (HKMA) relaxed the long-standing 70 percent restriction on the ratio of 
mortgage loan to property value, with an extra 15 percent lending being guaranteed by 
the government owned Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation. This arrangement ensures 
that private banks ' exposure to mortgage loan is still capped below the 70 percent 
ceiling (EIU 1999). 
In February 1999, the government announced the resumption of land sales after the 
expiration of the moratorium. A new application system has been introduced to help 
" However, the policy backfired in public debate, as the government was perceived to bend to the 
pressure of large property developers at the expense of consumers ' interests. 
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maintain the flexibility of land sales and at the same time the stability of property prices. 
Under the new arrangement, a developer may apply to the government for the sale of 
any listed sites, provided it offers a minimum price. If the government considers the 
offered price reasonable, it will put up the site for public auction or tender. The 
administration claims the system will enable the market to decide the optimum amount 
of land to be disposed and the optimum timing of disposal (Hong Kong Government 
1999)." Property prices seemed to stabilize by the first quarter of 1999. 
6.2.4 Issues Raised 
To summarize, the change of political landscape has significant implications for the 
development of property markets in Hong Kong. Before the hand-over, land supply was 
restrained by the Sino-British arrangement, while the interest rate instrument was 
subdued by the linked exchange rate system. After July 1, 1997, the constraint on 
demand side management remains as long as the currency board arrangement is in 
place. Nonetheless, on the supply side, the authorities now have much larger scope to 
flex their muscles. This change has opened up lot more possibilities and, thereby, a 
number of theoretical as well as policy issues. To name a few: 
o In an economy in which the government monopolizes all land resources, what is the 
optimal supply of land? 
o Given the economy with heterogeneous incomes, what are the redistribution effects 
of government intervention in public and private property markets? 
o What are the most effective instruments for intervention in property markets? 
o How do property market oligopolies, which engage in long-term irreversible 
investments, behave under the uncertainties of land disposal and macroeconomic 
environment? 
" For more details about the new disposal system, visit the web-site of the Lands Department of the Hong 
Kong government Chttp://www.info.gov.hkllandsd/landsale/pamph.htm). 
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o What are the roles of mortgages in both capitalization and the formation of asset 
bubbles? 
o How does the exchange rate arrangement, especially a currency peg, interact with 
property markets? 
To keep in line with the theme of the whole thesis, this chapter only concentrates on the 
issue of the effectiveness of intervention instruments. The next chapter focuses on the 
interrelation between the exchange rate arrangement and property markets. 
Nevertheless, other issues can be developed into other research projects in the future. 
6.3 PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF PROPERTY MARKET 
The purpose of this section is to explore some fundamental economic properties of real 
estate markets. Although the model has far less features than the general equilibrium 
model presented in the next chapter, it manages to capture a number of the issues 
previously discussed. These include (i) the effectiveness of a mortgage limit as an anti-
speculation instrument; (ii) the consequence of rising household income; (iii) the effect 
of changing the interest rate on mortgage loans; and (iv) the impact of property 
inflation. 
The model is based on Miles (1994). It consists of a representative household and a 
representative competitive property developer. A feature of the model is that the 
household makes use of a mortgage to purchase dwellings. All the macroeconomic 
variables are exogenous, including the interest rate, the money supply, and the price of 
non-durable goods. The nominal wage is fixed too, so employment is demand 
determined. The quantity and relative price of housing are determined by a market 
clearing condition, but expected property inflation is given. The notations of the model 
are listed in Appendix 6. 
6.3.1 Household 
The maximization problem confronted by the household is as follows (the time 
subscripts are skipped for notational neatness): 
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Maximize rU(c,h,m)e-JUdt 
subject to: 
y+ z = c+ Ph(Jh +rhh)+ n ,m+ rz+m (6.1a) 
Ih = Jh[l+¢ h(Jh / h)) (6.1b) 
h = Jh -ohh. (6.1c) 
The economy is closed. The household consumes three goods: non-durable goods (e) , 
housing (h), and liquidity (m). The household earns a fixed income (y) and borrows a 
new amount of mortgage loan (2) every period (equation 6.1a). It spends on non-
durable goods (e), housing investment (PhIh), the property tax payment (Phrhh), the 
inflation tax payment (nem), and the interest payment on the mortgage (rz ), and saves 
the rest as financial assets (m). Housing is modeled as a consumption capital, so its 
accumulation is subject to an adjustment cost (¢hJ/ Ih ) and depreciation (ohh ), as 
commonly done in modeling physical capital (equations 6.1b and 6.1c).15 The 
specification implicitly assumes that one unit of housing stock generates one unit of 
housing services, and the rent of a dwelling is just equal to its price. Therefore, the 
property tax is actually levied on the implicit rent earned from the property. Altering 
these simple one-to-one relations will not change the properties of the model; for 
example, see Tumovsky and Okuyama (1994). Financial asset is equal to money 
balance net of outstanding mortgage debt. 
The household is supposed to borrow by using its property as collateral: 
ephh "? z; e E [0,1). (6.2a) 
e is the mortgage loan to housing value ratio ; the larger the borrowing capacity of the 
household, the larger the ratio . To examine the impact of mortgage limit on the property 
15 More detailed discussion about the adjustment cost of housing capital can be found in Chapter 7. 
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market, it is necessary to assume the household is financially constrained. That is, 
equation (6.2a) is binding: 
8Phh = z; 8 E [0,1]. (6.2b) 
Requiring 8 to lay within [0,1] implies that there is no need to impose the no-Ponzi 
game condition on the household. This is because, at any point of time, the net value of 
the assets held by the household is at least equal to the real money balance, which is 
always non-negative. This point is especially important when the real interest rate on 
mortgage loans measured in the property price (rh) is negative: 
r+Jrc-Jr" =r-Jr=li, <0. (6.2c) 
Without the constraint (6.2b) the system will explode under this circumstance, as 
mortgage borrowing will tend to infinitely large. Equation (6.2c) is realized when the 
relative inflation rate of property outpaces the mortgage interest rate, as happened in 
Hong Kong during 1991-94 (see Section 6.2.1.2). 
Equation (6.2b) restricts that, if the property price falls , lenders can immediately 
contract the size of the mortgage. In reality, it is hard to maintain the asset to liability 
ratio in such a strict sense. In fact , when property values plummet substantially, and 
abruptly, those financial instirutes which have a sizable mortgage loan exposure may 
not be able to balance their balance sheets and become insolvent. 
The current value Hamiltonian of the problem is given as follows: 
H, =U 
+A,{y-c- pJh[(1-8)+¢h(Jh / h)]-['h +(r+oh -Jr)8]Phh -m-Jr,m) 
+A2 (Jh -ohh-h). 
Besides the original constraints, the other first order conditions are given as follows: 
U, =A, (6.3a) 
A,Ph[(1-8)+2¢h(Jh / h)] = A2 (6.3b) 
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Al = AI(f.1+nJ-Um (6.3c) 
A2 = A2(f.1+0h)-Uh +AIPh[Hh +O(r+Oh -n)-¢h(Jh / h)2] . (6.3d) 
Note that these first order conditions imply that c, hand m are strictly positive, 
otherwise they should be expressed in terms of Kuhn-Tucker conditions. At the steady 
state: 
U: IU; = (f.1 +nJ (6.4a) 
U: / U; = VIPh (6.4b) 
y=c' +ncm· +V2Phh· (6.4c) 
where: 
VI = (f.1 +0 h + 'r h) + O(r - f.1- n) + ¢h8 h(2f.1+ ° h) 
V2 =Oh(1+¢hOh)+O(r-n)+'rh· 
Asterisk "*,, denotes that the household is at an equilibrium. If utility is non-negative, VI 
must be positive. A sufficient but not necessary condition is that the real interest rate on 
mortgage loans measured in the property price is positive, that is: 
r-n=rh 2:0. 
Equation (6.4a) asserts that, at the steady state, the marginal utility of acquiring one 
more unit of liquidity is equal to the depreciation of money. Equation (6.4b) indicates 
that, at the steady state, the utility of holding one more unit of housing is equal to that of 
foregone consumption. The latter is equal to the sum of the depreciation, the interest and 
tax payments, and the adjustment cost of the property, minus the expected gain from the 
mortgage due to appreciation of property assets relative to non-durable goods. Since the 
household is bounded to borrow as long as it possesses non-zero property assets, it must 
be impatient at the prevailing interest rate, that is: 
f.1-rh =f.1+ n - r 2:0 . 
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6.3.1.1 Housing as an Asset 
A2 is the imputed value of housing. Its solution can be computed by using equation 
(6.3d): 
A e-CI'+Ii,)r = B - rr {V + V P [,f, (J / h)2 + 8(rr - 0 - r) - r }e-CI'+Ii,), ds (65a) 2 0 Jo h c h 'f"h h h h • • 
Bo is a constant tenn, detennined by an initial or a tenninal condition. Since it is 
assumed h to be strictly positive, it must be true that: 
limA
2
e-CI'+Ii,)r = 0 (6.5b) 
Substituting (6.5b) into (6.5a) gives: 
Bo = r{Vh +V,Ph[¢ h(Jh / h)2 +8(rr-Oh -r)-rh}e-CI'+Ii')'ds. (6.5c) 
Substituting (6.5c) back into (6.5a) gives: 
A2e-CI'+Ii ,)r = f{Vh +V,Ph[¢h(Jh / h)2 +8(rr-oh -r)-rh]}e-CI'+Ii')'ds . (6.5d) 
Equation (6.5d) equates the discounted imputed value of housing at time t, A2e -CI'+Ii,)r, to 
the discounted utility of housing from time t to infinity. This illustrates that the value of 
housing can be expressed as that of a financial asset. On the right-hand side, Vh is the 
utility from housing services generated directly by occupying the dwelling. 
V , Ph8(rr - 0 h - r) is the utility from the consumption financed by the capital gain of the 
mortgage, net of the depreciation of the property and the interest payment of the 
mortgage. ¢h(Jh / h)2 is the reduction of the adjustment cost arisen from a larger 
housing stock. Lastly, r h is the reduction of consumption due to the property tax. 
6.3.1.2 Comparative Static 
To process further , it is necessary to specify the utility function in more details. Since 
non-durable goods, housing and liquidity are assumed to be essentials, it is reasonable 
and convenient to adopt a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
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V(c,h,m) = B,cah~m'-a-fi. (6.6a) 
Thereupon, it can be solved for the steady state demands for housing, non-durable 
goods and real money balance, respectively: 
h' = j3y(lI Ph) / (V,V3 + j3v2) (6.6b) 
c' = ayv, / (v,v3 + j3v2 ) (6.6c) 
m' = (1- a - j3)y[v, / (Ji + nJl / (v, V3 + j3v2 ) (6.6d) 
where: 
V3 = [aJi+ (1- j3)nel / (Ji + nJ. 
For simplicity, V3 is assumed to be positive. The results of some comparative static 
exercises are given in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Results of Comparative Static 
Mortgage to property value ratio 
(8) 
Disposable income (y) 
Mortgage interest rate (r) 
Relative property price (Ph) 
Relative inflation of property (Jr) 
Inflation of non-durable goods (Jre ) 
Property tax ('l'h) 
Mortgage to Property Value Ratio 
Housing (h*) 
rh> 0 : ? 
o ~ rh : + 
+ 
+ 
Non-durable Real money 
goods (c*) balance (m*) 
rh ~ 0: - rh ~ 0 : 
0> rh: ? 0> rh: ? 
+ + 
0 0 
+ + 
Surprisingly, a less restrictive mortgage limit, e, does not necessarily raise housing 
demand. Instead, the outcome depends on the sign of rho Recall that the household is 
bounded to borrow by equation (6.2b) as long as it holds property assets. rh is the 
interest rate on the mortgage measured in the property price and, thus, the real cost of 
property acquisition. If it is positive, a larger amount of borrowing will incur a 
202 
higher real cost. On the other hand, easing the credit limit allows the household to 
purchase a bigger dwelling. Therefore, the overall impact on housing demand is 
ambiguous. If rh is negative, purchasing real estate by mortgage loans, in effect, 
becomes a profitable investment. It thus definitely stimulates a greater demand for 
property, as a larger stock value of property will raise the total amount of borrowing. 
The result hints that when there is a substantial property price plunge, simply relaxing 
the liquidity constraint faced by households, as the HKMA did during the Asian crisis, 
may not be effective to stabilize the real estate market. In particular, as the downturn of 
the Hong Kong property market was associated with interest rate hikes, the condition of 
rh > 0 was likely to be valid. 
The demand for non-durable goods changes in a different direction. If r h is positive, the 
interest payment of the mortgage will reduce the amount of income that can be spent on 
non-durable goods. If rh is negative, the mortgage becomes an interest bearing financial 
instrument, so the intertemporal substitution effect will induce the household to reduce 
consumption on non-durable goods and to invest more on property. On the other hand, a 
greater property stock and, thus, a larger mortgage will increase the current disposable 
income of the household. The income effect will lead to greater consumption of all 
goods. Consequently, the overall impact on the demand for non-durable goods is 
ambiguous. The same argument applies on real money balance. 
Disposable Income 
A higher disposable income, y , increases the consumption of all housing, non-durable 
goods, and real money balance, consistent with a general result that all commodities are 
normal goods under a Cobb-Douglas utility function . 
Mortgage Interest Rate 
Increasing the mortgage interest rate, r, will unambiguously lower the demand for 
housing, non-durable goods, and money balance. This is because, even if at the steady 
state, the household is bound to borrow. A higher interest rate will reduce the real 
income and, therefore, the consumption of all goods. 
Property Price 
A higher current property price, Ph, reduces the demand for housing as expected. 
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Nonetheless, it has no impact on the demand for non-durable goods and money 
balances. This is obviously the consequence of using a Cobb-Douglas utility function in 
that there is no cross price substitution. 
Relative InDation of Property 
Unlike the current property price, an expected higher price of property relative to non-
durable goods in the future, n, increases the demand for all commodities. This is 
because appreciation of property assets raises the value of existing property and thus the 
mortgage size. This boosts the income of the household immediately and, hence, the 
demand for all goods. 
InDation of Non-durable goods 
Notice that when estimating the impact of non-durable goods inflation, nc, it is 
implicitly assumed that the relative inflation of property is zero. So, it is indeed a case 
of general inflation. As a result, there is no means to hedge inflation. Nevertheless, 
general inflation will still erode the purchasing power of money. As a result, the 
household needs to reduce the consumption of all commodities. 
Property Tax 
A positive property tax reduces the demand for all commodities. This is simply because 
for every level of housing stock the household needs to pay a higher tax. The negative 
income effect gives rise to the outcome. 
6.3.2 Property Developer 
To complete the model this section specifies the supply side of the property market. The 
maximization problem of the property developer is as follows: 
Maximizing r IIe-"'dt 
subject to: 
II = Phx-(wn+ p,I+Ik ) (6.7a) 
F(n,k,l) = x (6.7b) 
204 
Ik = pJk[l + I/\CJk / k)] (6.7c) 
k=Jk-Okk . (6.7d) 
The developer employs labor (n), capital (k) and land (l) to produce housing. The real 
gross profit or net cash flow (II) is simply equal to the revenue (PhX) minus the total 
non-capital cost, including factor rents (wn+PIl) and investment expenditure (h) . II is 
indeed the total rental payment to capital. Thus, the economic profit of the developer is 
equal to zero, as expected in a competitive market. Since this is a partial equilibrium 
model, the labor wage (w) in the construction sector does not necessarily link to the 
income of the household. The current value Hamiltonian of the profit maximization 
problem is given as follows: 
H2 == Phx-wn- PIl - pJk[l+¢kCJk / k)]+,1 3CJk -Okk). 
Besides the original constraints, the other first order conditions are given as follows : 
w/p=F" (6.8a) 
P, / Ph = F, (6.8b) 
,13 = Pk[l+¢kCJk / k)] (6.8c) 
Pc 3 = ,13(.u+Ok)-[pJ~ + (¢kPk)CJk / k)2] (6.8d) 
At equilibrium, equations (6.8a)-(6.8d) can be rewritten as: 
w / F" = P, / F, = (Pk / F.')[(rk +Ok)+¢kOk(2rk +Ok)] = h (6.8e) 
Equation (6.8e) indicates that, for a profit maximizing developer, the marginal cost must 
be equal to the marginal output for each factor. For capital, the marginal cost consists of 
the depreciation, the time discounting factor, and the adjustment cost. If all factor prices 
are fixed, a higher property price relative to non-durable goods and, thus, to the labor 
wage and land price, will raise the supply of housing. Therefore, it can be written that: 
X=X(Ph) ;x(.»O, x'>O, x"<O. (6.8f) 
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If the supply of housing investment goods is equal to the demand, it must be true that: 
X(Ph ) = Jh · (6.8g) 
6.3.2.1 Property Market Equilibrium 
Substituting equation (6.8g) into (6.1c), and making use of n in equation (6.4b), it can 
obtain the two equations that determine the property market equilibrium: 
h=X(Ph)-Ohh. (6.9a) 
Ph = -(1/ 8)( (U; / U;) + Ph[(J1+ 0 h + T h)+ 8(r- 11)+ ¢hO h(211 + 0 h)]}' (6.9b) 
The two equations can be approximated by a linear matrix equation: 
[h] [all a!2 ][h-h"] P = a2! an P- p" (6.9c) 
where:!6 
a!!=-Oh<O 
a!2 =xp >0 
a2! = (U;U;h - U;U;h) / [8(U;)2] > 0 
a22 = (1/ 8){-[d(U; / U;)/ dPh]+[(11+0h +Th)+8(r- 11)+¢hOh(211+ I1h)]} > O. 
Double asterisks, "**", denotes that both the household and the property market are in 
the steady state, as distinguished from the steady state of the household only. It is 
straightforward to show that equation (6.9c) has one negative and one positive root. 
Hence, the steady state of the property market is a saddle point. When the property 
market is at equilibrium, h = Ph = O. A plot of equation (6.9c) is given in Figure 6.5. 
16 Note that the derivative of U;/U, with respect to p is positive. 
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Ph 
L 
" 
h=O 
J 
.J 
1 Ph = 0 
h* 
Figure 6.5: Phase Diagram for the Property Market 
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6.4 POLICY EXPERIMENTS 
The policy options available to the authorities can be distinguished between demand 
side and supply side instrument, respectively. On the demand side, the main instruments 
include the property tax and restriction on mortgages. On the supply side, the main 
policy instruments are the supplies of land and construction workers. 
6.4.1 Demand Side Policy 
6.4.1.1 Unanticipated Shock 
First, an unanticipated permanent rise in the property tax is considered. Suppose the 
economy is at the equilibrium point A in Figure 6.6 initially. The rise in the property tax 
has unambiguous negative effects on housing demand, shifting the jJ = 0 locus 
leftwards. Responding to the fall in demand, the price of housing drops immediately. 
This is represented by a jump from point A to B on a new saddle path. Over time, the 
housing stock contracts, as the supply of new dwellings is smaller than the replacement 
demand. And the contraction in supply lifts the property price slightly. This adjustment 
process corresponds to the movement from point B to the new equilibrium point C. 
An important aspect of this adjustment process is that, in the short run, the property 
price overshoots its long-run equilibrium level, as point C is definitely lower than point 
A. This overshooting in property price is simply ascribed to the fact that the housing 
stock can not be altered flexibly in the short run due to adjustment costs. 
Another type of demand side instruments are those targeting the means of financing 
property acquisition: mortgage interest rate and mortgage limit. While both are applied 
on the mortgage, targeting the price is more effective than targeting the quantity in 
terms of certainty. A higher mortgage interest rate, like a higher property tax, shifts the 
demand curve downward, and reduces the steady state housing stock and price. On the 
other side, as discussed previously, a quantitative control on the loan to value ratio can 
have either positive or negative effects on housing demand. Therefore, the demand 
curve may shift up as well as down. Nevertheless, in all the cases of unanticipated 
demand shocks, the overshooting story described above still applies. 
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Ph 
h=O 
B Ph =0 
h* 
Figure 6.6: Impacts of a Negative Demand Shock on the Property Market 
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6.4.1.2 Anticipated Shock 
Now consider an anticipated demand shock. Suppose the authority announces at time to 
a permanent increase in the property tax that will become effective at time t ], where t] > 
to. For simplicity, the announcement is assumed to be credible. Back to Figure 6.6, now 
the dynamic path followed by the economy is A-D-E-C instead of A-B-C. After the 
announcement of the new tax scheme, the property price drops immediately from point 
A to D. This is because, as households can perfectly foresee that the new equilibrium 
price will fall below the original level, to avoid capital losses in the future, they will 
immediately try to reduce their holdings of housing assets. As the supply of housing is 
rigid in the short run, the housing price must fall to clear the market. During the period 
between to and t], property developers react to the news of a lower future property price 
by cutting down production. However, since demand falls faster than supply, a 
continuous slide of the property price is envisaged. This intermediate adjustment 
process is denoted by the path from point D to E on the figure. It should be noted that 
the path D-E is also a utility maximizing path associated with the original saddle point, 
though it does not fulfil the convergence conditions as the saddle path does . At time tJ, 
when the new tax scheme is put into practice, the economy should just arrive at point E. 
After that, it simply follows the new saddle path to point C as in the case of an 
anticipated shock. 
The position of point D (and hence point E) depends on the duration between to and t]. 
The shorter the duration, the closer of point D to B. At an extreme that t1 = to, point D is 
just equal to point B (and point E), as the anticipated shocks is actually unanticipated. 
At another extreme that t1 - to tends to infinity, point D tends to coincide with point A, 
and so is D-E with the it = 0 locus. That is, the economy will tend to take infinite time 
to reach point C. 
Since point E is always below point C, the property price still overshoots its long run 
equilibrium level. Nonetheless, compared to the case of unanticipated shocks, the 
overshooting is dampened. The intuition is simple, by announcing the tax scheme 
earlier, the authority essentially gives the private sector time to carry out part of the 
needed adjustment before the policy is actually put in place. 
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6.4.2 Supply Side Policy 
6.4.2.1 Unanticipated Shock 
If there is little substitution between land, labor and capital inputs, any decrease in the 
supply of land or construction labor will reduce the steady state housing stock at all 
price levels. In Figure 6.7, this is represented by a leftward shift of the h = 0 locus. The 
spontaneous impact is a rise in housing price, as indicated by a jump from point A to 
point B in the figure. Over time the housing stock falls as the replacement demand is 
smaller than the supply of new housing units. The economy moves from point B along 
the new saddle path to the new equilibrium point C. In contrast to the case of demand 
shocks, the housing price does not overshoot its equilibrium level, as point C is clearly 
above points B and A. 
6.4.2.2 Anticipated Shock 
Again, the authority announces at time to a permanent reduction of land disposal that 
will become effective at time t1 , with tl > to. Now the adjustment path is A-D-E-C 
instead of A-B-C. At time to, when the policy is announced, the property price jumps 
instantaneously from point A to D. This is because, as agents expect a higher property 
price in the future, it is profitable to increase property asset holdings. With an inelastic 
supply of housing, the property price goes up in response to a greater demand. From 
time to to t1, demand continues to rise. This keeps pushing up the property price. A 
higher price, in turn, induces property developers to deploy more resources in housing 
construction. The housing stock increases as the supply of new housing units is larger 
than the replacement demand. This intermediate adjustment is denoted by the section D-
E on the diagram. 
An important aspect of this adjustment process is that housing stock actually expands in 
the medium run. At time tl, when the policy comes into effect, the supply of newly 
finished housing units starts to reduce. This gradually cut into existing housing stock. 
Eventually, housing stock diminishes to below the original level. In the figure, this is 
represented by moving from point E to B and further to point A. 
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Figure 6.7: Impacts of a Negative Supply Shock on the Property Market 
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6.4.3 Policy Implications 
The above experiments clearly indicate that, the preferred policy to manage the property 
market depends on the policy objective and whether the policy is pre-announced. 
Unanticipated demand side policies will engender overshooting in property prices. If 
fluctuation in property prices is undesirable, then the authorities should either make use 
of a pre-announcement to dampen price overshooting or shift to supply side 
management. On the other hand, anticipated supply shocks give rise to overshooting in 
housing output. Accordingly, if output fluctuation is considered disadvantageous to the 
economy, anticipated supply side policies should be avoided. 
Although simple, the above analytical results help shed light on the performance of the 
Hong Kong property market. On the one side, the city-state has been exposed to 
external demand shocks continuously. On the other side, with the supply of land being 
highly constrained before 1997, the authorities have resorted more to demand side 
interventions. The model in this study predicts that, without enough time to digest the 
information, property prices tend to overshoot their equilibrium levels when news 
suddenly arrives. Based on the above analysis, the shift of the Hong Kong SAR 
government more to supply side management after the hand-over seems to be in the 
right direction. 
Furthermore, the SAR government has attempted to use pre-announcement of medium-
to long-term land disposal programs to smooth property price expectation. The 
analytical results in this study suggest that such programs alone may not be enough to 
achieve the objective, inasmuch as anticipated supply side shocks actually envisage 
output overshooting. To avoid unnecessary output volatility, it will be warranted to have 
more stable and even land disposal plans over a longer time horizon. That also seems to 
be the government's objective. Moreover, the above analyses abstract from many 
institutional details. In particular, major developers in Hong Kong normally have built 
up their own land banks to enhance their flexibility in production. Such buffers of land 
supply may render output overshooting less significant in practice. 
Last, but not least, as mentioned in Section 6.2, after the Asian crisis, the Hong Kong 
government put forward an application system in which developers can nominate (with 
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a price offer) any listed land sites for sales. This system allows the market to partly 
determine the quantity of land disposed. Effectively this provides a channel to substitute 
quantity fluctuation for price fluctuation. Notwithstanding, the authorities still maintain 
the discretionary power to veto an application or simply to not put up enough sites for 
application. Therefore, the system is 'biased' in the sense that it can avoid excess-
supply but not under-supply of land. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Property markets have enormous significance for the Hong Kong economy. This is 
reflected in the fact that property related activities dominate a lot of economic areas in 
Hong Kong, such as loan making, employment, government revenues, and the national 
output. Furthermore, the city-state has virtually no natural endowments other than land 
resources, which are almost completely monopolized by the government. Thus, 
delivering appropriate land and housing policies becomes extremely important for both 
social and economic considerations. Nevertheless, the authorities are confronted with 
many challenges as well as constraints. The population is growing at a fast pace, partly 
due to massive Chinese migration. In spite of continuous effort to develop more 
utilizable land, land is still a scarce resource in per capita terms. At the same time, the 
interest rate instrument has been surrendered under the currency board arrangement, 
limiting the demand side management capacity of the authorities. As a result, the 
pressure on the supply side management has been mounting. It can be foreseen that 
housing will continue to be a key problem for Hong Kong in the future. 
The partial equilibrium model developed in this chapter shows that property taxes, and 
the supply of land and labor all have unambiguous impacts on housing prices and 
quantities. Nonetheless, unanticipated demand side policies can lead to overshooting in 
property prices, and anticipated supply side policies lead to overshooting in housing 
outputs. The effectiveness of quantitative controls on mortgage loans is conditional on 
the interest rate and property inflation. The interest rate on mortgage loans, on the other 
hand, has more precise effects on the property market. However, even if under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, unless mortgage loan rates can be separated from other interest 
rates, that is there is credit market segregation, the interest rate instrument can not be 
assigned solely to maintain the stability of property markets. An essential question 
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arising from this is whether the business cycle of property markets necessarily coincides 
with that of the wider economy. This question is centrally about the general equilibrium 
relationship between property markets and the rest of the economy. The next chapter is 
devoted to this question. 
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Appendix 6 
Table 6.Al: Definitions of Notations (in alphabetical order) 
Symbol 
c 
F 
H 
h 
It 
Jh 
J. 
k 
m 
n 
Ph 
p. 
PI 
r 
rh = r - 7r 
r. 
V 
x 
y 
z 
II 
1r , =F,/~ 
1r h =Fhl P" 
7r = trh - 7r, 
I/Jh 
I/J. 
8h 
8. 
Definition and Notes 
real consumption of non-durable 
production function 
real consumption of housing services 
real investment on housing 
real investment on physical capital 
fixed formation of housing capital 
fixed formation of physical capital 
real capital input 
real land input 
real money balance 
real labor input 
relative price of housing in terms of non-durable goods 
relative price of capital goods in terms of non-durable goods 
relative price of land in tenns of non-durable goods 
real interest rate of mortgage 
real interest rate of mortgage measured in property price 
real interest rate faced by property developer 
instantaneous utility function: Vp V", Vm >0; V", V h", Vmm < 0 
supply flow of housing per unit time 
disposable real income 
real mortgage 
gross real profit or real net cash flow 
inflation of non-durable measured in nominal price 
inflation of housing measured in nominal price 
relative inflation of housing to non-durable 
adjustment cost coefficient of housing 
adjustment cost coefficient of physical capital 
deprecation rate of housing of housing 
deprecation rate of housing of physical capital 
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CHAPTER 7 
Properry Markets & Exchange Rate Arrangement 
Part II 
Synopsis 7 
This chapter presents an intertemporal general equilibrium model to study the 
interaction between property markets and the wider economy in an open 
macroeconomic context. To resemble the Hong Kong economy, the model emphasizes 
the coexistence of multiple real estate markets and the government's role in property 
markets. It is found that non-tradability, durability and adjustment costs give rise to the 
unique position of real estate in the economy. A resource boom in the construction 
sector can lead to a completely opposite result to that in the tradable non-durable 
manufacturing sector. Secondly, due to the adjustment costs in the accumulation of 
housing capital, the real impacts of monetary changes on property markets are more 
prolonged than those on non-durable sectors. As a result, a fixed exchange rate regime 
exacerbates the business cycles in property markets and the economy as a whole. 
Likewise, simulation results show that, the attempt by the Hong Kong government to 
stabilize property prices during the Asian crisis, by suspending land disposal, might 
have come at the cost of further aggravating the impacts of the crisis and retarding 
economic recovery. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is a continuation of the last one. While the partial equilibrium model 
presented in the last chapter is useful to illustrate some basic economic characters of 
property markets, falls short of capturing the institutional features of the Hong Kong 
property market. The capacity of the model is also limited, inasmuch as it abstracts from 
all open economy elements. 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate exchange rate arrangement issues by 
extending the previous model into a better-equipped one. Firstly, the model is developed 
from a partial into a general equilibrium model, with three different industries and three 
real estate markets. Secondly, government interventions in real estate markets are fully 
acknowledged. Thirdly, the model is constructed under an open economy framework, 
with a range of nominal rigidity and exchange rate arrangement options. 
Three sets of simulation experiments are conducted under four different regimes to 
capture various effects of property markets. They correspond respectively to a change of 
monetary policy, a change of land policy, and a reevaluation of financial risk in the 
domestic economy. While the exercise is primarily for theoretical purposes, the 
structure of the model roughly resembles the economic structure of Hong Kong, and the 
simulations by and large relate to recent events or policy innovations in the territory. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief 
review of the literature and a non-technical preview of the model ; Section 3 explains the 
mathematical details of the model; Section 4 discusses the results of simulations; and 
Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
7.2 REVIEW AND PREVIEW OF HOUSING MODELS 
Early studies of housing and real estate are rooted deeply in neoclassical consumer 
theory. Housing is considered to be a durable good. Households and real estate 
developers are assumed to maximize their one period utility and profits, respectively. 
Examples include McDonald (1979), Friedman and Weinberg (1982) and Maclennan 
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(1982). Later studies, following the mainstream development in economic theories, 
emphasize the intertemporal feature of economic decisions. One of the earliest attempts 
of this kind is Hammond (1987). Contemporary studies of this topic further integrate 
with capital theory, capturing the nature of real estate as both a durable good and a 
physical asset, for example Okumura (1997) and Miles (1994). Incorporating the asset 
nature of real estate significantly enriches the dynamics of the property market. Similar 
to its role in other asset markets, expectation becomes crucial. The partial equilibrium 
model presented in the last chapter is a typical example of this type of model. 
Studies like Okumura (1997) and Miles (1994) are still basically confined within the 
microeconomic framework, in the sense that a number of crucial macroeconomic 
variables are set to be exogenous, such as wages, interest rates, and inflation. As a 
result, the equilibrium of the housing market is determined separately from, rather than 
in conjunction with, other markets. 
This general equilibrium framework has been increasingly embraced. Recent examples 
include Turnovsky and Okuyama (1994) and Nielsen and Sorensen (1994). However, 
both studies ignore the supply side constraint of land, as well as a number of 
macroeconomic factors, such as capital adjustment costs, the external balance, and the 
role of money. A multi-country model constructed by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1995), 
the G-Cubed model, has incorporated consumer durable goods and residential housing. 
Nevertheless, in the current version of the model the supplies of natural resources , 
including land, are assumed perfectly elastic. The model also abstracts from commercial 
building. More importantly, the linkage between property markets and the balance of 
payments is largely overlooked in most studies. Two noticeable exceptions are Morande 
(1992) and Matsuyama (1990). The former establishes the linkage between current 
account balance and property prices empirically, while the latter does it theoretically. 
Notwithstanding, both studies do not account for the role of the exchange rate regime. 
Moreover, Morande (1992) focuses solely on residential property, whereas Matsuyama 
(1990) neglects the role of land supply. 
On the other side, if one widens the scope from housing specifically to more generally 
non-tradable (durable or non-durable) goods, there will be no supply shortage of general 
equilibrium analyzes. For example, see Rebelo (1997), van Winccop (1993), and the 
citations in their papers. In terms of model structure, these two papers share some 
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similarities with this study, although this study is differentiated from them, and all other 
papers cited previously, by its much more detailed treatment of property markets. 
Table 7.1: Structure of the Model 
! Country: --------- I Factors: 
I 
Single small open economy i Physical capital (imported) 
, Agents: I Labor (mobile across sectors) 
I
' Household ! Sector-specific factors (including land) 
Government I Housings: 
I 
Industries: I Commercial building 
Manufacturing (tradable, non-durable) I Residential housing: 
I Servicing (non-tradable, non-durable) I Public-subsidized housing 
I Construction (non-tradable, durable ) I Private-funded housing 
This chapter attempts to integrate property markets into an intertemporal general 
equilibrium model, with a rational expectation representative agent for each sector of 
the economy.! The basic framework of the model is a combination of two workhorses 
in economics: the Salter (1959) and the Ramsey (1928) model. 
As summarized in Table 7.1, the model is constructed with five agents : three production 
sectors, a representative household, and a government. The three industries correspond 
to tradable non-durable manufacturing goods, non-tradable non-durable services, and 
non-tradable durable housing. Highlighting the coexistence of various real estate 
markets in an economy, the model distinguishes between commercial building, private-
funded residential housing, and public-subsidized residential housing (the last two 
hereafter are abbreviated as private housing and public housing, respectively) . The 
purpose of incorporating public housing in the model is to capture the fact that half the 
population in Hong Kong inhabits various forms of public-subsidized dwellings. It also 
! See Hartley (1997) for an extensive and strong criticism of this type of representative agent model, 
along with rational expectation. 
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provides a platform to examine how public housing policies influence the private 
housing market. 
Each industry uses primary factors , intermediate goods, commercial building, and a 
sector-specific factor for production. One of the functions of incoqJorating sector-
specific factors is to stabilize the model and thus facilitate numerical iteration. In the 
construction sector, the specific factor is land. The inclusion of commercial building 
into the production implies the potential influence of property prices on export 
competitiveness. Physical capital is wholly imported from overseas, reflecting the 
situation that Hong Kong has virtually no heavy manufacturing industries. Intermediate 
goods include manufacturing goods and services. A function of incoqJorating these two 
intermediates into the production is to maintain the symmetry between the industries 
such that dissimilarities in inter-sectoral comparison can be easily highlighted. Another 
pUqJose is to enhance the interdependence between industries, which is crucial in the 
propagation of shocks. 
The household provides labor and capital services to the three industries in return for 
wages and interest. The household consumes residential housing, and non-durable 
goods, as well as leisure. Residential housing comprises private and public housing. For 
simplicity, the distinction between renting and purchasing is ignored. All housing is 
assumed to be sold. Due to government subsidy, public housing is sold at lower than 
market price. In recent years, the Hong Kong government has strongly encouraged 
public housing tenants to purchase their rented units from the authorities. 
The government budget is balanced in every period. This is consistent with the fact that 
the Hong Kong government does not issue any debts. Government expenditure is 
financed by a lump sum tax on the household and sales of specific factors to industry. 
Nonetheless, government still has a crucial role. It controls the supply of land, and the 
distribution of land disposal amongst the three types of real estate, as well as the level of 
subsidy on public housing. It should be pointed out that, while the government is the 
sole supplier of land in the model, monopolistic behavior in the real estate market is not 
considered here. 
The model consists of only one country; the rest of the world is treated as exogenous. 
Capital is perfectly mobile internationally. The home country is a small trader in the 
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world market, so the prices of capital investment goods and manufacturing goods are set 
exogenously. Two constraints are imposed to avoid either infinite borrowing from or 
infinite lending to the rest of the world. Firstly, the domestic subjective discount rate is 
set equal to the world interest rate. Secondly, the domestic interest rate is equal to the 
world interest rate plus a risk premium, which is a function of the ratio of the serving of 
foreign debt to GDP. Together these two constraints imply that, at the steady state, the 
amount of foreign debt must be equal to zero.' 
The model incurs three sources of rigidity. Firstly, real rigidity arises from the 
adjustment costs of physical capital and housing accumulations. Secondly, the risk 
premium in the uncovered interest parity condition incurs real rigidity in foreign asset 
accumulation. Lastly, nominal rigidity comes from an error correction process of 
nominal wage adjustment. The role of money in the economy is modeled via a money-
in-the-utility-function approach. The setting of nominal rigidity is crucial as it gives 
money and hence the exchange rate regime real effects. Thereby, the labor market does 
not clear continuously, but labor is perfectly mobile across sectors. The last two sources 
of rigidity are imposed upon the model to ensure that it functions properly. Though 
somewhat arbitrary, they are conceptually appealing, empirically relevant and 
practically simple. Lastly, no deterministic growth trend is imposed on the economy. In 
other words, if there is no disturbance, the economy will be at a stationary equilibrium. 
The next section describes the structure of the model formally. The notation is listed in 
Table 7.Al in Appendix 7. 
2 One can change the amount of foreign debt at the steady state by allowing a discrepancy between the 
domestic subjective discount rate and the world interest rate. 
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7.3 GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
MARKETS 
7.3.1 Industries 
MODEL OF PROPERTY 
The objective of firms is to maximize a stream of discounted current and future real 
gross profit. Production in each sector involves two primary factors, two intermediate 
inputs, and commercial building, as well as a sector-specific factor. The production 
nesting is illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
Figure 7.1: Production Nesting 
primary factors (Si) 
ICES] 
capital (Ki) 
labor (Ni) 
output (Yi) 
[CD] 
in term ed iates (Xi) 
ICES] 
man ufactu ring (X 1 i) 
services (X2i) 
com m ercial 
building (Hi) 
specific factor 
(Li) 
The upper level of the production nesting is in the Cobb-Douglas form. In the lower 
level, the primary factor Sj is composed of physical capital and labor through a constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function. Indeed, this is the basic structure of the model: 
commodities without cross price substitutability are nested by a Cobb-Douglas function, 
and commodities with cross price substitutability are nested by a CES function. The 
model abstracts from the role of infrastructure in transforming natural land into usable 
land. Alternatively, one can consider the infrastructure is embodied in the construction 
of housing. For simplicity, the factor intensities of the three industries are set to be the 
same. 
Formally, the objective of firm i is to: 
maximize s: IIie-R'dt 
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subject to: 
II, = (P; / P)Y, - (PK / P)IK' - (PH / P)I Hi -(W / P)N, 
-(Px, / P)X, - (PLi / P)L, (7.la) 
I K, = JK,[l+(¢K / 2)(JK' / K,)] (7.lb) 
K, = JK, -oKKK' (7.1c) 
I H, = JH,[l+(¢H / 2)(JH' / H,)] (7.ld) 
H, = J H' - 0 HH,; (7.le) 
where: 
Yi = Q' (S" X" H" L,) (7. If) 
Q' = f3 31 (S, )P32 (X, )P33 (H, )P34 (L, )P35; f3 32 + f3 33 + f3 34 + f3 35 = 1 (7.lg) 
(S,)P6 = f35(K,)P6 +(1- f3 5)(N,)P6; f3 6 E (0,1) (7.lh) 
3 3 
P= I,P;(Y, - I,Xi})/ Y 
i=1 ) =1 
(7.1i) 
3 3 
Y = I, P;.r=O(Y, - I, Xi})' 
i=1 )=1 
(7.1j) 
Equation (7.la) indicates that the net cash flow (IIi) of firm i is equal to the value of 
output (Y;) minus the costs of factors (Ki, Ni, and Li) and intermediates (X;). IIi is the real 
gross profit that is paid to the capital-owner (i.e. the household) instead of the economic 
profit. Sector-specific factors (Li) can be considered as natural resources. Their supplies 
are controlled by the government. Profit tax is ignored, as it is irrelevant to the study. 
Since labor (Ni ) is perfectly mobile, wages (W) are equalized across sectors. All the 
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relative prices are measured in terms of the GDP deflator (P). Y is GDP, and Xij is the 
amount of output from industry i being used as intermediate inputs in industry j.3 
Equations (7.1b) and (7.1c) describe the formation of physical capital (K;). The 
formation of capital is subject to an adjustment cost as a standard setting since Lucas 
(1967), Uzawa (1968), and Treadway (1969). Equations (7.1d) and (7.1e) determine the 
formation of housing capital (H;), which is used as an input in each industry. The 
formation of housing capital is also subject to an adjustment cost, similar to physical 
capital. Equations (7.1 f)-(7 .lh) describe the production technology as illustrated in 
Figure 7.1. 
R(s) is the average of the short-term interest rate, ret), over time sand t, defined as: 
1 IS R(s) = -- r(v)dv. (s - t) r 
The current value Hamiltonian of the maximization problem for the firm i is given as: 
hi '= (P, / P)Qi(Ki,Ni, X i, H i, L,)-(PK / P)lKi - (PH / P)IHi -(W / P)Ni 
-(PXi / P)Xi - (PLi / P)Li 
+AJKi{IKi -Jd1+(¢K / 2)(JKi / K i )]} 
+ A JHi {I Hi - J Hi [1 + (¢ H / 2)(1 Hi / Hi )]} 
+A Ki (1Ki -8KK i) 
+A Hi (1Hi -8HH i )· 
Besides the original constraints , other first order conditions of the maximizing problem 
are given by: 
J Ki = (qKi -l)(Ki / ¢K) (7.2a) 
3 Note that X3i = 0 for allj. 
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JH; =(qH;-I)(H;/¢H) 
qK; = AK;P / PK 
qH; = AH;P / PH 
w = P,Q~; 
Px; = P,Q~; 
Pu = P,Q~; 
A K; = (/ + 8 K)A K; - (P, / P)Q~; - (PK / P)( ¢ K /2)(1 KJ K KY 
AH; = (r' +8 H)A H; -(P, / P)Q~; -(PH / P)(¢H /2)(1 H; / HY · 
(7 .2b) 
(7.2c) 
(7.2d) 
(7.2e) 
(7.2f) 
(7.2g) 
(7.2h) 
(7.2i) 
Equations (7.2a) to (7.2b) govern the fo=ation of physical capital and commercial 
building. AKi and AHi are the increment to the value of fi= i from accumulating one 
more unit of physical capital and commercial building stocks, respectively. So, 
equations (7.2c) and (7.2d) define the marginal Tobin's q of physical capital and 
commercial building, respectively. Tobin ' s q conveys the info=ation about the 
profitability of investment. As pinned down by equations (7.2a) and (7.2b), it is 
profitable to further invest as long as Tobin ' s q is greater than one. Equations (7.2e) to 
(7.2g) state that the deployment of any factor is up to the point that its marginal benefit 
is equal to its marginal cost. Dynamic equations (7.2h) and (7.2i) remark that each 
capital is accumulated up to where the marginal cost equates to the marginal benefit. 
The fo=er is equal to the interest rate plus the depreciation rate, while the latter is 
equal to the rise in output plus the fall in the adjustment cost, due to a larger capital 
stock. 
Xi is an aggregate inte=ediate good, composed of manufacturing goods and services. 
The proportion of the two goods in Xi is determined by a second-tier optimization 
process as follows: 
maximize Xi 
subject to: 
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(X; )/312 = f311 (Xll l l2 + (1- f311 )(X2 ; )/312 ; f312 E (0,1) 
Px;X; = PJXll + P2 X 2; 
where: 
(Px; )1-0"12 = f3, t2 (p; )1-0"12 + (1- f311 t l2 (p,. )1-0"12 ; a 12 = 11 (1- f312)' 
Solving the problem, it can be obtained: 
XI; = X;[f3II(PX; / p;»)O"I2 (7.3a) 
X2; = XJ(1- f311)(PX; / P2 »)O"I 2. (7.3b) 
Equations (7.3a) and (7.3b) state that the demand for goods j, j = 1 or 2, is negatively 
proportional to the ratio between its price Pj and the intermediate input price index PXi . 
7.3.2 Household 
The household is treated as the fourth sector in this model. The household maximizes 
utility from consuming services from residential housing, non-durable consumer goods, 
leisure, and liquidity. The consumption nesting is illustrated in Figure 7.2. The first 
level is in the Cobb-Douglas form, and the second in the CES form. Residential housing 
comprises private and public housing. Similar to the intermediate input in production, 
the non-durable consumer good (C4) comprises manufacturing goods and services. 
Figure 7.2: Consumption Nesting 
residential housings (H4) 
ICES] 
public housing (HG ) 
private housing (HV) 
Utility (U) 
non-durable goods (C4) 
ICES] 
manufacturing (Cl) 
services (C2) 
money balance (M/P) 
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leisure (-N4) 
Formally, the optimization problem of the household is stated as: 
maximizing four H4 , C4 ' M I P, N4 ) e-/U dt 
subject to: 
(W / P)N4 + rCA - M / P) = 
(Pv / P)Iv + 8(Pe / P)Ie + (P4 / P)C4 + A + n(M / P) + TX (7.4a) 
Iv = IHv[l+(¢H /2)(JHV / Hv)] (7.4b) 
Hv =JHV-OHHv (7.4c) 
Ie = IHdl+(¢H /2)(JHe / He)] (7.4d) 
He = IHe -OHHe (7.4e) 
(H4 )p2 = f3,(Hv )P2 +(1- f3,)(He )P2 (7.4f) 
3 
N4 = 2,Ni , (7.4g) 
i=l 
where: 
U(H4 , C4 , M / P, N 4 ) = f32o[(H4 )P2' (C4 )'-P22]P2\M / p)'-P23 - f324 (N4 )P25 (7.4h) 
3 
A = 2, (qKiKi +qHiHi)+A' +M / P. (7.4i) 
i=l 
Equation (7.4a) is the budget constraint of the household. The household earns labor 
income as well as interest from asset holdings, and allocates them amongst housing 
investment (Iv and Ie), non-durable goods, savings (A), and tax duty (nMIP + TX). 
While the household is consuming housing services, it is the housing investment goods 
that enter the budget constraint. The subsidy per unit cost of public housing is equal to 
(I-8). Equations (7.4b) to (7.4e) specify the formation of residential housing. As 
expressed in equations (7.4c), (7.4e) as well as (7.1e), housing investments are partially 
absorbed by the replacement of depreciated housing. For simplicity, the possibility of 
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redevelopment on the land of existing dwellings by private developers is excluded. In 
other words, depreciated buildings are demolished, and the recovered land is returned to 
the government rather than to property owners. This is consistent with the fact that 
almost all land in Hong Kong is leasehold rather than freehold land (see Chapter 6) . 
An additive separable utility function is used to simplify the interaction between the 
consumption of commodities and leisure (equation 7.4h). The household 's financial 
possessions (A) consist of domestic asset (qkiKi and qHiH),' foreign asset (A") and real 
money balance (M/P). Following McKibbin and Sachs (1991), it is assumed the 
household is holding claims against the physical and housing capital of firms (equation 
7.4i), rather than holding claims against firms' financial liabilities, that is, securities. 
However, with a perfect capital market, the two treatments are equivalent.' As 
mentioned previously, the rental payment of capital to the household is just equal to the 
net cash flow of corresponding firm (n). 
The role of money in the model deserves a little more discussion. This is because the 
primary concern of this chapter is the influence of the exchange rate regime on property 
markets. Mechanically the difference between flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes 
is the amount of money supplied (Argy, McKibbin et al . 1989). And the effect of 
changing money supply hangs on the way money and nominal rigidity is being 
modeled. The issue of nominal rigidity is discussed in Section 7.3.5. Money is 
incorporated into the model via the money-in-the-utility-function approach popularized 
by Sidrauski (1967) and Brock (1975). The underlying rationale of this approach is that 
money provides liquidity for transaction and therefore engenders utility. There are a 
number of competing theories about how to incorporate money into economic models. 
Other widely adopted approaches include the cash-in-advance approach in Clower 
(1967) and Lucas (1980), the shopping-time approach in Saving (1971) and Kimbrough 
4 The value of a financial asset is equal to Tobin 's average q times the capital stock. Therefore, here it is 
required the equivalence of Tobin's average q and Tobin's marginal q to hold (Hayashi 1982). 
, For an example of explicit treatment of commercial securities and bonds in an intertemporal general 
equilibrium model, see Turnovsky (1996). 
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(1986), and the transaction-costs approach in Rebelo (1997)6 Nonetheless, there is 
increasing research that shows under certain conditions, such as complementarity of the 
utility function, equivalent results can be obtained from different approaches (Feenstra 
1986; Wang and Yip 1992; Croushore 1993).7 
As described above, what the agents purchase are housing investment goods rather than 
ready-to-use housing capital. The investment goods then accumulate into housing stocks 
subject to adjustment costs. As a result, the adjustment process is virtually the final part 
of the production process, but is carried out by the users rather than by the construction 
sector. The same specification is also used in the accumulation of physical capital . This 
specification requires further justification. 
In the case of physical capital, the adjustment cost is commonly explained as installation 
cost. In the case of housing, the nature of the adjustment cost is slightly more 
complicated. From the disposal of land to the completion of a building, there is a 
prolonged construction period. Secondly, there is a time gap between the completion of 
a building and actual utilization, due to the transaction costs involved in mortgage 
arrangements, moving, and decorating (Harmon and Potepan 1988). While the former 
type of delay comes from the production side, and the latter from the consumption side, 
both can be modeled by adjustment costs. To simplify the model, the two adjustment 
costs are grouped into one on the consumption side. The major benefit in doing this is to 
simplify the simulation program substantially by maintaining the symmetry between the 
settings of the three industries. 
One would probably expect the adjustment cost on the production side to be much 
larger than that on the consumption side. As a result, the price of housing investment 
goods is not a good indicator of the actual or effective property price. A simple, though 
6 An uncommon money-in-the-production-function approach is used in McKibbin (1986). Under this 
approach, liquidity lubricates production rather than consumption. Assuming the production function a 
CES nesting of primary factors and real money balance, the derived function of money balance virtually 
resembles the Keynesian money demand function. 
7 Yet none of these approaches are immunized from the criticism of Wallace (1998) that monetary 
theories should not presume the necessity or superiority of using fiat money in exchange. He asserts that 
monetary theories should "specify both the physical environment and the equilibrium concept of the 
model ina way that does not reI y on the concept called money or force the modeler at the outset to specify 
which objects will playa special role in trade" (Italic original). 
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imperfect, way to remedy this problem is to include adjustment costs in the measures of 
property prices. Formally, the effective property prices are defined as: 
PHi = PH[l+(¢H 12)(Jm 1 Hi)] 
PHC = Pcl1+(¢H 12)(JHC 1 Hc)] 
PHV =Pv[l+(¢H 12)(JHV 1 Hv)]' 
A drawback of this simplified setting is that it does not allow property developers to 
behave strategically to influence housing prices by accumulating an inventory of newly 
finished dwellings when prevailing market prices are low. This means the model can not 
capture the movement of building vacancy rates, which is one of the real estate market 
indicators. This strategic behavior could be important when there are unanticipated 
shocks, especially in stochastic models. 
The current value Hamiltonian of the household's maximization problem is given by: 
h4 ;;: U(H4 ,C4 ,M 1 P,N4 ) 
+AA[(W 1 P)N4 + rA - (Pv 1 P)Iv - 8(Pc 1 P)Ic - (p" 1 P)C4 - i(M 1 P) -IX] 
v 
+ L A1Hi {Iv - J d1 +(¢H 12)(J Hi 1 H,)} 
i=G 
v 
+ LAHi(JHi -0 HHi ) 
i=G 
+A H4 [/31(Hv )P2 +(1- /31)(Hc )P2 -(H4l2] 
3 
+AN4(N4 - LNi )· 
i=l 
Besides the original constraints, other first order conditions are given by: 
JHi = (qHi -J)(Hi 1 ¢Hi); i = G, V 
qHC =AHCPI(AA8PC) 
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(7.Sa) 
(7.Sb) 
.. 
qHV=AHVPI(AAPV) (7.5c) 
U H4 = A H4!32 (H4 )/32-1 (7.5d) 
UC4 = AAP4 I P (7.5e) 
UN4=-AAWIP (7.5f) 
Urn =i (7.5g) 
AA = (f.1- r )AA (7.5h) 
AHc =(r+DH)AHC -AH4(1-!3I) !32(Hcl2-1 
-AA8(PCIP)(¢HI2)(JHCIHd (7.5i) 
AHv = (r+DH)A HV -AH4 f31f3 2(H v)/32-1 -AA(PV I P)(¢H 12)(JHV I Hv)2 . (7.5j) 
Equations (7.5a) to (7.5c) govern the formation of residential housing in a way similar 
to commercial building. Equation (7.5d) defines the value of the marginal benefit of 
housing services. Equation (7.5e) equates the marginal benefit of consuming one more 
unit of aggregate non-durable goods to its marginal cost. Equation (7.5f) implies that the 
household will supply labor services up to the point that the marginal disutility of 
working is just compensated by the marginal value of labor incomes. Equation (7.5g) 
warrants that the holding of real money balance will rise up to the point that the 
marginal benefit is just equal to the marginal cost, i.e. the nominal interest rate. 
Equation (7.5h) states the dynamic of the shadow price of financial assets. When the 
domestic interest rate goes up, investment falls. All other things being equal, this must 
be matched by an increase in consumption. When consumption rises, the marginal 
utility of consumption, which is the shadow price of financial assets, declines. 
Equations (7.5i) and (7.5j) have similar interpretations as equation (7.2i). 
Similar to the treatment of intermediate inputs in the production side, the composition of 
the aggregate good C4 is determined by a second-tier optimization process: 
maximize C4 
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subject to: 
(C4)p4 =/33(CI)P4+(1-/33)(C2)P4 ; /34 E(O,l] 
P4 C4 = PICI + P2 C2 
where: 
(P4)I-a4 =/3Ja4 (Pr)I-a4+(1_/33)a4(P2 )I-a4; 0"4 =11(1-/34). 
Solving the maximization problem, it can be obtained: 
C1 = C4 [/3J(P4 / Pr)]"4 (7.6a) 
C2 = C4 [(1- /33)(P4 / Pz)],,4. (7.6b) 
Equations (7.6a) and (7.6b) state that for a given expenditure on non-durable goods, the 
budget share of, say, C] falls when its price rises relative to C2• 
7.3.3 Government 
The government has to balance the budget in every period. The budget constraint of the 
government is given by: 
3 L (Pu / P)Li + TX. = (1- 8)(PG / P)IG · (7.7a) 
i=1 
The left-hand side of equation (7.7a) is the sum of the revenues from selling sector-
specific factors to the industries and from the lump sum tax on the household. For 
simplicity, all the specific factors are supposed to be natural resources, so no production 
is involved. The right-hand side of equation (7.7a) is the spending on public housing. 
There is no need to explicitly incorporate money supply in the government budget 
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constraint, insofar as the lump sum tax item will convey any money wealth to the 
household! 
The remaining role of government is possibly more important. Firstly, it controls the 
rate of land supply.9 Secondly, it controls the distribution of land between residential 
and commercial purposes, as well as the distribution of residential land between private 
and public housing, in order to maintain the price differentials between various types of 
real estate. Lastly, it determines the level of subsidy on public housing. Indeed, these are 
precisely the roles of the Hong Kong government in the property markets. 
Whenever the government determines the distribution of land usage, it is separating the 
property markets and hence creating price discrepancies between the three types of real 
estate. Nonetheless, 'controlling the distribution of land usage' is only a conceptual 
notion. In the model, it is assumed that the government controls the distribution of 
housing investment goods, which are something like semi-products. An important merit 
of this shortcut specification is that it can highly simplify the model. An essential 
question about the difference between controlling the distribution of land, and that of 
housing investment goods, is who bears the risk of property price fluctuation . In the 
former it is the developers, as there is a prolonged construction period, while in the 
latter it is the final users. With prefect foresight the two are equivalent. Nonetheless, in 
stochastic models such risk could be crucial in influencing agents ' behavior. This 
specification is actually related to the adjustment cost issue discussed in Section 7.3.2. 
The three functions of the government can be modeled either by exogenous variables or 
by endogenous policy reaction functions. For simplicity, both the rate of land supply 
and the level of subsidy are set exogenously .lO In contrast, in determining the 
distribution of housing investment goods, it is assumed the government adopts a policy 
8 If there is no lump sum tax item, then the money supply should be incorporated in the government 
budget constraint. Money supply will be a stock (or state) variable. Thereupon the consumption and 
investment behaviors of the government will become crucial in channeling the effects of money policies. 
9 Since there is no land bank in the model, there is no need to distinguish between ' land disposal' and 
' land supply' here. 
10 A possible way to endogenize the rate of land supply and the level of subsidy simultaneously is to 
impose that the revenue collected from the former must be balanced by the expenditure on the latter. That 
is, the lump sum tax on the household is fixed at zero. 
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reaction function to minimize certain price indexes of the goods. By minimizing the 
price indexes, the government indeed constrains price discrepancies between the three 
real estate markets. Therefore, as a whole, the government is carrying out a restrained 
(or balanced) market segregation policy: dividing the three property markets on the one 
hand, and limiting the price discrepancies between the three markets on the other. As 
seen later in the simulations, the effect of this specification will envisage a high 
correlation between property prices. This effect seems to have support from Figure 6.3 
in Chapter 6. 
At the outset it should be pointed out that minimizing the property price index does not 
necessarily imply maximizing the utility of the household. The price minimization 
policy is preferred mainly for its transparency and tractability. Secondly, as discussed 
above, effective property prices are equal to the prices of housing investment goods 
corrected by the adjustment costs. Therefore, minimizing the property price index of 
housing investment goods is merely a convenient approximation of minimizing an index 
of effective property prices. 
There are two property price indexes to be minimized. The nesting of the property price 
indexes is illustrated in Figure 7.3 . 
Figure 7.3: Property Price Index Nesting 
property Price Index (P3) 
ICES ] 
commercial building price (PH) residential housing price index (PC) 
ICES] 
private housing price (PV ) 
public housing price (PG ) 
(m arket price) 
The upper level minimization problem is given by: 
minimize P3 
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subject to: 
(~)~1O =/39(PC)~iO+(1-/39)(PH)~10 ; /310 E[l,oo) 
P3Y3 = Pclc +PHlH 
where: 
Y3=IH+lc' (7.8a) 
Solving the problem, it can be obtained: 
[/39/(1- /39)](PC / PH)~lO-l =lc /lw (7.8b) 
Note that equation (7.8a) implies that industrial (IH) and residential (Ie) housing 
investment goods are prefect substitutes, as they are produced by the same production 
function. Therefore, the price differentiation between these two commodities is purely a 
result of market separation. The same point holds for private and public housing 
investment goods. Equation (7.8b) indicates that to minimize the general property price 
index P3, the share of residential housing investment goods will be increased when its 
price rises versus that of commercial building. 
The share between private (Iv) and public (Ie) housing investment goods is determined 
by a second-tier price minimization process similar to the previous one: 
minimize Pc 
subject to: 
(Pc)~12 = /311(PV)~12 +(1- /3 11)(PGl I2 ; /312;:0: 1 
PcIc = PvIv + PGlG 
where: 
Ic=lv+IG' 
It should be noted that, the market price of public housing (Pc) rather than the 
subsidized price (ePe) is used in the index. Solving the problem, it can be obtained: 
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[.Bll / (1- .Bll)](PV / PC)'JI2-l = Iv /Ic· 
7.3.4 External Balance 
The external accounts are specified as follows: 
3 
TB = (P, / P)EX - (PK / P)2.JK; (7.9a) 
i::::l 
CA = TB+rA" (7.9b) 
fi." =CA (7.9c) 
/1 = r" (7.9d) 
z= ZP; / P (7.ge) 
r=r" +~+z/z (7.9f) 
~ = .B16 - .B17rA" / Y (7.9g) 
P'=ZP," (7.9h) 
PK =ZP;. (7.9i) 
Equations (7.9a) and (7 .9b) are merely the definitions of trade balance (TB) and current 
account balance (CA), respectively. Equation (7.9c) states that a current account surplus 
must be matched by a capital account deficit of the same size. A capital account deficit 
means the domestic household accumulates a larger financial claim against the rest of 
the world. Equation (7.9d) restates that the domestic subjective discount rate (f1) is set 
equal to the world interest rate (r"). Equation (7.9f) defines the uncovered interest parity 
condition: the domestic interest rate is equal to the world interest rate plus a risk 
premium (~). The existence of risk premium is a matter of empirical fact. It can be 
raised by many different factors, such as perceived uncertainty of defaulting and 
impediments to capital flows. Notwithstanding, in this model, which embraces no 
uncertainty, the risk premium is more a device to ensure model closure. It also provides 
a simple platform to examine financial crisis without complicating the model with 
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stochastic processes. 
Equation (7.9g) specifies the risk premium as a function of the interest payment of 
foreign debt to GDP ratio. It implies that accumulation of foreign debt (asset) will come 
at the extra cost (benefit) of a higher (lower) interest rate. /316 is an exogenous 
component of the risk premium. As the domestic subjective discount rate is set equal to 
the world interest rate, equations (7.9f) and (7.9g) together constrain the home economy 
not to accumulate any foreign debts or assets in the long run. This actually poses a 
stronger binding condition on the system than the usual no-Ponzi game condition: 
r A'e-"'dt = O. 
A reason for using equation (7.9g) rather than the usual no-Ponzi game condition is that 
it is hard to transform the latter into a programmable equation under the setting of this 
model. 
Equations (7.9f) to (7.9g) are crucial in the sense that they tie down the model in the 
long run, but allow the domestic interest rate to deviate from the world interest rate and 
the discount rate in the short run. Otherwise, the model will encounter "disturbing 
implications from the open-economy Ramsey model", in that all the dynamics are ruled 
out by forcing the domestic interest rate to be equal to the world interest rate and the 
discount rate at every period (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995: 108). 
An alternative specification of the risk premium is: 
~ = /316 - /317 A' I Y. (7.9j) 
The difference between equations (7.9g) and (7.9j) is that the former targets the serving 
of the debt, while the latter targets the principle of the debt. Which one should be used 
is a matter of empirical issue. An analogy can be found in the choice of fiscal policy 
rule in macroeconomic models in whether the tax rate should target the government 
debt or the fiscal deficit to guarantee public solvency in the long run. Mitchell, Sault et 
al. (1998) find that qualitatively the two policy rules make no difference, whereas 
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quantitatively the deficit rule gives rise to more monotonic behaviors for models than 
the other one. In this case, equation (7.9g) will give the domestic economy greater room 
to move around.11 This is because, when the stock of foreign assets rises, the risk 
premium and hence the domestic interest rate will fall. But the fall in the domestic 
interest rate itself will retard the fall in the risk premium. As a consequence, the 
economy can sustain a larger change of foreign assets. 
Another possible twist of equation (7.9f) is to add an error correction term to smooth the 
variation of the risk premium: 
~ = /3;6 - jJ';7 rA ' I Y - /3;8!J.(rA· I Y) 
Again, the choice between the two specifications is an empirical rather than a 
conceptual issue. Equation (7.9f) is adopted due to its simplicity. Last, but not least, 
besides incorporating a risk premium, a completely different way to avoid the above 
small open economy problem is to endogenize the discount rate by, for instance, setting 
it as a function of consumption, as is done in Uzawa (1968). However, doing so will 
complicate the model in a very distracting way. 
Equations (7.9h) and (7.9i) define the terms of trade, through specifying the values of 
imported capital investment goods and exportable manufacturing goods, respectively. 
The price of capital investment goods is set to be one as the numeraire. 
7.3.5 The Rest of the Model 
The rest of the model consists of market clearing conditions and some identities. In the 
above two sub-sections, the labor and money markets are already assumed to clear, as 
there is no explicit distinction between supplies of and demand for the two 
commodities. The market for the construction sector is also assumed to clear by 
equation (7.8a). The remains are the manufacmring and servicing markets: 
11 This has been verified in experimental simulations, which are not reported here. 
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3 
YI = LXIi +CI +EX (7. lOa) 
i=1 
3 
Y2 = LX2i +C2 · (7. lOb) 
i=1 
Equations (7.lOa) and (7 . lOb ) state that the output of these two sectors is disposed 
among intennediate inputs (X), domestic consumption (C), and, in the case of the 
manufacturing industry, export (EX). Two more identities are required: 
n=FIP (7 .lOc) 
m=MIP. (7.10d) 
The open economy model is basically completed up to equation (7.10d). However, so 
far the modeled economy works in a nominally frictionless environment. Inasmuch as 
all prices are flexible, money ceases to have any real impact." Hence, the usefulness of 
the exchange rate regime is confined to either bringing in or insulating from foreign 
inflation. Obviously, such a conclusion is not very interesting. To introduce nominal 
rigidity, the wage setting equation is modified to allow partial backward looking 
behavior. Recall that if the nominal wage is completely flexible, given the values of all 
other variables, equations (7.2e) and (7.Sf) together determine the equilibrium wage (W) 
and labor supply (N4): 
W= P,Q~i (7.2e) 
UN4 =-?c AWIP. (7.Sf) 
Now the nominal wage is assumed to be determined by an error correction mechanism 
as follows : 
"IV I W = /318(W - W) I W; /31 8 E [0,1] (7.11a) 
W=-UN4PI ?cA' (7.11b) 
" This has been verified in experimental simulations, which are not reported here. 
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/318 detennines the flexibility of nominal wage; if it is equal to one, nominal rigidity 
ceases to exist. Equation (7.5f) is rewritten as equation (7.11 b) to define the steady state 
nominal wage ("IV). SO, in the short run, employment is mainly driven by the demand 
side, although the supply side also has an influence, via the equilibrium nominal wage. 
In this case, the labor market does not clear continuously anymore. Now the supply of 
labor is detennined by equation (7.5f) and the demand by equation (7.2e); the 
unemployment rate is given by: 
u=(N; -N~)/ N;. 
Although the case of perfect nominal flexibility is not the concern of this study, it can 
serve as a benchmark, so the effects of the exchange rate regime can be brought out 
from the complexities of the model. 
As asserted by Blinder (1997), a model with sticky prices and wages appears to be far 
more relevant for studying short run fluctuations. Further imposing price rigidity in this 
model will only magnify the quantitative, but not the qualitative, differences between 
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. 
7.4 SIMULATIONS 
7.4.1 Baseline and Simulations 
As the modeling exercise is for theoretical rather than forecasting purposes, the 
parameters and exogenous variables of the model are imposed rather than estimated. 
However, the values of the world interest rate, the capital adjustment cost, and the 
capital depreciation rate are based on McKibbin and Sachs (1991). The world interest 
rate is set at 5 percent, indicating that one period corresponds roughly to one year. The 
share of government subsidy in public housing is assumed to be moderate at 30 percent. 
The lump sum tax on the household turns out to be a subsidy, because the revenue 
collected from selling specific factors is more than enough to finance expenditure on 
public housing. This reiterates the point that land sales can provide government with an 
indirect but effective means of taxation. The national account and other details of the 
modeled economy at the initial equilibrium are summarized in Tables 7.A2 to 7.A6 in 
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Appendix 7, and the values of the parameters and exogenous variables are listed in 
Table 7.A7. 
The model consists of slightly over 100 equations; behavioral equations and identities 
are roughly of equal proportions. It is solved numerically using the computer program 
Fair-Taylor, which is based on the algorithm suggested by Fair and Taylor (1983). For a 
review of the numerical techniques used to solve this type of nonlinear rational 
expectation models, see McKibbin (1987) and McKibbin (1995), who has also 
developed the Fair-Taylor software. 
A total of eight simulations are conducted, corresponding to three types of shocks and 
four regimes. The combinations are summarized in Table 7.2. Some auxiliary 
simulations are also briefly discussed when required for comparison. The first regime is 
the benchmark, in which all the nominal variables are perfectly flexible. Thereby it will 
generate exactly the same real result under any exchange rate arrangement. To simplify 
the movement of prices, a flexible exchange rate arrangement is chosen for the 
benchmark regime. The second regime is characterized by nominal wage rigidity and a 
flexible exchange rate, denoted as the flexible regime. The third regime is restrained by 
the same degree of nominal wage rigidity as in the last one, but with a fixed exchange 
rate. This is denoted as the fixed regime. The last regime is the same as the fixed regime, 
but the output price of the construction sector is fixed, and land supply is endogenized 
instead. This is denoted as the fixed price regime. 
Table 7.2: Summary of Simulations 
Regime Specifications Permanent Permanent 1 Temporary 
nominal land supply I financial 
shock shock shock 
Benchmark i Flexible exchange rate, flexible 
I nominal wage 
Flexible I Flexible exchange rate, sluggish I I 
regime I nominal wage 
'I 
Fixed regime I Fixed exchange rate, sluggish I I nominal wage , i 
Fixed price i Fixed exchange rate, sluggish I 
I : regime I nominal wage, fixed property prices 
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The purpose of considering multiple regimes is to provide a controlled environment 
and, thus, to isolate the effects of individual factors. In particular, the comparison 
between the results of the first and second regimes can reveal the impacts of nominal 
wage rigidity, and that between the second and third regimes can delineate the 
differences between the two exchange rate arrangements. 
The first set of experiments is a permanent increase in the domestic nominal money 
supply by 5 percent. Only the flexible regime is considered, as the money supply 
becomes endogenous under the other regimes. This simulation aims to illustrate how 
monetary policies influence property markets when there is nominal rigidity. This 
exercise sheds light on the results of other simulations, as the fundamental difference 
between flexible and fixed exchange rate regimes is the amount of money supplied. The 
second set of experiments is a permanent rise in the supply of land by 10 percent. As 
explained in Chapter 6, land supply is an increasingly important policy instrument in 
Hong Kong. Both the flexible and fixed regimes are considered to demonstrate the 
interaction between property markets and the exchange rate arrangement. 
The last set of simulations is a temporary financial crisis. The crisis is modeled as a 
jump in the exogenous component of the risk premium, {316. This can be interpreted as a 
reevaluation of investment risks in the home country, especially in terms of redeeming 
foreign debts. Moreover, a controversial issue that arose in Hong Kong during the Asian 
crisis was the nine months moratorium on land sales announced in June 1998. The 
purpose of the moratorium is to stabilize property price. This study tries to examine the 
impact of such a policy on the recovery of an economy disrupted by a risk premium 
shock." The policy is modeled by endogenizing land disposal in order to fix the output 
price of the construction sector. 
Obviously, by no means can the risk premium shock give a sufficient account for the 
recent Asian financial crisis. As discussed in detail in McKibbin and Martin (1998), the 
Asian crisis seems to have been a combination of multiple shocks. They suggest the 
primary shocks were probably a (downward) reevaluation of the future profitability of 
13 As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no presumption about the non-optimality or optimality of the 
moratorium here. This chapter just examines the macroeconomic consequence of such an action . 
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investment in many of the 'miracle' Asian economies. As those countries' capacity for 
repaying foreign debts was being revised, the risk premiums for lending to them were 
scaled up accordingly. The story did not end here, as a series of secondary shocks 
followed. 
A higher risk premium pushed up domestic real interest rates and caused a real 
devaluation. Firms exposed to large unhedged foreign borrowings easily turned into 
insolvency. Furthermore, due to intense speculative pressure on Asian currencies, a 
break of de facto exchange rate links between those currencies and the US dollar and 
thus a substantial depreciation were largely factored into market expectation. Lastly, the 
disarray in financial markets and the economic uncertainty following the onset of the 
crisis degenerated into a credit crunch, suffocating production of both structurally viable 
and nonviable establishments. All these second waves added to the investment risk in 
the home country and raised the risk premiums in Asian economies further. 
In a word, while risk premium shock itself is not the primary source of the problems 
underlying the Asian crisis, it provides a useful quantifiable (partial) reflection of those 
problems. On the other side, due to the setting of the model, it is more appropriate to 
interpret the simulation results as the most efficient adjustment processes through which 
the crisis-hit economies can recover when there is no market failure, rather than a 
conjecture of the reality." 
In the following simulation, the exogenous component of the risk premium increases by 
0.01 during the first three periods and returns to the benchmark zero level thereafter. 
The scale of the shock is far more moderate than that observed in Hong Kong and other 
disrupted Asian economies. 
In summary, the simulations carried out in the following are experimental in nature. The 
outcomes are inevitably restrained by the structure and parameters of the model. 
Nevertheless, the important aspect of the experiments is to pinpoint the unique and 
significant role of property markets in macroeconomic analysis, and to highlight the 
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possible channels through which property markets interact with the rest of the economy. 
Concrete policy recommendations can not be made without addressing some more 
fundamental issues not covered here. Nonetheless. understanding the transmission 
mechanisms, as this study attempts to do, is essential for addressing any policy issues. 
7.4.2 Money Supply Shock 
In this simulation, the domestic nominal money supply increases permanently by 5 
percent. The shock basically resembles the case that Hong Kong imports lower interest 
rates from the US via the currency board arrangement. Selective results are shown in 
Figures 7.4 to 7.11b. 
The impact of the money supply shock is a straightway short run expansion due to 
nominal wage rigidity, followed by gradual resumption of long run neutrality. In the 
short run, output prices increase faster than the sticky nominal wage, causing real wage 
to fall. A familiar result of aggregate-demand-aggregate-supply models is yielded, in 
that a monetary expansion leads to a (temporary) rise in industrial outputs and a fall in 
the unemployment rate. The movement of the nominal wage reflects the degree of 
nominal rigidity in the model (Figure 7.9). After three periods, the nominal wage has 
adjusted over 73 percent towards its new equilibrium level. But the impact on physical 
capital and housing is far longer lasting, as the stocks accumulated in the initial period 
take time to depreciate (Figure 7.6). 
The discrepancy between the GDP deflator and housing prices deserves attention 
(Figure 7.11b). Given the adjustment costs, the housing supply is inelastic in the short 
run. Consequently, in the initial period, housing prices surge faster than the deflator. 
This inflationary discrepancy basically explains the formation of the property inflation 
spiral in Hong Kong during the early 1990s. A positive demand shock arising from 
China's economic recovery, plus the US's lower interest rates, prompted the inflation of 
real estate to be higher than that of general inflation in Hong Kong. The pressure 
14 Noland, Liu et al. (1998) model the crisis with a real exchange rate shock along with a negative 
productivity shock to capture the interruption in the financial market. But such a treatment is rather ad 
hoc. 
247 
" 
2 c 
] 
E 1.6 
.5 
E 
.g 1.2 
~ 
§ 0.8 
-B 
~ E 0.4 
" ~
~ 0 
.~ 1.4 
1 1.2 
~ 
~ 
~ ~8 
" fM 
~M 
~ 
~ 0.2 
~ 
~ ° 
" 
Figure 7.4: Industrial Output and Real GDP 
(Nominal Shock) 
~ manufacturing 
~services 
--0- construction 
~ __ real GDP 
-... 
-
-
-
-
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 4649 52 55 58 61 64 
i. 
~ 
~ 
.I 
Figure 7.5: Consumption 
(Nominal Shock) 
-+- manufacturing 
~service s 
__ aggregate housing 
" .", 
i---
I--
I--
I--
1 4 7 10 13 16 1922252831 34374043 464952555861 64 
Figure 7.6: Industrial Building and Residential Housing 
Stocks (Nominal Shock) _______ ----, 
--+- manufacturing 
0°1: I ~------I --0- services ~ construction 
0,1 1. ~~--I 
~ 
~ 0.05 
~ 
C 
" ~ ·005 -'--------------------------' 
1 4 7 10 13 16 1922252831 3437 40 43464952555861 64 
248 
<2 ~ 
.~ B 
0;-0 
00 <= ~ ~ 
.0 0 v. 
o "0 Oll 
-5 e g 
~ ~] 
~ " -
" Oil <= eo <= ~ 
c .:::: 0 
~ .<= U 
.<= U u u _ ~ 
" " eo > !! ~ 
<= .• 
" t: 
" 0 
" Q. Q. :l 
" <= ] 
.Q 
1! E 4 
o 
.:: 
~ 
"5 2 
" Oil ~ 1 
" 
" ~ 0 
.~ 6 
0; 
.2 4 
" .<= 
Figure 7.7: External Balance 
(Nominal Shock) 
--- --- .. _----
2.5 
--0- rnanufactuIing export -
-
1.5 
---tr trade balance 
-
~ current account -
0.5 
0 13." 
·0.5 ~ 
· 1 
1 4 7 10131619222528313437 404346495255586164 
-
'~ 
Figure 7.8: Exchange Rates 
(Nominal Shock) 
I-*- nominal exchange rate 
-0- real exchange rate 
1"1: 1. 1:" ':1'11: '''I: ' ' '' '1': ' : ' 1'' . 1111 . ' '' 1, 1,, 11 , 111 :1 
14710131619222528313437404346495255586164 
Figure 7.9: Wages 
(Nominal Shock) 
0.16 
0.12 
0.08 
0.04 
o 
·0.04 
·0.08 
I d f-I J ~realwage E 2 o .:: ~ 0 
~ -2 
~ 
~ -4 
" 
" & -6 
l' -o-nominal wage ~ 
1 I-
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34374043 4649 5255 58 61 64 
249 
0 
" ~ ·002 
.2 ~O 04 l! . 
;; -0.06 
0 
, 
• 
Figure 7.10: Unemployment Rate 
(Nominal Shock) 
I 
I 
~ -008 f-
f -0.1 
~ -0.12 
-+- unemployment rate b 
.!2 
-0.14 
" c ] 
.B 
E 
£ 
f 
" ~
-= ~ 
~ 0 
1" 
I 4 7 10 13 16 1922 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 
Figure 7.11a: GDP Deflator and Housing Prices 
(Nominal Shock) 
-t-- manufacturing 
~services 
~constructio n 
~private housing 
-&- public housing 
-+-GDP deflator 
," 
"'" 
r-
t--
t--
f-
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 
Figure 7.11b: GDP Deflator and Housing Prices· A 
Magnified View (Nominal Shock) 
~ , ~I'" """,!!In"" I ~ ~ "Iro"err : ~rnM" ~""; E 
---<::r servIces £ ~ 4.8 ~'7=------- ~ construction 
~private housing 
-&-pub1ic housing 
~ 
-+-GDP defl ator 
F 4.7 117*--------~ 
1S. 4,6 I III ' I 7"7r-;~~~;~' ~" ~ '~' ~' ;:;-;;"':~~~~s=~~=~=~J , , '" I:: : " I: ' , ! 
7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 4043 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 
250 
stemmed from rising property prices forcing people to seek an effective means of 
hedging inflation . The real estate market itself provided a natural solution to the 
problem created within it - and a vicious circle was formed. Notwithstanding, this 
model can not be used to illustrate the formation of property asset bubbles, as the 
assumption of perfect foresight and the convergence requirement in the solution 
algorithm have precluded the possibility of doing so. 
On the front of external balances, the small country scenario of monetary expansion 
prevails. The monetary expansion causes nominal as well as real deprecation (Figure 
7.8). The latter is much smaller than the former in terms of magnitude, since the effect 
of the former is partially neutralized by domestic inflation. The trade and current 
account balances of the home economy improve in the short run (Figure 7.7), resulting 
in mounting foreign assets. Notwithstanding, in the long run, the holding of foreign 
assets has to reduce back to zero, as pinned down by the interest parity condition. 
Matching this is a change of signs in the trade and current account balances in the 
medium run. In the long run, the two accounts again resume balance. 
Last, but not least, the magnitude of the impact of such as a nominal shock basically 
provides a good measure for the difference between the flexible and fixed regimes. 
Thus, it is useful to point out that the magnitude is particularly sensitive to two 
parameters, namely the risk premium parameter, 1317, and the nominal wage adjustment 
parameter, 1318. The first parameter governs the magnitude of fluctuation of the domestic 
real interest rate, and the second one the speed of adjustment towards the long run 
neutrality equilibrium. 
7.4.3 Land Supply Shock 
In the second set of simulations, the shock is a 10 percent permanent increase in the rate 
of land supply. Recall that land is the sector-specific factor in the construction industry. 
Selective results are illustrated in Figures 7.12 to 7040. Two dimensions of the land 
policy shock are worth examining. Obviously, the first one is the difference between 
different regimes. The second is the rather unexpected result for the external balance. 
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Figure 7.21: Aggregate Residential Housing 
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Figure 7.22: Export of Manufacturing Goods 
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Figure 7.35: Price of Manufacturing Goods 
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7.4.3.1 Common Results 
Before examining any dissimilarity, it is useful to first understand the common results 
across different regimes. In general, industrial outputs, physical capital stocks and 
housing stocks increase as a result of the land policy change. The largest boom 
expectedly resides in the construction industry (Figure 7.15). This is because the shock 
is virtually a resource boom, and comparable to an increase in productivity in the 
construction industry. Although the output of the construction industry jumps 
immediately after the shock, housing stocks increase only gradually due to adjustment 
costs (Figures 7.18 to 7.21). Echoing this is a fall in all property prices (Figures 7.33 
and 7.34). This is because the price minimization processes guarantee any increment in 
housing investment goods will be shared by all property markets according to their 
weightings in the property price indexes. 
The simulation result shows that the increase in land disposal encourages investment 
and savings (see below). As a result, larger stocks of both domestic and foreign assets 
are accumulated (Figure 7.24). As the home economy becomes a net creditor to the rest 
of the world, manufacturing exports must go up by more than the rising import of 
capital investment goods. Nonetheless, manufacturing output does not pick up fast 
enough in the short run. As a result, the initial surge in manufacturing exports has to be 
matched by a fall in private consumption (Figure 7.16). Likewise, higher savings lead to 
a decline in the consumption of services (Figure 7.17). 
7.4.3.2 External Balances 
The dynamic of the external balance deserves special attention. To help shed light on 
the results , it is useful to compare the impacts of similar resource booms in the three 
industries , respectively. Figures 7.41 to 7.49 show the impact of a 10 percent permanent 
rise in the specific factor in the three industries, respectively, under the benchmark 
regime. In Figure 7.41, the curve "manufacturing" corresponds to the impact of a 
resource boom in the manufacturing sector on real GDP, and the curve "services" 
corresponds to that of a resource boom in the service sector, and so forth. 
The first consideration is the result of a specific factor shock on the manufacturing 
industry. With a larger input of specific factor, the output of the manufacturing industry 
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Figure 7.44: Consumption of Aggregate Non-durable 
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immediately leaps right after the shock and then continues to increase. The current 
consumption of tradable manufacturing goods also rises. But the increase in output 
outpaces that in consumption, leading to a surge in manufacturing exports (Figure 7.45). 
However, to cater for the larger demand for capital stocks in all industries, capital 
imports grow even faster than manufacturing exports, resulting in a deterioration of the 
trade and capital account balances (Figures 7.46 and 7.47). Echoing this is a real 
appreciation (Figure 7.49). Thus, overall, the home economy borrows from the rest of 
the world in the initial period, and repays the debt when manufacturing output goes up. 
This is a typical result for a resource boom in a tradable consumption goods sector. 
While the story for a resource boom in the service sector is similar, a key distinction is 
that services are not tradable. Therefore, the economy can not borrow as much as in the 
previous case. Consequently, expansion of the economy is much smaller. The dynamic 
of the external balance is similar; the trade and current accounts are in deficit initially. 
But the magnitude is scaled down very substantially. 
Why does the resource boom in the construction sector give an opposite result, as far as 
the external balance is concerned? Retrospectively, it is realized that, in the long run, 
the effect of greater land supply can be materialized only through higher domestic 
investment. This is simply because neither land nor housing investment goods are 
directly consumable. Secondly, both commodities are non-tradable, so the home 
economy can not export them in exchange for foreign consumer goods. Thirdly, since 
the accumulation of housing and physical capital is subject to adjustment costs, 
materialization of the boom has to be mostly delayed into the future. The simulation 
results show that the rise in domestic investment is wholly financed by higher domestic 
saving. 
An essential equation is why the home economy does not borrow from overseas to 
finance the growing investment. This is because, due to the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function , housing commodities and non-tradable goods are Edgeworth complementary, 
that is, UHC > O. The utility maximization process requires the marginal utilities from 
consuming housing and non-durable goods to be equated. Due to the adjustment costs, 
housing stocks are contemporaneously static. Therefore, the household prefers to save 
more in the short run to accelerate the process of housing investment, so that it can 
consume more of both commodities simultaneously in the later period. This is verified 
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from the fact that, in the case of resource booms in both the manufacturing and service 
sectors, the consumption of aggregate non-durable goods (i .e. manufacturing goods plus 
services) rises in the initial period (Figure 7.44). While, in the case of a resource boom 
in the construction sector, consumption actually falls. 
In summary, the non-tradability and adjustment costs of housing are the crucial aspects 
of the impact of a land supply shock on the external balance. Forasmuch as services are 
non-tradable but incur no adjustment cost, the outcome for a resource boom in the 
service industry is something in between the previous two cases, as illustrated in the 
simulation. 
Lastly, the figures suggest that the changes in the trade and current account balances are 
rather small. This is due to the fact that, to facilitate the non-linear program to converge, 
it is necessary to assign the risk premium parameter /317 a fairly large value - 1.0. In 
principle, the smaller the value of /317, the larger the change of the external balance. 
7.4.3.3 Dutch Disease 
It is worth pointing out that the output of the service industry reduces only marginally in 
the first few periods (Figure 7.14). Initially this is paralleled by a fall in output price and 
labor input in the service industry (Figure 7.36). In other words, there is a slight 
tendency for the service sector to contract. In the literature, such a contraction effect of 
resource booms is commonly called the Dutch disease. 
Expansion in one sector can cause contraction in others because of two factors. Firstly, 
the booming sector attracts labor and mobile resources from other sectors, pushing up 
production costs in the latter. This is referred to as the resource movement effect 
(Corden and Neary 1982). Secondly, changes in relative prices shift consumption 
demand towards the cheaper output of the booming sector. This is referred to as the 
spending effect (ibid.). 
In this model, the Dutch disease is rather mild. This is because industrial production is 
linked closely by intermediate inputs and commercial building. The positive land supply 
shock reduces the price of commercial building, and the cost of production in the 
service industry. Secondly, housing production also requires services as an intermediate 
input, helping to maintain the output price of the service industry. Thirdly, the land 
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supply shock increases total labor supply. This explains why the price of services falls 
only very marginally, and why the output of the service industry shrinks only during the 
very early period. In the longer-term, demand for services is actually boosted by higher 
incomes. 
The same story can be applied to the manufacturing industry. Nonetheless, the 
manufacturing industry is further sheltered from contraction by the fact that it is the sole 
export sector and its output price is fixed at the world level. 
Furthermore, the effect of contraction becomes conditional on factor intensity, once 
capital is mobile across sectors in the long run. Behind this ambiguity is the Rybczynski 
effect: at constant output prices, when labor is extracted away by the booming sector, 
the output of the remaining labor-intensive sector declines and that of the capital-
intensive sector rises. In the model, the factor intensities of all the industries are set to 
be the same, and capital is importable. Therefore, the Rybczynski effect is eliminated. 
7.4.3.4 Dissimilarities 
Now turning to another dimension of the comparison: the differences between the three 
regimes. Discrepancies mostly reside on the nominal rather than on the real side. The 
reason why the three regimes yield similar real results is that the change in nominal 
money supply under the fixed regime is very small , only in the order of 0.1 percent. In 
the last simulation, it was shown that a 5 percent monetary expansion generates short 
run real effects with a magnitude of about 0.1 to 1 percent. Together these infer that the 
real differences between the three regimes under a 10 percent land supply shock will be 
fairly insignificant. 
The close resemblance between the benchmark case and the flexible regime extends to 
nominal variables such as prices, the nominal wage and the nominal exchange rate. 
Nevertheless, the fixed regime gives rise to significant permanent deviations from the 
other cases for all prices. The differences on the nominal side are obviously a result of a 
change in the money supply in order to maintain the nominal exchange rate. The results 
for the flexible regime show that the nominal exchange rate appreciates across time. It 
implies a pressure to loosen the money base under the fixed regime (Figure 7.28). The 
rising trend of liquidity in the domestic money market is transmitted into price 
discrepancies between the fixed regime and the other two regimes (Figures 7.32 to 
268 
7.38b). The initial fall in the nominal money supply arises from the fact that the GDP 
deflator needs to contract at the beginning to engender a real depreciation comparable to 
those in the other two regimes. 
Last but not least, the flexible regime incurs the largest change in the unemployment 
rate (Figure 7.40), even though the absolute value of the change is small. This is 
because the resource boom lowers output prices, raising the real wage under the flexible 
regime. The fixed regime is largely sheltered from an upsurge in unemployment 
because the GDP deflator falls by a smaller proportion. 
7.4.4 Financial Shock 
In this set of simulations, the shock is a hike in the risk premium by 1 percentage point 
from the baseline of zero for three consecutive periods. The results for the fixed price 
regime are momentarily put aside while the results for the other three regimes are 
discussed. The results are illustrated in Figures 7.50 to 7.73. The second turning point at 
period four is due to the vanishing of the shock." As in the previous simulation, the 
outcomes for the benchmark case and the flexible regime resemble each other. In terms 
of the altitude of fluctuation, few differences are found in GDP, unemployment, and real 
wage, as the economy adjusts faster when there is no nominal rigidity. In the following, 
the common results of the three regimes are again considered first , and then differences 
are discussed. 
7.4.4.1 Revitalization 
The basic mechanism of economic recovery under such a financial shock is simple: the 
home economy exports its way out via a real depreciation (Figures 7.63 to 7.67). 
Therefore, the current account balance improves sharply (Figure 7.65). Echoing this is a 
contraction in domestic consumption (Figures 7.54 and 7.55). This essentially reflects 
the revitalization process that most crisis-hit Asian economies have undergone from 
"Therefore, if the financial shock dies out gradually, rather than suddenly, the economy will converge to 
the steady state smoothly without experiencing the second turning point. 
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Figure 7.61: Physical Capital Stock in Service Sector 
(Financial Shock) 
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Figure 7.62: Physical Capital Stock in Construction 
Sector (Financial Shock) 
g I f~'" .... I f OM [~ 1tt ""~f~ 
-+-benchmark 
~ -0.2 
-Q-f1exible 
~ I c:r --tr- fixed U 15. -0.4 .l..-...:::...------------iL_=--==--__ . 
.~ 
~ 
.0 6 
" ~ 
E 
.g 
1;'. 
a 0 
-B f -3 
~ -6 
Q. 
" 15 
" ~ 
.0 10 
-E 
" g 
" i 0 
f -5 
~ -10 
0. 
-
4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 
Figure 7.63: Export of Manufacturing Goods 
(Financial Shock) 
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Figure 7.64: Trade Balance 
(Financial Shock) 
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Figure 7.69: Unemployment Rate 
(Financial Shock) 
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1998 onwards. This also explains why the current account deficit in the US has 
deteriorated following the crisis. 
In the initial period, the output of the manufacturing industry goes up (Figure 7.51), as 
the domestic price of tradable manufacturing goods rises with the depreciation of the 
home currency. In the opposite, higher input costs of manufacturing intermediate goods 
and capital investment goods leads to a contraction of the service and construction 
industries (Figures 7.52 and 7.53). 
7.4.4.2 Physical & Housing Capitals 
An interesting outcome is that all capital, including physical capital and real estate, 
rebounds strongly after periods of contraction (Figures 7.56 to 7.62). This can be 
understood more easily if one considers the case of a permanent financial shock. In the 
case of a permanent shock, the short run adjustment is the same as that of a temporary 
shock. Nevertheless, as the domestic subjective discount rate is still the same as the 
world interest rate, the long run equilibrium requires the risk premium to remain as zero. 
That is, the rise in the exogenous component of the premium must be balanced by an 
equal decline in the endogenous part. Thus, the holding of foreign assets has to go up 
permanently, resulting in a greater stream of dividends . As the long run equilibrium 
obligates the current account to be exactly evened, the trade balance must be 
permanently in deficit. This is achieved by joint higher consumption and lower 
production of manufacturing goods. Furthermore, the long run effect on manufacturing 
output is transmitted into smaller factor inputs, lowering the levels of capitalization and 
employment in the manufacturing sector. On the other hand, a higher long run income 
raises the consumption of housing and services, leading to higher levels of capitalization 
in the construction and service industries." 
In summary, for a permanent risk premium shock, there is capital outflow in the short 
run but net inflow in the long run. That is, the long run impact of a permanent shock is 
just the opposite to that in the short run. A temporary shock works like a truncated 
permanent shock. This explains why the trajectories of most variables show such strong 
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cyclical fluctuations 17 The fluctuations of physical capital and housing stocks are more 
prolonged than other variables as capital accumulations involve adjustment costs. 
7.4.4.3 Dissimilarities 
In contrast to the case of a land supply shock, the result for the fixed regime is different 
from those of the other regimes on both the real and nominal sides. For most aspects, 
especially in the real estate markets, the fixed regime generates much larger volatility. 
Again, the differences between the fixed regime and the other two regimes are a result 
of changes in the money supply. 
The financial shock abruptly forces the nominal exchange rate to depreciate in the short 
run under the flexible regime. Thus, to maintain the peg under the fixed regime, the 
monetary authority has to contract the money supply. The contraction of the money 
supply is in the order of 10 percent in the short run. Recalling that a 5 percent nominal 
shock gives rise to short run real effects with a magnitude of 0.1 to 1 percent, the real 
impact arising from the exchange rate peg is roughly in the order of 0.2 percent (such as 
capital and housing) to 2 percent (such as consumption). Obviously, the magnitudes of 
the above results are subject to the values of various elasticities. Notwithstanding, it 
demonstrates that, with nominal rigidity, a fixed exchange regime could magnify the 
volatility of property market business cycles and prolong the adjustment process. 
The impacts of the financial shock on the outputs of the three industries are different in 
magnitude but not in direction (Figures 7.51 to 7.53). Nonetheless, the impact upon the 
manufacturing industry is opposite to that on the service and construction industries. 
Aggregating the output of the three industries together (weighted by their prices) into 
real GDP, the flexible and benchmark regimes envisage positive growth after the shock 
(Figure 7.51), while the fixed regime envisages a negative result. Nevertheless, the 
increase in GDP under the benchmark and flexible regimes is merely a result of stronger 
16 This has been verified in experimental simulations not reported here. 
17 Another way to make sense of the results is to consider the vanishing of the temporary shock after three 
periods just another shock of the opposite sign. 
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exports. As under the fixed regime, domestic consumption still has to contract (Figure 
7.54 to 7.55). 
At first glance, the result of output expansion under the benchmark and flexible regimes 
is counter-intuitive, especially when compared with the fact that economic recession 
was commonly in place following the Asian financial crisis. The 'economic boom' in 
the model is related to the way the simulation is conducted. 
Firstly, the simulation does not encompass a fall in productivity arising from market 
failure. As discussed previously, financial market disarray added significantly to the 
wounds in the afflicted Asian economies. 
Secondly, the shrinking of many Asian markets for Hong Kong exports, and the drying 
up of private consumption and domestic investment due to the dismal atmosphere, is 
crucial in explaining the abrupt downturn of the Hong Kong economy. These factors are 
not captured by the simulation. 
Thirdly, the model comprises the home country and the rest of the world only. So, there 
is no competing devaluation. By the same token, the increase in manufacturing exports 
by the home country does not incur any downward pressure on the world price of 
manufacturing goods. 
Fourthly, as the home currency depreciates, the domestic prices of intermediate inputs 
of services and housing investment goods declines relative to that of manufacturing 
goods. Thus, it helps boost manufacturing production. 
Fifthly, due to adjustment costs, capital stocks can not be removed quickly, dampening 
the impact of the shock on production, including manufacturing production. 
Lastly, the manufacturing sector is large in this model. At the initial equilibrium, 
manufacturing output accounts for 65 percent of GDP (Table 7.A3). Therefore, it is 
possible for expansion in the manufacturing sector to overwhelm the contraction in the 
service and housing sectors. 
While it is useful to understand the insufficiency of the model, it is even more crucial to 
maintain the discussion in perspective, in that the most important aspect of the 
simulation results is the relative instead of the absolute outcomes between various 
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regimes. 
7.4.4.4 Property Price Stabilization Policy 
The last issue to be examined is the impact of the financial shock under the fixed price 
regime. The purpose of this simulation is to examine the consequence of the Hong Kong 
government's attempt to stabilize property prices after the outburst of the Asian crisis 
(see Chapter 6). The actual action taken by the Hong Kong government was to freeze 
land sales for nine months . In contrast, in this simulation, the output price of the 
construction sector is exogenously fixed, and the land supply becomes endogenous .'8 To 
make the simulation more relevant to Hong Kong, the exchange rate is also fixed. 
Selective results are plotted in Figures 7.74 to 7.85. 
To maintain the output price of the construction sector under the financial shock, the 
land supply has to reduce. The consequence is a much larger fluctuation of housing 
stocks under the fixed housing price regime than under the flexible housing price 
regime (Figures 7.78 to 7.81). Real GDP also experiences a much larger volatility than 
it would otherwise (Figure 7.74), though the swing of unemployment changes very 
marginally (Figure 7.83). The increase in the volatility of real GDP comes almost 
exclusively from the construction sector. The output of the manufacturing and service 
sectors, as well as the current account are largely unaffected (Figures 7.75 , 7.76, and 
7.82). 
Recall that the fixed regime gives rise to the largest economic fluctuations under the 
financial shock, compared with the flexible and benchmark regimes. The above results 
imply that artificially stabilizing property prices, as the Hong Kong government did 
during June 1998 to March 1999, will magnify the business cycles and further prolong 
economic recovery. The results also show that the primary channel for working through 
the effects of fixing property prices is the construction sector and not the financial 
market. 
18 It should be noted that, despite the price of construction output (i.e. housing investment goods) being 
fixed , effecti ve propeny prices are not fi xed as adjustment costs are fle xible. 
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In Chapter 6, it was mentioned that property developers in Hong Kong pressed the 
government to suspend land sales to stabilize property prices. Nevertheless, the 
simulation results indicate that the construction industry is the main (or even the sole) 
sector to suffer from such a stabilization policy. This seeming incons:stency between 
the theoretical result and empirical observation reinforces the assertion in the last 
chapter that developers in Hong Kong have considerable market power. As a result, the 
theoretical result deriving from perfect competition assumptions may fail to pin down 
the monopolistic behavior of Hong Kong developers. Secondly, the existence of land 
banks and stocks of finished but unsold properties can in reality further bolster the 
benefits of a property price stabilization policy for developers. 
7.4.4.5 Remarks 
The results for the financial shock simulation can be summarized as follows. 
The hike of risk premium is essentially a terms of trade shock on capital, in that the 
domestic borrowing cost of funds becomes higher than that abroad. Counterbalancing 
the increase in the exogenous component of the risk premium, the home country needs 
to accumulate net foreign assets in order to reduce the endogenous component of the 
risk premium. Putting it in the perspective of the Asian crisis, this is like an upward 
reevaluation of the default risk in Asian economies, perhaps due to 'excessive' private 
short-term borrowing or system weakness. This higher default risk can be neutralized by 
re-strengthening the debt payment capacity of the economies, through cutting down 
foreign debt (or in equivalent terms qualitatively, accumulating foreign assets). This 
requires a rise in net exports, and, in turn, a real depreciation for the home economy. 
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, real depreciation is brought mainly by nominal 
depreciation. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the monetary authorities are obligated 
to maintain the nominal value of the home currency by reducing the money supply. 
Consequently, the economy has to bear the impact of an additional contractionary 
monetary shock. With the parity in nominal exchange rate intact, real depreciation is 
achieved by a downward adjustment of commodity and factor prices, where the 
authorities try to stabilize property prices, and land supply is withheld. This is 
equivalent to adding another negative productivity shock to the terms of trade shock and 
contractionary monetary shock. This explains why the depression effect of the financial 
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shock is exacerbated by a fixed exchange rate regime, and further aggravated by a price 
stabilization policy in property markets. 
The findings reiterate an orthodox wisdom that, under a fixed exchange rate regime, 
whether a currency board or other arrangements, price and wage flexibility is crucial for 
the restoration of equilibrium under economic distress. Inasmuch as real estate and other 
commodities are imperfectly substitutable, for both consumption and production 
purposes, maintaining the flexibility of the property market becomes crucial in 
maintaining macroeconomic stability. This further implies that, in terms of 
macroeconomic management, conducting appropriate land and property market policies 
is as important as conducting appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, especially for 
those economies which have a substantial share of property related economic activities. 
7.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents a rational expectation, intertemporal general equilibrium model to 
study the interaction between property markets and the wider economy in an open 
economy context. To resemble the Hong Kong economy, the model consists of 
disaggregate industrial structure and property markets. A number of comparative 
simulations are conducted. It is found that non-tradability, durability and adjustment 
costs give rise to the unique position of real estate in an economy. These economic 
features influence both the internal and external balances of the economy. In particular, 
a resource boom in the construction sector can lead to a completely opposite result to 
that in the tradable non-durable manufacturing sector. 
The interaction between the exchange rate arrangement and property markets can be 
best described as a superimposition of the effects from each of them. The influence of 
the exchange rate arrangement comes primarily from its linkage with the money supply. 
As long as there is nominal rigidity, no matter whether it is due to wage or price 
stickiness, changes in the money supply will be non-neutral. Due to the adjustment cost 
in the accumulation of housing capital, the real impacts of monetary changes on 
property markets have stronger inertia than those on non-durable sectors. As a result, a 
fixed exchange rate regime might cause more volatile and more prolonged business 
cycles in property markets and the economy as a whole than a flexible regime. 
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Two policy implications of the interrelation between property markets and the exchange 
rate arrangement can be highlighted. Firstly, due to the special institutional setting in 
Hong Kong, land disposal comes under the government ' s control. This opens up the 
possibility for the authorities to conduct supply side macroeconomic managemellt. This 
possibility is particularly beneficial for Hong Kong, if the monetary instrument is 
continuously committed to maintain a fixed exchange rate regime. On the other side, the 
simulation result of this chapter shows that a fixed exchange rate regime can magnify 
the business cycles in the property market and the economy as a whole. This represents 
the potential cost of using land supply and housing policies in macroeconomic 
management. Inasmuch as property related activities are a major component of the 
Hong Kong economy, any decisions about the exchange rate arrangement should come 
with a balance between the above cost and benefit. 
To conclude, it is worthwhile pointing out some possible further improvements to the 
model. For instance, the review in the last chapter indicates that the private housing 
market in Hong Kong is characterized by high market concentration and the strong 
market power of property developers. Extending the model to incorporate imperfect 
competition and strategic behaviors would be a desirable research program. A possible 
way to extend the model in this direction would be to allow developers to stock up 
finished housing units to influence market prices. This would give rise to an endogenous 
vacancy rate, which is one of the important indicators of property markets. By the same 
token, the model could also be extended to allow developers to accumulate inventories 
of land. As pointed out by Dodsworth and Mihaljek (1997), building up land banks is a 
common strategic practice of property developers in Hong Kong. In fact , empirical 
research shows that, even given two to three years construction time lag, over the period 
1965-90 the correlation between land sale and net private housing supply in Hong Kong 
was still weak (Peng and Wheaton 1994). 
Secondly, the last chapter highlighted the heterogeneity of residential housing markets 
in Hong Kong, along with the divergence between prices and rents. The non-
homogeneity of residential dwellings reflect differences in preference, product 
differentiation, and, perhaps most importantly, heterogeneous household incomes. 
These issues can not be addressed by this model in its current form. 
Moreover, in the literature a lot of endeavors has already been spent on modeling the 
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Asian crisis. However, the perfonnance of large-scale computational models has been 
far from satisfactory. The fundamental reason being that those models are not prepared 
to deal with the financial market failures which characterize the crisis. Moral hazard 
problems, short run speculative capital movements, contagion (if it does exist), and tL.! 
fonnation of risk premiums have received little attention. The property market model 
presented in this study is also ill equipped in this aspect. In particular, the crucial role of 
real estate as collateral is over-simplified under a perfectly functioning financial market. 
Therefore, the model fails to capture the linkage between a property market plunge, 
credit crunch and banking sector insolvency. Inasmuch as the oil crises in the 1970s and 
1980s have inspired modelers to improve their supply side specifications, it can be 
foreseen that the Asian crisis will trigger a similar effort to incorporate credit market 
imperfections into prevailing models. This is obviously a direction in which this model 
could evolve. 
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Appendix 7 
Table 7.Al: Definitions of Notations {in alphabetical order} 
Symbol 
Sector Subscript (i): 
2 
3 
4 
Symbol: 
A 
A" 
C4 
Ci 
CA 
EX 
H4 
Hi 
HG 
Hv 
Ie 
IG 
IH 
IHi 
h i 
Iv 
JHi 
JHG 
JHV 
h i 
K; 
Li 
M 
Definition and Note 
manufacturing industry 
service industry 
construction industry 
household 
financial assets 
net holding of foreign assets 
consumption of non-durable goods, composed of good 1 and 2 
consumption of good i, i = I, 2 
current account balance 
net export of good 1 
composite residential housing stock 
commercial building stock in sector i 
public-subsidized residential housing stock 
private-funded residential housing stock 
total investment on residential housing, composed of I v and Ie 
investment on public-subsidized residential housing 
total investment on commercial building, composed of l Hi 
investment on commercial building in sector i 
investment on physical capital in sector i 
investment on private-funded residential housing 
formation of commercial building in sector i 
formation of public-subsidized residential housing 
formation of private-funded residential housing 
formation of physical capital in sector i 
physical capital stock in sector i 
sector-specific factor input in sector i 
nominal money balance 
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m 
N4 
N/ 
N/ 
N; 
P 
P4 
Pc 
Pc 
PH 
P; 
p/ 
PK 
PK ' 
Pu 
Pv 
Px; 
Q; 
qH; 
qHC 
qHV 
qK; 
R(s) 
ret) 
r 
S; 
TB 
TX 
U 
W 
W 
X; 
Xu 
y 
Y; 
real money balance measured in GDP deflator 
total employment 
total labor demand 
total labor supply 
labor input in sector i 
GDP deflator 
price of composite good C4 
price of residential housing investment good Ie 
price of public-subsidized residential housing investment good I c 
price of commercial building investment good IH 
domestic price of good i, iI, 2, 3 
foreign price of good 1 
domestic price of imported capital 
foreign price of imported capital 
price of sector-specific factor L; 
price of private-funded residential housing investment good I v 
price of composite intermediate factor X; 
production function of sector i 
Tobin ' s q of commercial building in sector i 
Tobin ' s q of public-subsidized residential housing 
Tobin's q of private-funded residential housing 
Tobin's q of capital in sector i 
the average of the short-term interest rate ret) from time s to t 
short -term interest rate at time t 
world interest rate 
primary factor input in sector i, composed of K; and N; 
trade balance 
lump sum tax on household 
instantaneous utility function 
nominal wage rate 
steady state nominal wage rate 
intermediate input in sector i, composed of goods 1 and 2 
the amount of good i used as intermediate goods in sector j 
real GDP 
output of sector i 
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z 
Z 
f316 
f3IB 
DH 
DH; 
DK 
At 
IT; 
11: 
(1-8) 
rpH 
rpw 
rpK 
J1 
~ 
nominal exchange rate (the domestic price of foreign currency) 
real exchange rate 
tie-down parameter of risk premium 
parameter of wage flexibility 
deprecation rate of commercial building 
deprecation rate of i-type of residential housing; i G, V 
deprecation rate of physical capital 
shadow price of variable j 
real gross profit or net cash flow of sector i 
inflation rate of GDP deflator 
subsidy rate of public residential housing investment goods 
adjustment cost parameter of commercial building 
adjustment cost parameter of i-type of residential housing; i G, V 
adjustment cost parameter of physical capital 
domestic subjective discount rate 
risk premium 
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Table 7.A2: The National Account 
Nominal value % of sub·total 
Consumption of manufacturing goods 109.38 48.54 
Consumption of services 115.95 51.46 
Sub· total of consumption of non·durables 225.33 100.00 
Investment on residential housing 64.38 26.02 
Investment on industrial building 34.93 14.12 
Investment on physical capital 148.11 59.86 
Sub·total of private investment 247.42 100.00 
Government spending on public housing 16.23 
Net exports 0.00 
GDP 488.98 
Table 7.A3: Relative Sizes of Industries 
Gross output value % of sector output 
Manufacturing export 148.11 46.55 
Manufacturing intermediate 60.68 19.07 
Manufacturing consumption 109.38 34.38 
Output of manufacturing industry 318.17 100.00 
Service intermediate 61.57 34.68 
Service consumption 115.95 65.32 
Output of service industry 177.52 100.00 
Output of construction industry 115.54 
Intermediate input 122.24 
GDP 488.98 
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% ofGDP 
22.37 
23.71 
46.08 
13.17 
7.14 
30.29 
50.60 
3.32 
0.00 
100.00 
% ofGDP 
30.29 
12.41 
22.37 
65.07 
12.59 
23.71 
36.30 
23.63 
25.00 
100.00 
.f 
~ 
Table 7.A4: Relative Sizes of Property Markets 
Gross output % of sub-total % of total 
Private housing 
Public housing (measured at un subsidized price) 
Sub-total of residential housing 
Manufacturing 
Services 
Construction 
Sub-total of industrial building 
Total 
Table 7.A5: Prices 
Foreign capital investment goods (in foreign currency) 
Output prices 
Manufacturing goods 
Services 
Construction (in aggregate terms) 
Property prices (including adjustment costs) 
Private housing 
Public housing (subsidized rate) 
Industrial building 
Others 
GDP deflator 
Nominal wage 
Nominal interest rate 
value 
265.09 
541.01 
806.10 
181.81 
101.44 
66.02 
349.27 
1221.39 
Nominal exchange rate (domestic value of foreign currency) 
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32.89 21.70 
67.11 44.29 
100.00 66.00 
52.05 14.89 
29.04 8.31 
18.90 5.41 
100.00 28.60 
100.00 
Nominal value (in domestic currency 
unless specified otherwise) 
0.40 
0.38 
0.37 
0.58 
0.58 
0.73 
1.30 
14.47 
0.05 
1.23 
Table 7.A6: Household's Balance Sheet 
Item 
Real interest payment 
Lump sum tax' 
Real wage payment 
Pre-tax income 
After-tax income 
(a) Negative lump sum tax means subsidy. 
Nominal value 
200.63 
·34.62 
82.93 
283.56 
318.18 
Table 7.A7: Values of Parameters and Exogenous Variables 
r = 0.05 Ii = 0.05 f321 = 1.0 f31 = 0.7 
M = 1000 e =0.7 f3" = 0.33 f3, = 1.0 
PK' = 1.0 OK = 0.1 f323 = 0.9 f33 = 0.5 
PI" = 0.33 OH = 0.1 f3'4 = 1.0 f34 = 0.5 
Li = 20.0; ¢K = 20.0 f325 = 2.0 f35 = 0.5 
(i =1-3) ¢H = 20.0 f331 = 12.5 f36 = 0.2 
f332 = 0.6 f37 = 0.7 
f333 = 0.2 f38 = 2.0 
f334 = 0.1 f39 = 0.5 
f335 = 0.1 
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% of pre·tax income 
70.75 
-12.21 
29.25 
100.00 
112.21 
f310 = 2.0 
f311 = 0.5 
f312 = 2.0 
f313 = 0.25 
f3/4 = 0.25 
f315 = 0.50 
f316 = 0.0 
f317 = 1.0 
f318 = 0.20 
Chapter 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
Synopsis 8 
This chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis . It is found that, in terms of symmetry 
of disturbances, neither Hong Kong and China, nor Hong Kong and the US are as 
correlated as some member states of the European Monetary Union. Furthermore, the 
entrepot trade of Hong Kong has reduced the opportunity cost of choosing between the 
US dollar and renminbi as the nominal anchor for the Hong Kong dollar. The special 
institutional. setting in Hong Kong provides the administration with opportunities, as 
well as challenges, to use land disposal policies for macroeconomic management. In 
particular, due to adjustment costs, business cycles in property markets tend to have 
strong inertia; and a fixed exchange rate regime can further magnify these cycles. The 
greatest advantage of the current linked exchange rate system in Hong Kong is the 
credibility and stability the US dollar offers. Insofar as the renminbi is not yet 
convertible in its capital account and largely untested for its credibility and acceptability, 
it can hardly be a better monetary standard for Hong Kong in the near future . This thesis 
concludes that as long as Hong Kong can maintain its structural flexibility, the issue of 
the choice of nominal anchor will be secondary to its future development. 
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8.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This section summarizes the findings of Chapters 2 to 7 in sequence. 
The chapters are framed around three issues in relation to the exchange rate arrangement 
of Hong Kong as laid down in Chapter 1: 
o Is it economically sustainable to form a Chinese Monetary Union (CMU) between 
China and Hong Kong? 
o Does the indirect trade between the US, China and Hong Kong affect the choice 
between the US dollar and renminbi as the nominal anchor for the Hong Kong 
dollar? 
o How does the exchange rate arrangement influence the business cycles of the Hong 
Kong property market? 
8.1.1 Economic & Political Background 
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the Hong Kong economy. Tracing the 
evolution path of Hong Kong, it shows that the China factor has predominantly 
influenced the development of the city, both economically and politically. Except during 
the period of China's implementation of a closed-door policy, Hong Kong has clearly 
defined its economic role as the intermediary between the mainland and the rest of the 
world. The increasing integration of the two economies is mostly a result of the private 
sector exploiting the comparative advantages of the two instead of policy coordination. 
The second factor that has shaped the development of Hong Kong is the policy 
framework of positive non-interventionism. The attitude of the government to let the 
market run its course, plus the intrinsic flexibility of the economy, has lubricated the 
adjustment of the economy against a changing environment. 
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8.1.2 Chinese Monetary Union: Part I 
Chapter 3 studies the sustainability of forming a CMU between China and Hong Kong. 
Using the structural vector autoregression (V AR) technique, it has been found that, in 
terms of synchronization of both supply and demand shocks, China and Hong Kong are 
not as coherent as some member states of the European Monetary Union (EMU). The 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that China and Hong Kong are of highly diverse 
economic structures, so that their business cycles are likely to be driven by shocks of 
different sources. 
On the other hand, it has been shown that when a transmission lag is allowed the 
correlation of supply shocks between the two economies becomes comparable to their 
European counterparts. This finding is in line with another postulation that, since the 
two economies are deeply complementarily integrated, disturbances from the big 
economy (China) can be easily transmitted to the small one (Hong Kong). The empirical 
result has suggested the passing-through period to be about six months. 
Using provincial data, it has also been verified that Hong Kong is not equally correlated 
to all Chinese provinces. Expectedly, it has a much stronger correlation with coastal 
provinces, especially Guangdong, than with inland provinces . 
Drawing on the results of both this chapter and Chan (1996), it has been concluded that 
there is still a lack of concrete evidence that a CMU is a practicable idea at this stage. 
8.1.3 Chinese Monetary Union: Part II 
Chapter 4 reapplies the OCA theories upon the Chinese provinces . Measuring against a 
number of OCA criteria, including fiscal integration, production diversification, 
openness, integration of goods and factors markets, it has been found that Chinese 
provinces are fairly diverse, compared with the European Community and the US. 
Most importantly, it has been observed that a single market for either goods or factors 
has yet to be established in China. Excessive administrative decentralization has 
transferred the power of economic decision making from the central government partly 
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to enterprises and partly to local government. Regional competition has led to economic 
segregation between the provinces. Both goods and factors are not freely mobile across 
the provinces, dissipating the opportunities of exploring the benefits of division of labor 
between them. 
The structural V AR and other time series modeling techniques have been deployed to 
estimate the symmetry of disturbances between the provinces. Only a group of six 
provinces around the eastern coast have been identified as being consistently highly 
correlated under different estimation specifications. 
The result has highlighted the heterogeneity of the Chinese provinces, not only at the 
micro but also at the macro level. This signifies that "one-size-fits-all" monetary 
instruments, such as the interest rate, will be insufficient to manage the business cycles 
of the diverse provinces. 
8.1.4 Choices of Nominal Anchors & Entrepot Trade 
Chapter 5 shifts the focus to the interrelation between trade structure and the choice of 
nominal anchor. What underpins the significance of this issue is the fact that the 
entrepot trade of Hong Kong is very large, not only compared to other economies, but 
also compared to the direct trade itself. As detailed in Chapter 5, the US, China and 
Hong Kong have constituted the largest indirect trading bloc in the globe. 
Conventional arguments about the relationship between trade and the exchange rate 
arrangement become inconclusive once more than two currencies are involved, as in the 
case of entrepot trade. Thereby, this chapter develops a three-country indirect trade 
model to disentangle the interdependence between trade structure and the choice of 
nominal anchor. 
It has been ascertained that entrepot trade can substantially alter the impact of foreign 
disturbances on a small economy. The actual effect depends on the nature and source of 
disturbances, as well as the trade structure. But, more importantly, it has been 
established that as long as certain conditions are fulfilled, entrepot trade can reduce the 
opportunity costs of choosing one foreign currency instead of another as the nominal 
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anchor. These conditions include: (i) the economy has a relatively large indirect trade 
sector; (ii) its value-added in re-exports is small; and (iii) its trade partners have 
relatively large direct export sectors. 
In general, the trade structure of Hong Kong satisfies these three requirements. As far as 
trade is concerned, the result undermines the net gain, if any, of switching the monetary 
standard of Hong Kong from the US dollar to the renrninbi. 
8.1.5 Property Markets and Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part I 
Chapter 6 opens up the new topic of the relationship between property markets and the 
exchange rate arrangement. It reviews the changes of policy setting in Hong Kong' s 
property markets over the periods of the hand-over and the Asian financial crisis. A 
crucial change of the 1997 transition was the abolition of the annual quota on land 
disposal and its associated constraint on rnid- to long-term planning of land supply. 
An important policy development in Hong Kong's property markets after the change of 
sovereignty was the government ' s ambitious attempt to increase the housing supply and 
private housing ownership. Nonetheless, housing demand was dismantled by the Asian 
financial crisis. By the end of 1998, property prices had fallen by over half from their 
peak levels. These changes in supply and demand have been analyzed in both this and 
following chapter. 
In this chapter, a rational expectation, intertemporal partial equilibrium model has been 
developed in order to understand the effectiveness of various intervention policies in 
property markets. It has been demonstrated that qualitative demand side policies, such as 
changing the mortgage loan rate, have more precise effects than quantitative ones, like 
changing the loan to value ratio. Secondly, it has been found that unanticipated changes 
in demand side policies can lead to overshooting in property prices, attributing to an 
inelastic supply of housing in the short run. On the other side, anticipated changes in 
supply side policies like land disposal can cause overshooting in housing output. 
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8.1.6 Property Markets and Exchange Rate Arrangement: Part II 
Chapter 7 was developed on the basis of Chapter 6. The partial equilibrium model 
developed in the latter has been extended into an intertemporal multi-sector general 
equilibrium model. The model captures some institutional features of Hong Kong's 
property markets, such as the coexistence of private and public housing markets. But the 
general outcomes of the modeling exercise also have applicability to other small open 
economies. 
A number of simulations have been conducted to examine the interrelationship between 
the exchange rate arrangement and property markets. An important result is that a land 
supply boom in the durable non-tradable construction sector gives rise to dynamic 
adjustment of the current account, which is the opposite to that of a resource boom in 
the non-durable tradable manufacturing sector. The result has drawn attention to the 
dynamics arising from the durability and tradability of commodities, as well as 
adjustment costs in open economy analyses. 
The influence of the exchange rate arrangement on property markets comes primarily 
from its effect on the money supply. This implies that the influence hangs crucially on 
the non-neutrality of money. Due to the adjustment cost in housing capital 
accumulation, the real impact of monetary changes on property markets is more 
protracted than that on non-durable goods markets. This sluggishness in housing output 
means that, inasmuch as prices and/or wages are not perfectly flexible, the same shock 
could lead to stronger business cycles in property markets and the economy as a whole 
under a fixed exchange rate regime than under a flexible one. 
On the policy front, this chapter analyzes the impact of a financial shock on an 
economy, and the consequence of stabilizing property prices during the occurrence of 
such a disturbance - as the Hong Kong government did during the Asian crisis. It has 
been demonstrated that a temporary financial shock - modeled as a rise in risk premium 
- can lead to cyclical fluctuations in property markets. Again, the generated business 
cycle is stronger in terms of magnitude under a fixed change rate regime than under a 
flexible regime. Artificially stabilizing the property price by upholding land disposal 
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will further augment the vicissitudes and prolong recovery of the economy from the 
crisis. 
8.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The findings of Chapters 3 to 7 have delivered firm answers to the three questions raised 
at the beginning of this thesis. This section attempts to integrate these findings and draw 
some policy implications from them. 
The economic basis for monetary unification between Hong Kong and China is that the 
two economies have integrated into an increasingly inseparable economic entity. 
Therefore, unifying the two currencies could be a means both to accelerate and explore 
the benefits of this economic synergy. Nonetheless, the close examination of the 
development of the Hong Kong economy clearly indicates its integration with the 
Chinese economy is based mostly on comparative advantage rather than on 
macroeconomic policy coordination. 
An important implication of this observation is that the potential benefits arising from 
unifying the two currencies could be marginal, given that the structural forces which 
have pushed for economic fusion between the two are already so strong. The experience 
of the EMU has shown that the substantial dividends yielded from economic integration 
amongst its member states arose from market integration independent of single currency 
matters, such as the 1992 single market program. If the Chinese and Hong Kong 
authorities have the political will to strengthen the economic linkages between the two 
territories, efforts should first be gravitated towards removing hurdles that impede 
microeconomic integration. Some initiatives in this direction have been raised recently, 
such as to release the restrictions on the migration of mainland scientists and engineers 
to Hong Kong in order to boost the domestic hi-tech industries. 
The cost of unifying the Hong Kong dollar into the renminbi highly depends on 
synchronization of the business cycles between the two economies. On this front, there 
is no evidence to suggest that the CMU can do better than the EMU. Ironically, the 
symmetry of shocks between the US and Hong Kong has been found to be anything but 
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strong. If the lag relationship between the disturbances experienced by China and Hong 
Kong is still not sufficient to affirm the sustainability of the CMU, the current linked 
system between the Hong Kong and US dollars has to be justified by other even stronger 
rationales than the correlation of business cycles. 
Therefore, a number of the theoretical considerations that have so far arisen from the 
monetary integration literature seem to be insufficient, or even irrelevant, in order to pin 
down the absolute advantage for Hong Kong to either stay in the US dollar zone or to 
switch to the renminbi zone. The findings of Chapter 5 reinforce this 'irrelevance' 
argument. It has been demonstrated that the dominance of entrepot over direct trade with 
the US and China can substantially reduce the opportunity cost for Hong Kong to 
choose between the US dollar and the renminbi as its monetary standard. As the 
intermediary function of Hong Kong has intensified due to the development of 'new' 
entrepot trade, such as transshipment and offshore trade, the shielding effect derived 
from its unique trade structure is likely to strengthen further. 
Inasmuch as the ex post findings of many issues examined have turned out to be 
inconclusive, in terms of picking the optimal nominal anchor for the Hong Kong dollar, 
it suggests that the true determining factor has not yet been identified. It is argued here 
that this missing factor is the status of the nominal anchor. While China is well ahead of 
the US in terms of economic, political and cultural affiliation with Hong Kong, its 
currency can hardly measure up to the greenback when it comes to international 
acceptance, circulation and credibility (in fact , few other national currencies do).' Most 
importantly, China' s capital account is not yet fully convertible, its monetary system is 
still undergoing transition from a command control system to a market oriented one, and 
its capacity to conduct credible stable money policies is yet to be truly tested. Thus, it 
would be a financial regression for Hong Kong to join the renminbi zone before China' s 
, Tavlas (1997) argues that, as the US satisfies OCA criteria to a larger extent than other major industrial 
countries , including Germany, France, Japan and United Kingdom, the US dollar is theoretically better 
posited as an international currency. Empirically, he also shows that while Deutsche mark and Japanese 
yen have been increasingly used in international markets after the deregulation of the Germany and 
Japanese financial markets, the share of the US dollar continues to account for 40 to 80 per cent of various 
types of international transactions. 
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economic infrastructure has achieved a similar degree of sophistication even to that of 
Hong Kong itself, let alone the US. 
Whereas the current linked exchange rate system with the US dollar has provided vital 
nominal stability for the development of the Hong Kong economy, it has not been 
accomplished without cost. As indicated previously, the business cycles of Hong Kong 
and the US are far from synchronized. Since the monetary policy of Hong Kong is tied 
by the US Federal Reserve Bank, the pressure of macroeconomic adjustment weighs on 
other policy instruments and the flexibility of the economy. 
Monopolistic control over land resources in Hong Kong offers the authorities 
opportunities, as well as challenges, to engage in supply side macroeconomic 
management. Control over land disposal enlarges the administration's room for 
maneuver. The benefit of this flexibility is significant, as the monetary instrument has 
already been pre-committed to maintain the exchange rate parity. On the other hand, due 
to adjustment costs, the business cycles in the property market tend to have strong 
inertia. More importantly, a fixed exchange rate regime can magnify the business cycles 
in the property market and the economy as a whole. This represents the cost of using 
land supply policies in macroeconomic management, especially under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. Given that the property market makes up a significant proportion of the 
Hong Kong economy, operating land policies that will strike a balance between cost and 
benefit becomes extremely challenging. If the administration needs to take into account 
microeconomic factors , such as maintaining the affordability of residential housing, that 
task becomes even more demanding. 
8.3 FINAL REMARKS 
Two final remarks can be made. 
Firstly, while a unified currency can forcefully symbolize the political will of economic 
cooperation, it does not guarantee its delivery. The analysis of market segregation in 
China in Chapter 4 has already dismissed the fallacy that a single currency implies a 
single market. In the aspect of goods and factor market integration, there is still plenty of 
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room for improvement before the CMU can even come close to the EMU. The merit of 
the linked exchange rate system in Hong Kong leans more heavily on the nominal 
stability and credibility that the US dollar offers than on anything else. In this aspect, 
regardless of the optimality of the current system, China can hardly offer a better or even 
comparable alternative for Hong Kong in the near future. 
Secondly, going back to the fundamentals, price and wage flexibility remains the 
foremost criterion for designing any exchange rate arrangements. This proposition is 
once again verified in Hong Kong's property markets. For years, Hong Kong has been 
regarded as a structurally flexible, fiscally robust, and time-tested resilient economy. 
The important aspect of this is that, compared with many other economies, Hong Kong 
is in a much better position to benefit from a fixed exchange rate regime. To a certain 
extent, as long as all these economic characteristics are maintained, the choice of the 
monetary standard will be a less than primary issue for the future development of Hong 
Kong. 
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